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Brexatom – anxiety and ramifications

This paper examines the implications of Brexit on the nuclear industry, in particular the meaning and manifold consequences of Brexatom (a term which designates Britain’s withdrawal from the Euratom Treaty), since a less known fact is that triggering Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty also means a withdrawal from the Euratom Treaty. The paper explains the views and positions of the key stakeholders (British nuclear industry, MPs, scientists, think tank experts, FORATOM) and outlines the importance of transitional arrangements until a successor framework is put in place, especially if the United Kingdom will not be seeking an associate membership in the Euratom Treaty, as it currently seems to be the case.

Brexit means Brexit

A year ago, the British voted to leave the European Union (EU) in a referendum that opens a new page in the history of European construction. Thus, in February 2016, the Prime Minister (PM) of the United Kingdom (UK), David Cameron, announced the date for referendum, after the conclusion of an agreement with the Member States (MSs) of the European Union was contested as inadequate by the pro-Brexit camp. The June 23, 2016 referendum led to an unexpected “Brexit victory” and the immediate resignation of PM Cameron the next day.^[1] Subsequently, Theresa May won the Torries’ internal elections (on July 11, 2016), and was appointed PM two days later. Theresa May’s words after her appointment as the leader of the Conservative Party remain historic: „Brexit means Brexit!”^[2]

Figure 1. Letter from the British PM to the EU Council President triggering Article 50^[3]

On March 29, 2017, Theresa May triggered Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (Lisbon Treaty)^[4], notifying the European Council about “the United Kingdom’s intention to withdraw from the European Union“, meaning that the UK is to officially leave the EU by April 2019, as set in paragraph (3) of Article 50. The two-year period might be extended, with unanimous agreement of the European Council. The same letter notified about „the United Kingdom’s intention to withdraw from the European Atomic Energy Community” (i.e.: the Euratom Treaty).

The event marks the first time that a Member State (MS) triggers Article 50, a provision which, in the opinion of Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, Britain’s former permanent representative to the EU in the 1990s and the person who actually wrote Article 50, ”it would only ever be triggered by a dictatorial regime”.^[5]

In her January 17, 2017 speech^[6], the British Prime Minister outlined the 12 goals of Brexit negotiation, with a focus on the British Union (England, Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland), immigration control, rights of European citizens in the UK and of British citizens’ in the EU, the conclusion of new trade treaties with other countries, including EU members, the imperative to deliver a „smooth and orderly” Brexit, etc.

The outcome of the early elections on June 8, 2017, called in order to strengthen the government’s position vis-a-vis Brexit, raised instead more doubts about the future, leaving the conservative party weaker and disproving the expectations of the conservative leader.^[7]

Legal aspects of Brexit for nuclear activities in the United Kingdom

The Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM Treaty) was signed in Rome on March 25, 1957, at the same time with the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (TEEC), which later became the Treaty on European Union, creating the European common market, i.e. the European Union of today.

The EURATOM Treaty, with clear provisions on pooling knowledge, infrastructure and funding, has led to an unprecedented development of nuclear energy in the European Union, which today concentrates „128 nuclear power reactors (119 GWe) operating in 14 of the 28 EU member states” accounting for over one-quarter of the electricity generated in the whole of the EU^[8] and about one-third of the nuclear power plants (NPPs) operating worldwide. Through the development of NPPs, nuclear equipment and fuel manufacturing, radioactive waste management programs and projects and the development of new nuclear technologies, the European nuclear research and industry has a leading global position. The British industry represents a significant and visible part of this effort.

The last consolidated version of the EURATOM Treaty^[9] integrates the changes brought about by the Treaty of Lisbon, linking Article 106 of this treaty with Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union. Thus, a decision by a Member State to withdraw from the EU is also reversing its membership in EURATOM.

A less known implication is the UK’s withdrawal from the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which is firmly linked to the Lisbon and EURATOM Treaties. Apparently ”Theresa May got this obsession” against the ECJ, as Prof. Sir David Edward, a former judge at the ECJ said ”because she doesn’t know the difference between the court of human rights [a non-EU body] and the court of justice [of the European Union]”.^[10] However, some anti-Brexit politicians have initiated actions, difficult, but not impossible to be successful, in the post June 2017 elections context, to maintain the United Kingdom in the European Court of Justice.^[11]

British positions on Brexatom: industry, parliament, Chatham House

The view of the British industry

Today, in the UK, there are “15 nuclear reactors generating about 21% of its electricity but almost half of this capacity is to be retired by 2025”^[12], and the rest by 2030. It is imperative to build new nuclear power generation capacities to replace what is to be retired, and thus maintaining a balanced energy mix as a defining feature of the British energy security of supply. In fact, energy security, together with energy market failure (”the UK observes that these market failures are not purely theoretical, as would be proven by the fact that no investment in new nuclear power stations has taken place in the UK since market liberalisation” ^[13]) were the major arguments for the European Commission’s approval in 2014 of the financing support mechanism adopted for the new nuclear project at Hinkley Point C, Somerset.

Figure 2: UK Electricity production

This new nuclear build program is currently governed by the Euratom Treaty, being developed in partnership with nuclear industries from both within the EU (France) or from outside (USA, China, Japan, Republic of Korea). Without an alternative that would come into force simultaneously with the exit from Euratom, which means, inter alia, the negotiation of new nuclear cooperation agreements with each third state, this program can suffer considerable delays. The risk applies to the whole range of nuclear activities in the UK: operation, life extension or decommissioning of existing reactors, uranium and nuclear fuel manufacture, radioactive waste management and storage, nuclear research and the development of advanced nuclear fission or fusion technologies.

Even before the referendum, the UK nuclear industry, through the voice of Tom Greatrex, General Manager of the UK Nuclear Industry Association (NIA), former Labour MP in the House of Commons and energy minister in the shadow Labour Cabinet, warned about the energy security risk, paraphrasing Hamlet in an article titled “EU or not EU – Energy Security is still the Question”.^[14]

The UK NIA, an association with over 260 member companies from the entire British nuclear industry, representing about 65,000 workers, has advocated for UK remaining in the EURATOM Treaty, at least until new arrangements are put in place, vigorously demanding government cooperation with industry in this direction. Following the June 8, 2017 elections, Tom Greatrex said: “If current policy is maintained, which would see the UK withdraw from Euratom, the new Government must, as a matter of urgency, look to ensure alternative arrangements are in place as soon as possible to avoid a damaging cliff edge”^[15], reiterating the findings of the UK NIA report ”Exiting Euratom. The UK’s Withdrawal from Euratom” ^[16], published in May 2017.

According to this study, the main directions affected by the exit from the EURATOM Treaty are:

• Nuclear Safety and Safeguards – The United Kingdom has a robust and well established national nuclear regulatory and safety system, but when leaving the EURATOM regime, a new appropriate framework will need to be established to comply with international nuclear safeguards commitments, reconsidering its relations with the IAEA under a Voluntary Offer Agreement, to be in force upon leaving EURATOM.
• Access to the European nuclear market and Nuclear Co-operation Agreements (NCAs), covering projects and activities like the Nuclear New Build (NNB), existing operating, long term operation (LTO) or decommissioning of existing ones, exports. The British nuclear industry has a particular experience in the Americas, Europe, the Middle East and Asia. Also, the free movement of goods and skilled workforce represents an aspect affecting both sides.

The solution seems to be the renegotiation of the existing NCAs concluded under the umbrella of the EURATOM Community (Australia, Canada, Japan, Kazakhstan, South Africa, Ukraine, the United States and Uzbekistan) by March 2019, before the end of the two year period triggered by Article 50.

Leaving the EURATOM Treaty without an alternative arrangement will have a dramatic impact on the entire British nuclear industry, which has had enormous benefits from the treaty. The alternative of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is not enough, as it is not covering all aspects of nuclear trade.

• Nuclear Fuel Market – EURATOM regulates the supply of nuclear fuels (the supply of ores, source materials and special fissile materials movement to and from Member States); all fissile materials in the United Kingdom covered by the Treaty legally belong to EURATOM.^[17]
• Research & Development – a reduced access to the European Research and Development Platform covering both fission and fusion (funds, exchange of information, cooperation, skills and knowledge development etc.), with adverse consequences for both sides, the EU and the UK.^[18]

The British nuclear industry has provided the government with detailed and relevant information to help it understand the role of EURATOM, the position of the industry being to maintain the UK status as a EURATOM member. The UK NIA recently stated in a public debate on Brexit that took place in Northern England, in Cumbria county that “It is important now that the government ensures there is regular and constant dialogue with the industry, so they can understand the full consequences of decisions they will take over the period ahead.”^[19]

The view from the UK Parliament and Chatham House

Brexatom has provoked reactions in various other environments. For instance, a May 2017 Report of the Science and Technology Select Committee of the House of Lords reads that ”The undoubted potential of civil nuclear has been blighted by the indecision of successive Governments”.^[20] The report warns against the risks to the British nuclear sector by losing EURATOM membership after the two years of grace granted by Art. 50, if a viable replacement solution will not be agreed, among the identified risks being the loss of leadership in the field of nuclear fusion research. The report also highlights other risks related to access to the nuclear market, the majority of which are reported by industry.

The conclusions of the Report emphasizes that civil nuclear:

„is a long term industry where changes in direction in successive Governments’ policies and periods of lack of clarity have had a detrimental effect on the development of the industry, particularly in respect of civil nuclear generation over the last 20 years. The Government has highlighted the importance of the nuclear sector in its industrial strategy green paper and must develop a clear, long term vision and set of goals for civil nuclear strategy“.

Moreover, „[British – TC] scientists say leaving the Euratom agency that oversees nuclear safety in Europe will cause widespread confusion and have a potentially devastating impact on the industry in Britain”. Professor Roger Cashmore, President of the UK Atomic Energy Agency qualified the situation as „an alarming mess”.^[21]

Part of a vigorous effort to promote electric vehicles to cut CO2 emissions coming from the transport sector, the UK Government announced recently a ban on the sale of petrol and diesel cars by 2040. That means “as much as 18 gigawatts of extra demand for electricity – equivalent to six Hinkley Point power stations” in opposition to the “UK’s decision to withdraw from the Euratom treaty”.^[22] Professor Martin Freer, Director of the Birmingham Energy Institute and the Birmingham Centre for Nuclear Education and Research at the University of Birmingham concluded: “This is why Theresa May’s Brexit will kill off her own plans for a green car revolution”.^[23]

A broader analysis carried out by Chatham House^[24] this May highlights the complexity of the Brexit negotiations, considering that energy, energy security and climate change are areas where the United Kingdom and the future 27-member EU (EU27) could find easier cooperation in the future. Exiting the jurisdiction of the EURATOM Treaty which currently governs the British nuclear industry „will have a significant impact on the functioning of the UK’s nuclear industry, particularly in respect to nuclear material safeguards, safety, supply, movement across borders and R&D. Achieving this within the two-year Brexit time frame will be extremely difficult. The UK will need to establish a framework that it can fall back on to ensure nuclear safety and security”. Since the government does not intend to remain under the jurisdiction of the ECJ, and absent a new joint mechanism of compatibility between the EU and the UK, it may be forced to leave the EU emissions trading system (ETS) – a valuable instrument in the fight for climate change. This in turn will force it to define a new legal framework, and is a solution requiring enough political longevity, and going well beyond the two-year period, to be effective.

The Chatham House report recommends the government to ensure a smooth transition from the current, trilateral nuclear safeguards regime (UK, EU and the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA) to a bilateral one (UK and IAEA), allocate the necessary funds if the United Kingdom intends to maintain its status as an international nuclear fusion center, and establish the institutional framework to ensure adherence to the health and safety standards specific to the nuclear field.

British politicians are becoming more and more vocal about the dangers of industry losing a substantial number of jobs by leaving the umbrella of the EURATOM Treaty without having a new arrangement in place. Thus, Iain Wright, the chairman of the business and energy committee said that, without transitional arrangements in place before Brexit, the “repercussions of failing to do so are huge. The continued operations of the UK nuclear industry are at risk”.^[25] The same concern was expressed by Mr. Zheng Dongshan, senior VP of CGN, that the UK decision to leave EURATOM will “create some uncertainties” for the Chinese plans to develop three nuclear projects in UK, in partnership with EDF Energy.^[26]

John Woodcock Labour MP for Barrow, Cumbria, a nuclear industry stronghold where a new nuclear power plant at Moorside^[27] is planned next to Selafield^[28], has recently voiced concern over the future of UK nuclear projects under the current circumstances. In a recent public debate, he addressed the government’s representative by saying:

“I hope for a frank assessment of how the minister feels about the cloud of uncertainty over the industry, which has been created by the Government’s until now steadfast refusal to countenance remaining within a treaty that is working well, or to consider something sensible such as associate membership, and a seamless transition to that”, considering that the loss of Euratom membership may be a “calamity for Cumbria”.^[29]

Not only the opposition, but also conservative lawmakers, support the stay in the EURATOM Treaty, Ms Trudy Harrison, the constituent member of both Moorside and Sellafield, considers that the new nuclear safeguards bill does not cover all the aspects, declaring during the same debate:

“Because of the nature of the Sellafield site [Selafield treats radioactive waste from many EU Member States, but also from the U.S. and Japan – TC], Euratom safeguards are of key importance to its functioning. Every day, EURATOM officials monitor activity on site and ensure that fissile nuclear material at Sellafield is in the right place and is being used for its intended purpose. EURATOM owns cameras and other equipment and of course has the skills to carry out the work. If we leave, the ownership of that material and the skills will need to be replaced”.^[30]

The British press reports even a „revolt” from „around a dozen Conservative MPs”^[31] against the PM’s plan to withdraw from EURATOM, having a potential risk to maintain the majority in the House of Commons on the subject, as the Tories are already weakened after the June elections. According to Bob Neill, a former member of the conservative cabinet: „We should do all that is possible legally to maintain those benefits, by whatever means it takes. We should not allow any thoughts of ideological purity to get in the way of achieving that“(…) My judgment is that if we can legally remain within EURATOM, we should do so”.

Recently, some voices have circulated the idea of forming a centrist party aimed at blocking Brexit, including people “who have been in Conservative cabinets before now”^[32], as the Conservative party could split if Theresa May insists on pursuing a “hard Brexit”.^[33]

The Labour Party has explicitly called for Parliament to discuss the status of the UK as a member of the European Atomic Energy Community, putting pressure on the PM to give up opposition to EURATOM, putting jobs and nuclear safety at the forefront, and to abandon her obsession against the ECJ, inextricably linked to the Euratom Treaty.^[34]

A couple of days ago, David Miliband, former Labour’s foreign secretary, now president and chief executive of the International Rescue Committee, based in New York, recommended a second vote on the terms of a final settlement of the Brexit deal.^[35]

Position of the European Nuclear Industry

The European nuclear industry, through the voice of the European Atomic Forum (FORATOM), Europe’s commercial association of nuclear industry, based in Brussels, could not remain indifferent to the consequences of UK’s exit from the EU, given the close ties between the European nuclear industries. FORATOM has 15 national nuclear associations, including the Romanian Atomic Forum, through which FORATOM represents almost 800 European companies active in the industry and supports approximately 800,000 jobs.

It is expected that Brexit will adversely impact both sides, considering the free movement of goods and labour, transfer of know-how, research funding, carbon emissions trade etc, since the UK is to acquire third-party status in relations with the EU.

Withdrawing from Euratom will lead some significant UK NIA members to withdraw from FORATOM, weakening the industry position in front of European institutions and decision-makers. UK NIA is a founding member and one of the most respected members of the European Nuclear Industry Association, bringing added value through professionalism, and not least having a significant financial contribution to FORATOM’s annual budget.

In the press release of April 3, 2017, Jean-Pol Poncelet, General Manager of FORATOM, states that the UK „Being part of the Euratom Community enables new build, decommissioning, R&D and other programmes of work to continue without any disruption. Therefore, after officially triggering the process of withdrawing from the Euratom Treaty, the UK should comply with the provisions of the Euratom Treaty until new agreements replacing the current ones are concluded^[36]”, in full consensus with the position of the British industry. FORATOM press release emphasizes the integration of the British and European industries, in the field of nuclear fuel manufacturing^[37] and advanced research on nuclear fission and fusion.

A Brexatom dedicated working group (WG) was set up within FORATOM during this spring, where, together with the UK NIA it follows the developments, having the intention of finding joint ways to support the common interests of FORATOM members, including the UK NIA, in front of the European institutions. A FORATOM non-paper produced by the Brexatom WG, looking into the potential impact of BREXIT on the European nuclear industry, has now gone to the European Commission.

We are where we are

The position paper submitted by the European Commission to the EU27 Member States format^[38] informs that with UK leaving the EU, the Treaties, including the EURATOM Treaty, cease to be applicable, and the UK „will have sole responsibility for ensuring its compliance with international obligations arising therefrom”. The Withdrawal Agreement will have to „set out arrangements for the transfer of the ownership of special fissile materials and Community property located in the United Kingdom used for the purposes of providing safeguards to the United Kingdom, respecting the Community’s obligations under international agreements”. The position paper details matters like: (1) Safeguards obligations, (2) Equipment used to provide safeguards, (3) Special fissile material present on United Kingdom territory, as well as (4) Special fissile material present in the EU27, and (5) Spent fuel and radioactive waste.

Subsequently, the position paper was published^[39] with minor modifications on July 13, 2017, as the official EU position for the UK nuclear materials and nuclear safeguards negotiations, clearly showing that the UK will not remain part of the Euratom Treaty as of the withdrawal date from the EU.

During the same day, the British Government has released its “position on ownership and responsibility for special fissile material and related safeguard equipment”^[40], insisting on the „strong mutual interest in ensuring that the UK and Euratom Community continue to work closely together in the future”, expressing the ambition to ”maintain a close and effective relationship with the Euratom Community”. The British Government proposes a set of principles setting-up the Government priorities on this subject, revealing the complexity of the entire process. The Government position paper is a clear confirmation that the UK will leave the Euratom Treaty, as an inevitable consequence of triggering Article 50, a position similar to that of the European negotiators.

With regard to the position paper of the European Union, Tom Greatrex stated on behalf of the UK NIA: „The clock is ticking and there is still time for the government to review their exiting Euratom position and explore the alternative options available, including associate membership or at the very least a transitional period to avoid the cliff edge scenario both the government and industry want to avoid”^[41], but the options suggested by the industry do not appear in the British government’s position paper, leaving the industry with the moral satisfaction that „the UK government’s position paper demonstrates the complexity of replicating Euratom arrangements in UK regulation and cooperation agreements with third countries which the industry has warned of”.^[42]

It is premature to draw conclusions at this point. For now, we have the starting positions for the negotiations. However, for the European nuclear industry, it is obvious that the UK exit from the EU weakens the balance between MSs that own and/or intend to develop nuclear energy (the so-called “nucler like-minded” group) and those opposed to the development of the nuclear energy. Yet further (now unimaginable) consequences of Brexatom can materialize down the road and reveal themselves only during (or after) the exit process.

 

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FOOTNOTES:

1. EU referendum 2016 aftermath: All the key dates: When will Britain leave the EU?, Alice Foster, Express, June 23, 2017, http://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/644178/EU-referendum-dates-European-Union-Brexit-David-Cameron-Brussels ↑
2. UK: ‘Brexit means Brexit’ – Theresa May gives first speech as Tory leader, July 11, 2016, available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HhyaJMUIOqI ↑
3. Full text of The letter from the British Prime Minister to the EU Council President Donald Tusk: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/604079/Prime_Ministers_letter_to_European_Council_President_Donald_Tusk.pdf ↑
4. The Treaty on European Union (consolidated version), October 26, 2012, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506-fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_1&format=PDF ↑
5. Article 50 author calls for Brexit to be halted with a warning of ‘disastrous consequences’, Shehab Khan, Harriet Agerholm, Independent, July 18, 2017, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/article-50-author-lord-kerr-of-kinlochard-brexit-latest-news-warning-disastrous-consequences-a7846951.html ↑
6. Theresa May’s Brexit speech in full, January 17, 2017, The Telegraph, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/01/17/theresa-mays-brexit-speech-full/ ↑
7. Everything has changed in UK politics and so must Theresa May, Financial Times, June 9, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/63526716-4d14-11e7-919a-1e14ce4af89b ↑
8. Nuclear Power in the European Union, World Nuclear Association, updated May 22, 2017, http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/others/european-union.aspx ↑
9. EURATOM Treaty (consolidated version) available at: https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/consolidated_version_of_the_treaty_establishing_the_european_atomic_energy_community_ro.pdf ↑
10. May’s obsession with ECJ over Brexit ‘daft’, says former senior judge, Jennifer Rankin, The Guardian, June 13, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jun/13/theresa-may-judge-european-court-justice-brexit-david-edward ↑
11. Former ministers gang up to undermine Theresa May and keep UK in European Court of Justice, Express, Vickiie Oliphant, July 9, 2017, http://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/826557/Brexit-plot-Britain-European-Court-of-Justice-Theresa-May ↑
12. Nuclear Power in the United Kingdom, World Nuclear Association, updated July 2017, http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-t-z/united-kingdom.aspx ↑
13. Commission Decision (EU) 2015/658 of 8 October 2014 on the aid measure SA.34947 (2013/C) (ex 2013/N) which the United Kingdom is planning to implement for support to the Hinkley Point C nuclear power station, Official Journal of the European Union, (notified under document C(2014) 7142) (1), 28.4.2015, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015D0658&from=EN ↑
14. EU or not EU – Energy Security is still the Question, Tom Greatrex, Chief Executive, NIA, June 29, 2016, https://www.niauk.org/media-centre/blog/eu-or-not-eu-energy-security-is-still-the-question/ ↑
15. Press Release. NIA response to General Election 2017, NIA June 09, 2017, https://www.niauk.org/media-centre/press-releases/nia-response-general-election-2017/ ↑
16. Exiting Euratom. The UK’s Withdrawal from Euratom, UK Nuclear Industry Association, Study, May 2017, available at: https://www.niauk.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Exiting-Euratom_May17.pdf ↑
17. See Article 52 of the Euratom Treaty establishing the Euratom Supply Agency – ESA, a common nuclear energy market in the EU, to ensure a regular and equitable supply of nuclear fuel to EU users and the Article 86 of the same Treaty stipulating „Special fissionable materials shall be the property of the Community. The Community’s right of ownership shall extend to all special fissionable materials produced or imported by a Member State, a person or enterprise and subject to the safety control provided for in Chapter VII” ↑
18. For example, the Joint European Torus (JET) program, based in the United Kingdom and funded by it, can be cancelled or seriously delayed, potentially affecting the European fusion reactor project (ITER). ↑
19. Euratom membership loss a ‘calamity for Cumbria’ claims MP, News & Star, July 12, 2017, http://www.newsandstar.co.uk/news/business/Euratom-membership-loss-a-calamity-for-Cumbria-claims-MP-ad3c4f32-fc5b-4fbd-99b9-d08c90f68ec0-ds ↑
20. Nuclear research and technology: Breaking the cycle of indecision – 3rd Report of Session 2016–17, Science and Technology Select Committee, HOUSE OF LORDS, May 2, 2017 https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201617/ldselect/ldsctech/160/160.pdf ↑
21. Brexit will cause an ‘alarming mess’ for UK nuclear power, scientists warn, Ben Kentish, Independent, July 9, 2017, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/brexit-nuclear-power-euratom-hinckley-point-risks-nuclear-fusion-energy-bills-a7832136.html ↑
22. This is why Theresa May’s Brexit will kill off her own plans for a green car revolution, Professor Martin Freer, Independent, August 4, 2017, http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/brexit-euratom-theresa-may-nuclear-agency-professor-martin-freer-a7877611.html ↑
23. Idem. ↑
24. Staying Connected Key Elements for UK–EU27 Energy Cooperation After Brexit, Anthony Froggatt, Chatham House Report, May 2017, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/research/2017-05-10-staying-connected-energy-cooperation-brexit-froggatt-wright-lockwood.pdf ↑
25. UK nuclear industry at risk without EU support, MPs warn, Jillian Ambrose, The Telegraph, 2 May 2017, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2017/05/01/uk-nuclear-industry-risk-without-eu-support-mps-warn/ ↑
26. Idem. ↑
27. The Moorside nuclear power plant aims to build three nuclear reactors with a power output of about 1,400 – 1,600 MWe each. Following Toshiba’s withdrawal from the partnership, there are rumors of talks with KEPCO to take over, APR1400 developed by South Korea, replacing the AP1000 developed by Westinghouse. ↑
28. One of the largest nuclear sites in the world on which activities are dedicated to treatment, processing and storage of radioactive waste arising from both civilian and military activities. ↑
29. See footnote 19. ↑
30. See footnote 19. ↑
31. May warned not to ‘cut off nose to spite face’ as Tories revolt over Euratom, Rowena Mason, The Guardian, July 12, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jul/12/may-warned-not-to-cut-off-nose-to-spite-face-as-tories-revolt-over-euratom ↑
32. Two cabinet ministers ‘interested in new anti-Brexit party idea’, Matthew Weaver, The Guardian, August 11, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/aug/11/two-cabinet-ministers-interested-in-new-anti-brexit-party-james-chapman?CMP=fb_gu ↑
33. Hard Brexit could split Tory party, says Anna Soubry, Andrew Sparrow, The Guardian, August 13, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/aug/13/hard-brexit-could-split-tory-party-says-anna-soubry ↑
34. The Prime Minister’s Decision To Leave Euratom Shows She Is Willing To Put Ideology Above Jobs And Nuclear Safety, Huffpost, UK, Keir Starmer, Labour MP for Holborn and St Pancras, July 12, 2017, http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/keir-starmer-qc/eurotrom-ideology-brexit_b_17456210.html ↑
35. David Miliband: we need a second vote on Brexit deal, Jamie Doward, The Guardian, August 12, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/aug/12/david-miliband-calls-second-vote-on-brexit-deal-europe-britain ↑
36. FORATOM on BREXIT, press release, April 3, 2017, https://www.foratom.org/docs/press-releases/ ↑
37. For example, URENCO UK, Capenhurst, part of the URENCO, provides enriched uranium, together with URENCO Deutschland, URENCO Nederland and URENCO USA, for worldwide nuclear power utilities, https://urenco.com/about-us/about-urenco/ ↑
38. Position paper transmitted to EU27 on nuclear materials and safeguard equipment (Euratom), June 22, 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/essential-principles-nuclear-materials-safeguard-equipment_en.pdf ↑
39. Position paper on nuclear materials and safeguard equipment (Euratom), TF50 (2017) 3/2 – Commission to UK, July 12, 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/essential-principles-euratom_en.pdf ↑
40. Nuclear materials and safeguards issues – Position Paper, HM Government, July 13, 2017, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/627909/FINAL_OFF_SEN_Position_Paper_HMG_Nuclear_materials_and_safeguards_issues_Position_Paper_FINAL_120717__3_.pdf ↑
41. NIA comment on European Commission position paper on nuclear materials and safeguard equipment (Euratom), Tom Greatrex, Nuclear Industry Association, July 14, 2017, https://www.politicshome.com/news/uk/energy/nuclear-power/press-release/nuclear-industry-association/87541/nia-comment-european ↑
42. Brexit department lays out nuclear and justice stance for negotiations, Adam Vaughan and Jessica Elgot, The Guardian, July 13, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jul/13/brexit-department-position-papers-euratom-nuclear-european-court-of-justice ↑