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FOREWORD

A constellation of disruptive factors looms on the horizon: Brexit, U.S. elections and the possibility of a Donald Trump presidency, then there are the unusual events in Turkey this summer. The “black swan” events are multiplying and challenge established conventions. This Special Report is a unique collection of views on key security issues facing the North Atlantic Alliance and its members. The architecture of the Report is designed around four topics: the A2/AD issue after the Warsaw Summit, a discussion of ballistic missile defense in Europe, nuclear deterrence and Turkey.

The A2/AD bubble is a double-edged sword, argue Octavian Manea and Iulia Joja in chapter 1 which features an excellent discussion on access denial, decisions taken at the Warsaw Summit, and the 2nd offset strategy. The analysis provides context for some of the big lessons downloaded by the current top leadership at Pentagon in preparing itself for a new RMA.

In chapter 2, the authors, George Vişan and Ștefan Popescu, focus on a topic of great interest to Romania – the ballistic missile defense shield (BMD). The presence of the shield, of American and multinational forces can create the temptation to sub-finance your own military forces and the authors caution host states to avoid the pitfall of complacency and fix deficiencies in the area of conventional military capacity. Moreover, their text provides valuable insight into differences in perception towards the BMD project which stem from different historical experiences and strategic cultures.

Chapter 3 offers a bold look into a topic that is usually reserved for the analytical and military establishment of nuclear capable states. Going beyond basic deterrence is dangerous warn the authors of the chapter, Eliza Gheorghe and Liviu Tatu, who signal changes in nuclear postures of U.S. and Russia. In addition, the text offers a rare insight into the relation between the provider of security umbrella and its protégées and cautions against the danger of dragging the patron, and ultimately the entire alliance, into an unwanted conflict.

Finally, the last chapter is dedicated to events that unfolded in Turkey (a key NATO member state) this past summer: the coup, its aftermath, and impact on the country’s relations with the U.S., NATO and Russia. It pinpoints the role Turkey has in NATO, but also discusses the geopolitical ambitions which could dilute Turkey’s position in the Alliance going forward. What happens in Turkey next has a double significance, as it is a key country for both the Alliance Southern and Eastern Flanks.

We hope you will find the report stimulating and thought provoking.

Eugenia Guşilov
ROEC Director
Bucharest, October 5, 2016
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Chapter 1 is an insightful discussion about the A2/AD issue after Warsaw. Is there really no reason to panic regarding the Russian access-denial archipelago? Wales sent a message of a weak, nevertheless clear alarm – the Alliance refused to declare Russia an adversary, but considered it a threat. A lack of consensus among the 28 Allies continues to prevent a common perception of and approach to the relationship with Russia. The chapter lays out all the thorny issues: diverging threat assessments within the Alliance, NATO’s “reinforcement trap”, Europe’s gaps in air and maritime forces, Bucharest’s very low ability to deter and what can be done to contribute more to maritime deterrence in the Black Sea. It takes stalk of the reassurance measures decided in Wales and in Warsaw and maps out some of the advances of Eastern European states in thickening up deterrence in the East. The authors take note of Romania’s learning curve in framing the security threats in the wider Black Sea area. Before 2015, Romanian officials were very skeptical about A2/AD and reluctant to acknowledge the very existence of the issue publicly. Today, Romania seems to officially join the club of those NATO Eastern Flank allies (like Poland and the Baltic states) profoundly concerned about the emerging of the A2/AD bubbles in their proximity. However, the problem Romania and the Alliance face with regard to the Russian threat in the Black Sea is creating and developing a yet altogether virtually inexistent deterrence, first by punishment, then by denial.

The second part of the chapter explains the renewed Alliance focus on finding the next-wave deterrent technology and associated revolutionary operational construct. It offers an illuminating account of the second offset strategy: the context in which it appeared, its key architects, goals and battle test. The search for the 3rd offset strategy (currently underway) has its own architects, who access the past and its lessons in order to leverage the next wave of weapon-systems, to rethink and update operational constructs for an A2/AD environment.

Chapter 2 focuses on the NATO ballistic missile defense in Europe. It provides context for understanding the reason for its existence, its initial design (and subsequent amendment), it discusses issues that are less known to the general public such as missile defense economics or gaps in Romanian air defense systems. By default, the protection of the missile base at Deveselu falls to the host nation, Romania. Therefore, awareness of how well or ill-equipped is Romania to deal with potential cruise missiles strikes or air strikes (their concentration in the Black Sea is not accidental) against missile defense assets deployed on Romania’s territory is key. As is the understanding of how Russia is hedging against the U.S. missile defense deployments in Europe. Furthermore, this chapter offers a rare perspective on perception of the missile defense project. Much like in the story with the elephant and the blind men, Europe’s BMD is viewed differently, based on different historical experiences and strategic cultures. The concept of ‘strategic defense’ itself is perceived as an extra-European (American) one, since Europe has considered up until now tactical missile defense only. There is the American view, then there is Europe’s fragmented vision (with France at one end of the spectrum, pushing for greater European strategic autonomy, and the Eastern European host nations, at the other end, who see the BMD as an additional layer of security, on top of Art 5 guarantees). Finally, there is the Russian perception who fears any upset of the global strategic balance (i.e. any increase in the U.S. technological advantage), even if the BMD does not affect Russia’s land-based, underwater or nuclear deterrent.
Chapter 3 examines the role of nuclear weapons in NATO’s strategy. It has two distinct parts: one which looks at deterrence between the U.S. and Russia, the second one which looks at the reliability of the American nuclear umbrella over its junior allies in Eastern Europe. Since the crisis in Ukraine, both Russia and the U.S. have increased the profile and operations of their nuclear-capable forces. These two countries still hold over 90% of the nuclear warheads that exist in the world today (an estimated 15,000). What is yet more alarming, for the first time since the end of the Cold War, military exercises have included nuclear strike scenarios (Russia’s Zapad 2009 simulated the limited use of nuclear weapons). To make matters worse, Russia now admits a limited nuclear strike for de-escalation purposes: the so called ‘escalate to de-escalate’ policy. The role of the nuclear arsenal is no longer viewed as having mostly political value. These changes in Moscow’s and Washington’s nuclear posture spill into extended nuclear deterrence (END) territory. NATO is an alliance like no other - a nuclear alliance. But it is beset by two problems. First, Washington will have difficulty using END for anti-proliferation purposes, in other words, to keep its allies non-nuclear. The UK and France do not make their arsenals available for the kind of nuclear sharing schemes the U.S. has enforced since the Cold War, which leaves the U.S. in a unique position. Collective security commitments in nuclear alliances are meant to create the impression that all allies are created equal. Yet, geography and history quickly dispel such illusions. Every country tries to become the “special partner” and distinguish itself from other protégés by hyping the threat, provoking the adversary, or playing the victim. This attention-seeking behaviour poses the danger of dragging the patron, and ultimately the entire alliance, into an unwanted conflict. The ongoing one-upmanship between Romania and Poland presents NATO, and the United States, with a difficult circle to square: how to reassure two competing junior allies without causing further trouble with Russia.

Chapter 4 focuses on Turkey, a pillar state for the security of both the Southern and Eastern Flanks of NATO. Turkey has been a valued member of the Alliance since the 1950s. It has the second largest standing military power in NATO and is the most important NATO regional power in the Black Sea and in the Middle East. The chapter looks at what Turkey means in NATO and employs an interdisciplinary approach (military, foreign affairs and economic perspective) to shed light on the elephant in the room: the consequences of the failed coup attempt and, in parallel, the 8 month hiatus in its relations with Russia, followed by the subsequent rapprochement. The shooting of the Russian jet brought a nadir in Turkish-Russian relations, an episode that was put to rest at the end of June by the official apologies of the Turkish president. However, the mid-July coup seems to have created a watershed moment in Turkish-Russian relations. Turkey’s political messaging to Russia since has been loud and unequivocal, and stands in contrast to messages sent to the West. What implication may this have on Turkey’s relations with its Western allies? Or, is this just rhetorical? NATO is a military alliance, but it also represents a community of shared values. Turkey’s latest authoritarian accents place it much closer to the Russian and Chinese models than to those of NATO member states. Recent events do raise a legitimate long-term question: what does the new normal of Russian-Turkish relations mean for NATO? Drawing a firm conclusion is premature, but it has become evident that Turkey wants more geopolitical optionality.
Chapter 1

NATO’s access-denial problem after Warsaw

by OCTAVIAN MANEA and IULIA JOJA

How A2/AD umbrellas impact regional security and NATO’s deterrence posture

The Wales and Warsaw summits made significant progress in the effort of readjusting the Alliance to the realities of the post Crimea security environment, but the Alliance still faces a growing strategic gap from the perspective of responding to the Russian access-denial archipelago (the so-called A2/AD bubbles) that is spreading from the Barents and Norwegian Seas, to the Baltic and Black Seas, and even to the Eastern Mediterranean. The Alliance is currently assuring the security of its allies through the promise of power projection, deploying rapid reaction forces in order to reinforce the attacked member. The center of gravity of NATO’s recipe for defending its members remains essentially an expeditionary one. The biggest problem that the A2/AD systems pose is that, once deployed very near to NATO states borders, they are in fact challenging and potentially neutralizing the core aspect that, in theory, makes NATO’s collective defense pledge credible - the ability to project its forces and reinforce its flank members. The progress made by Russia in mastering the precision-guided warfare by building dense concentrations of Integrated Air & Missile Defenses (IAMDs) complemented by surface-to-surface ballistic missiles and land-air-sea launched cruise missiles, especially in Crimea and Kaliningrad, has enhanced the overall ability of Moscow “to deny the use of the airspace of border countries, and even constrain the movement of ships and land forces in a crisis or conflict.”

There are many observers that make the case that there is no reason to panic relative to the development of the A2/AD bubbles because of their inherent defensive nature.

Generally, the opinions with regard to the nature of the threat (or lack thereof) stemming from Russia can be summed up into two (opposing) points of view: on the one hand, there are those that argue that Russia is a real threat, based on the aggressive and threatening rhetoric adopted by Moscow and the military aggressions of their armed forces on many single occasions (including countless violations of NATO airspace), as well as through the massive and generally unannounced provocative military exercises organized at NATO’s borders. On the other hand, there are those that deny the threat represented by Russia and justify its aggressions with ambiguous historical and social explanations. They argue that sanctions against Moscow should be lifted and the Alliance should not respond in kind, with a deterrence buildup, as it would lead to military escalation. Arguably, the most famous such position with a credible voice within NATO was adopted by German foreign affairs minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, who stated before the Warsaw summit that "what we shouldn't do now is inflame the situation further through sabre-rattling and warmongering,” and

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allies "are well-advised to not create pretexts to renew an old confrontation" and that it would be "fatal to search only for military solutions and a policy of deterrence".²

Such a perspective on an apparently objective issue, one that is measureable with data, seems striking. However, modern, interdisciplinary approaches towards international relations have shown that discourse and perception often overthrow material reality. The way we perceive a military capability at our border – whether we consider it a threat or not – is shaping our reality. Concepts such as threat, enemy, offensive/defensive constitute social reality and are subject to interpretation, despite – disregarding what neorealists might argue – the availability of data, because data in itself – such as a dual capability Russian aircraft violating NATO airspace – can be perceived to differing, sometimes even opposing extents.

The same way data is subject to perception and interpretation at an individual level, discourse and narratives shape reality at the macro level: once perceived as a major threat to national security, a military aircraft violating airspace – or an A2/AD bubble – can be constructed through discourse and become social reality; or, the opposite perception – an accidental and non-threatening action of a partner. This is how Steinmeier’s narrative ends up to be opposite to Angela Merkel’s one, who argued on the eve of the Warsaw summit that Moscow has undermined European security in “words and deeds” by infringing Ukraine’s borders and has “profoundly disturbed” NATO’s eastern members, who “therefore require the unambiguous back-up of the alliance”.³

The discrepancy between Germany’s two leaders on one hand, and Berlin’s (as well as Paris’) general leniency towards a compromise with Russia and the acceptance of Moscow’s violations of sovereignty and international law, on the other hand, can easily be explained not only through economic incentives, but also through strategic culture. Germany and France have a long tradition of strong bilateral relations with Russia, imprinted as a relation between two empires with major cultural affinities, which is perceived by the public as being jeopardize by a limited conflict with a new state, on which Russia may have historical claims. Moreover, German public opinion is fundamentally pacifistic, a trait which is deeply rooted in Berlin’s strategic culture. Thus, any scenario of possible military escalation with Russia is met with unwillingness and the vastly preferred approach towards Moscow – disregarding of how aggressive Moscow’s actions in Eastern Europe might be – is political and diplomatic efforts to de-escalate and normalize relations.

What is missing from this analysis is the reality that an A2/AD bubble is a double-edged sword projecting a sort of shield under which the potential for aggressive contingencies cannot be excluded: “A2/AD capabilities are not only useful for defense, but they can also be useful for offence because they enable an aggressor’s forces to operate with greater impunity”, according to Ian Brzezinski, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Europe and NATO Policy.⁴ It is here where the A2/AD variable connects with another important piece of the post Crimea puzzle - the hybrid challenge, making a geopolitical fait accompli more likely: “A2/AD and ‘hybrid’ can reinforce each other in at least two ways. They create a sort of “double deterrent” to NATO intervention in a

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military crisis, i.e. by first generating a blurred or non-military cause that may negate the legitimacy of an imperiled ally’s invocation of Article 5, and then by raising the specter of a defeat for any NATO force that would be dispatched, thus strengthening the sense of a geopolitical fait accompli in the minds of risk-averse (Western) Europeans." In short, the whole access-denial security ecosystem in which the Alliance is operating today is creating what in NATO circles is called a “reinforcement trap” that has major consequences for its deterrence credibility: “either we reinforce our Baltic allies but we have to face a huge cost to do so by basically destroying most of the air-defense systems in Kaliningrad and face a Russian counteroffensive. Or we don’t do anything and don’t come to the help of our Baltic allies but obviously this would be the political end of the Alliance. We need a smart broad strategy to break away from the reinforcement trap so that we shouldn’t [be] facing very bad trade-offs between two very bad and costly choices.”

Moreover, A2/AD bubbles are defensive only in the initial buildup phase. Once a major power, such as the Russian Federation, installs and deploys to the respective area an accumulation of powerful, medium-range land, air and particularly maritime military capabilities, the A2/AD quickly becomes offensive in nature. See ISW map on Russian A2/AD range, on p. 10. This is the case of both Kaliningrad and increasingly Crimea, where Moscow has progressively deployed conventional and nuclear medium-range capabilities that now constitute a threat to the national security of member states that border the Baltic and Black Seas. The immediate and direct effect of A2/AD buildups is the access limitation of the bordering states to non-territorial spaces, first navigation of international waters, then the restricted or even denied access to the exclusive economic zones (EEZ). See Annex I, on pg. 24. This access to non-territorial space constitutes in itself an aggression and creates insecurity. Furthermore, the offensive nature of the A2/AD bubble can be extended by capability buildup, accompanied by an aggressive rhetoric and threats, to the extent that it may ultimately affect the territorial integrity of the bordering NATO member states.

One key aspect that can be observed in Romania is a gradual learning curve in the domestic public discourse in framing the security threats in the wider Black Sea area. Before 2015, Romanian officials were very skeptical about A2/AD and reluctant to acknowledge the very existence of the issue publicly. Today, Romania seems to officially join the club of those NATO Eastern Flank allies (like Poland and the Baltic states) profoundly concerned about the emerging of the A2/AD bubbles in their proximity. In a speech delivered at a CEPA conference in Bucharest, in early June 2016, as a preview of Romania’s core agenda at Warsaw, Mihnea Motoc, the Romanian Defense Minister made it very clear that he perceives the developments in the Black Sea after Crimea as transforming Romania in a “frontline state”. It is in this context that the Russian deployment of A2/AD measures “are a real game-changer, essentially altering the very fabric of the security environment” by jeopardizing the freedom of navigation in the region. From Romania’s perspective, there is a clear common denominator between the Black and the Baltic Seas: they are both access-denial ecosystems. In the words of the Minister of Defense, Romania has “another Kaliningrad and very likely a Kaliningrad+ in our vicinity”.

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6 Interview conducted by Octavian Manea with Fabrice Pothier, until recently, head of policy planning in the office of the NATO Secretary General, Summer 2016.
Russian Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2AD) Range: August 2016

Source: Institute for the Study of War (ISW), August 29, 2016
This very specific reading of the new operational realities made Romania to plead in Warsaw not only for an equal level of security across the whole Eastern Flank, but for a credible reassurance via a “robust defense and deterrence posture at the shores of Black Sea”. In general, it can be concluded that the access-denial environment in the Black Sea has become a major variable shaping the perception of Romania’s national security establishment. The project of the new Romanian Military Strategy adopted in May 2016 by Romania’s Supreme Defense Council (CSAT) right before the Warsaw summit noted that, although there is a low probability, “a military aggression enabled by the A2/AD capabilities in the Black Sea basin is the main threat to Romania’s security.” Even the Romanian president said in one of his major foreign policy speeches that the instability in the Black Sea ecosystem is driven by the Russian efforts of “imposing access-denial zones”.

From a maritime perspective, in both seas, Russia as a mature A2/AD actor will be well positioned to impose air and sea exclusion zones or increasingly be able to exert its influence and coercive potential over “exclusive economic zones and continental shelf exploitation claims” And there is no shortage of potential clashing points in the Black Sea, especially in those resource-rich segments. Overall, in both ecosystems “we are observing an Anti-Access/Area Denial strategy, which is one that we need to keep an eye on because it can restrict the ability of commerce and freedom of navigation and sea lines of communication that are in international waters. Those waters are called international waters for a reason. They belong to no one and they are there for all nations to be able to navigate with commercial vessels that contribute to prosperity, and as well, naval vessels that contribute to security”, said recently Vice Admiral James G. Foggo, III, Commander, Naval Striking & Support Forces NATO.

From a hardware perspective it is important to understand the specific shopping list that is at the heart of the Russian access-denial bubble in Kaliningrad, a variable fundamentally challenging the ways states in the proximity (and part) of the Baltic regional ecosystem have ensured so far their security:

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7 Selections from Strategia militară a României - Forţe armate moderne, pentru o Românie puternică în Europa şi în lume approved by the Romanian Government on 28th September 2016. : “Cu toate că o agresiune militară în Europa prezintă o probabilitate scăzută, capacitatea declanşării unei astfel de agresiuni, potenţată de realizarea capabilităţilor anti-access şi de interdicţie zonală (Anti-Access/Area Denial – A2/AD) în bazinul Mării Negre, reprezintă principală ameninţare la adresa securităţii României şi a statelor din regiune.” (p. 8)

8 Discursul Preşedintelui României, Klaus Iohannis, Reuniunea Anuală a Diplomatiei Române, 31 august, 2016: „La acestea se adaugă consolidarea forţelor armate ale Rusiei la frontiera sa vestică, încercările de impunere a unor zone de excludere a accesului în Marea Neagră şi utilizarea Mării Negre ca platformă de proiectare a forţei militare în estul Mediteranei.” http://www.presidency.ro/ro/media/discursuri/primirea-sefilor-de-misiuni-a-consulilor-generali-si-a-directorilor-institutelor-culturale-romanesti-cu-pritejul-reuniunii-anuale-a-diplomatiei-romane


10 The 44th Iteration of the BALTOPS Maritime Exercise, special Briefing by Vice Admiral James G. Foggo III, Rear Admiral Paddy McAlpine, Rear Admiral Francesco Covella, Lieutenant Colonel Per Gottfridsson, Commander Jarmo Holopainen via teleconference hosted by The Brussels Hub, June 8, 2016, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ime/useuropeanmediahub/transcripts/2016/258258.htm
# A2/AD assets in Kaliningrad and Baltic Sea Region

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<th>Asset*</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Operational Range</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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<tr>
<td>OTR-21 Tochka / SS-21 Scarab</td>
<td>Short range surface to surface missile</td>
<td>70-185 km</td>
<td>One missile brigade deployed in Kaliningrad;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iskander-M/ SS-26 Stone</td>
<td>Short range surface to surface missile</td>
<td>Around 500 km</td>
<td>A missile regiment has been deployed close to the Polish border. Set to replace OTR-21 Tochkas deployed in Kaliningrad;</td>
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<tr>
<td>S-300M / SA-10 Grumble</td>
<td>Long range surface to air missile</td>
<td>150-200 km</td>
<td>Deployed in Kaliningrad;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-400 Triumph / SA-21 Growler</td>
<td>Long range surface to air missile</td>
<td>250-400 km</td>
<td>Deployed in Kaliningrad;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-800 Oniks / 3M55/SS-N-26 Strobile</td>
<td>Supersonic anti-ship missile</td>
<td>300 km</td>
<td>To be deployed in the future aboard ships and as part of Bastion-P coastal defense missile complex;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3M54 Kalibr / SS-N-27 Sizzler</td>
<td>Supersonic/subsonic anti-ship missile and land attack cruise missile</td>
<td>50-2500 km</td>
<td>To be deployed in the future aboard new corvettes and frigates. Possibly already deployed on submarines assigned to the Baltic Sea Fleet;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-270 Moskit / SS-N-24-Sunburn</td>
<td>Supersonic anti-ship missile</td>
<td>120-250 km</td>
<td>Deployed aboard ships of Baltic Sea Flee. Can be launched from aircraft;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kh-35/3K60 Bal / SS-N-25 Switchblade</td>
<td>Subsonic anti-ship missile</td>
<td>130-300 km</td>
<td>Deployed aboard ships of the Baltic Sea Fleet. Can be launched from aircraft and deployed as part of the coastal defense system 3K60 Bal;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kh-22 / AS-4 Kitchen</td>
<td>Supersonic anti-ship missile</td>
<td>600 km</td>
<td>Deployed as part of the weapons system of the Tu-22M3 Backfire bomber;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kh-15 / AS-16 Kickback</td>
<td>Supersonic anti-ship missile</td>
<td>300 km</td>
<td>Deployed as part of the weapons system of the Tu-22M3 Backfire bomber.</td>
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*Asset designation is given according to Russian and NATO weapon classification systems. Weapons system data used is taken from Federation of American Scientists (fas.org) and Global Security (globalsecurity.org) websites.

The big difference between Kaliningrad and Crimea bubbles is that while the former “expands over much of allied territory, protecting an enclave from where the Russians can easily project force under the cover of those systems into the allied territory”\(^{11}\), Crimea is not (yet) directly threatening

\(^{11}\) Interview conducted by Octavian Manea with Stephan Frühling, an Associate Professor in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Summer 2016.
the territorial integrity of the NATO Black Sea allies. Given its proximity to the Baltic States, the Kaliningrad bubble can cut the reinforcement routes, including the Suwalki Gap that can be used by NATO rapid reaction forces to support them. From this perspective, the Black Sea NATO members are not necessarily exposed to a similar reinforcement trap. There are experts that are also questioning Russia’s rationale for using its Crimean A2/AD portfolio for coercive actions in the Black Sea: “becoming too aggressive in the Black Sea it will mean that they accept the consequences and that they are trapped in the Black Sea without having the possibility to exit to reinforce their forces in Syria and I don’t see them playing that card.”

**From a cyber perspective**, denial of the information battlespace to an adversary is a key ingredient for an A2/AD strategy. An enemy that cannot communicate and is unable to use its sensors, (i.e. is deaf, blind and mute), is vulnerable to a decisive counterattack. In this particular instance, the electromagnetic dominance of the battlefield facilitates the offensive employment of A2/AD assets and makes force projection or strategic reinforcement operations virtually impossible. For a detailed discussion of the cyber component, please see Annex II on Russian electronic warfare capabilities, on pg. 25.

**Reassurance and deterrence measures adopted by NATO since Ukraine**

*The Wales summit (2014)*

Its main purpose was highjacked by Russia’s unexpected aggression in Ukraine. From an Alliance criticized for overall lack of purpose, negligence of collective defense (in light of a shortage of threats after the end of the Cold War) and excessive emphasis on expeditionary warfare, NATO faced overnight the challenge of a military aggression in its immediate neighborhood and a threat to the security of its entire Eastern flank.

With this in mind, at the summit in Wales the Alliance new member states revisited the issue of the Russian threat with far more assertiveness than after the Russo-Georgian war in 2008 and confronted their reluctant Western counterparts. Wales was marked by the urgency to reassure its Eastern European member states and increase the military readiness in case of a Russian aggression directed at NATO territory.

However, the outcome (measures to bolster readiness) was to be limited, given the needed consensus of 28 member states. In terms of military strategy, Wales created a mild deterrent by punishment.\(^{13}\)

In terms of political statement, Wales sent a message of a weak, nevertheless clear alarm – the Alliance refused to declare Russia an adversary, but considered it a threat.

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\(^{12}\) Interview conducted by Octavian Manea with Guillaume Lasconjarias, Advisor in the Research Division of the NATO Defense College, Summer 2016.

Before the 2014 NATO summit, in the immediate aftermath of crisis in Ukraine, Allies already undertook some deterrence measures. The NATO Baltic Air Policing Mission was substantively strengthened and the U.S. established the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) of an initial 1 billion USD for one year, intended to reassure European allies of U.S. commitment to their security. Additionally, Washington deployed two more B2 stealth bombers to Europe.

The deterrence initiatives established in Wales are known as the NATO Readiness Action Plan (RAP), a set of assurance measures aimed at enhancing the military protection of Alliance’s Eastern flank. In practice, this meant: the non-permanent but continuous rotational presence of NATO troops on Eastern European allied territory; the establishment of a 4,000-strong Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF); the commitment to complex exercises that cover both crisis management missions and collective defense; updating of defense plans (including contingency plans); preparation of national infrastructure in the region; establishment of multinational command and control centers on the Eastern flank, and positioning facilities, equipment, supplies and logistics specialists on the flank to enable rapid reinforcement and deployment in case of an aggression.

The measures were important steps to reassure Eastern member states and came with considerable costs for training and maintaining high readiness forces. However, in light of the massive Russian threat, they don’t constitute more than deterrence tripwires and raise only mildly the possible costs, as even after Wales, NATO continues to rely on in-depth defense. More importantly, the ample and expensive measures adopted under RAP only defend against linear, conventional attacks, while hybrid threats are only beginning to be addressed. Furthermore, the rotational NATO forces established after the 2014 summit remain non-permanent, as NATO members refuse to commit to a permanent military presence on the Eastern flank.

The Warsaw summit (2016)

The debates that took place in anticipation of the NATO summit in Warsaw had a common denominator: Russia. While “Old Europe” was set to cool the dispute down and reduce or even lift sanctions on Moscow, “New Europe” aimed the opposite - to strengthen the Alliance’s defensive presence on the Eastern flank in light of the continuous military threat stemming from Russia, both in terms of rhetoric and action.

Beyond the progress in increasing NATO’s conventional deterrence and assessing the implementation of RAP, the Warsaw summit’s conclusions remained uncertain in terms of stances of heaviest players and of results: Germany’s stronger role in European security (as laid out in the 2016 White Paper), was clouded, however, by the Merkel-Steinmeier ambiguity; the pledged increased cooperation between NATO and the EU looks to be difficult and is regarded with wariness. The Warsaw summit means the continuation of measures initiated in Wales: enhanced land forces in the immediate proximity of Russia, which are considered as essential to the Baltic States and Poland. As expected, the center of gravity of the Warsaw summit was the Nordic Eastern flank. Four multinational battalions - coordinated by Germany, Britain, Canada and the United States as

15 Federal Ministry of Defense, White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr, 2016: https://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSSzPy8xBz9CP3l5EyrrHK9pNyydL3y1Mzi4qTS5Ay9IPzyvJz8xJRi_YJsR0UAIHdqGQ!!/
framework nations - will be deployed in the Baltic States and Poland. Furthermore, through ERI, 1,000 U.S. troops will be stationed in Poland, possibly in the Suwalki gap.\textsuperscript{16} Poland will also host the command center of a U.S. armored brigade (4,000 forces), with rotational units placed on the Eastern flank, including in Romania. Thus, the Warsaw focus was on battle groups and deterrence.

On the other hand, the South of the Eastern flank received far more modest attention. The only commitments snatched from the Bulgarians and Poles were to participate in the establishment of a multinational brigade under Romanian command. Romania’s initiative for a regional fleet failed spectacularly through the unprepared veto of Russian-influenced Bulgaria before the summit, thus calling off – for now – any common maritime deterrence in the Black Sea. Thus, Warsaw shaped a new reality: the North and South of the Eastern flank are in different solidarity leagues.

Given Bucharest’s failure to secure a regional Alliance response to the Russian military build-up in the Black Sea, Romania sought in Warsaw an enforced allied naval presence on its coast to protect the freedom of navigation, as well as the country’s national security, for which the new military strategy assesses the Black Sea A2/AD as its greatest threat.\textsuperscript{17} A decision on the issue of the Black Sea A2/AD was postponed until the NATO ministerial meeting in October 2016, but a significant decision is unlikely, as it would involve a complex debate of regional sea and air capabilities necessary for countering the Russian A2/AD.\textsuperscript{18}

Along with implementation of measures decided in Wales, conceptually, the approach was maintained beyond Warsaw. In spite of the Eastern European calls, the Alliance refuses to establish a permanent military presence on the flank and maintains its hope for cooperation with Russia, ignoring Moscow’s adversarial character. In the aftermath of Wales, a recommendation (but not a compulsory measure) was formulated to increase military budgets to the mandatory 2% of the GDP and dedicate 20% of the military budget to research and development. The Warsaw summit represented a benchmark for noting an increase in defense budgets:

**Net defense budgets variation in Europe between 2015 and 2016**

![Image of bar chart showing defense budgets variation](source)


\textsuperscript{16} The territorial strip between Kaliningrad and Belarus, vital to ensuring the land access of NATO troops to the Baltic ecosystem.

\textsuperscript{17} Military Strategy of Romania, 2016, Decision to approve, pp. 7-8, http://dlaj.mapn.ro/arhiva2016.php

\textsuperscript{18} NATO Warsaw summit communiqué, article 41, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm
Trend of European defense spending since 2007


Thus, compared to Wales, the Warsaw summit was more about reviewing the reassurance and mild deterrence measures adopted and complementing them with more modest measures. The aftermath of Warsaw will mean less of an implementation schedule, given the reduced number of measures decided upon. The 2016 summit meant a fragmentation of the Eastern flank into North and South, with the North benefitting from a military build-up and the South remaining a no man’s land, divided between unconventional threats stemming from the Mediterranean, the A2/AD build-up and hybrid threat taking place in the Moscow-controlled Crimean peninsula.

NATO’s European capability gap

The last two NATO summits – in Wales and in Warsaw – were all about increasing readiness. However, when theory is confronted with practice, the numbers don’t add up. NATO readiness reached a record low in 2014, and only recently started a slow path towards growth. Defined as the ability to perform a task that is assigned to it (in terms of both manpower and equipment), in technical terms readiness translates into flying hours, steaming days, tank miles and training events.19 While NATO formulated the RAP and established the VJTF in Wales, if measured in numbers, the overall readiness of European allied forces disproportionately dropped at the end of 2014: readiness levels for air forces were below 50%, while land and maritime force readiness also faced a series of critical concerns20 in France, Germany, UK and Italy, Europe’s largest armed forces.

20 Idem.
The decreasing trend of military readiness started in 1990 and was steadily maintained over the next decade, only to be further aggravated after 2001 by the tendency of European governments to largely abandon investments into defense. After 2007, the downward trend was reduced, but only a relative increase can be seen in light of the Russian invasion of Crimea. The downward trend of military readiness in Europe is directly proportionate to the dwindling defense budgets. After 2008, but also before (due to the lack of an immediate threat), Europeans have not been incentivized to invest in military budgets. Moreover, beyond technicalities, readiness is also about interoperability, threat adaptability, projection capacity, as well as political will and consensus.\textsuperscript{21} When assessed, one can easily draw the conclusion that Europe fails to lead in any of these areas. But the most evident problem remains the lack of consensus among the 28 Allies, which makes NATO unable to define its perception of and relationship with Russia.

Even though RAP and VJTF are designed to address the readiness and responsiveness and adapt the Alliance’s military posture overall, they fail to fill Europe’s major capability gap. In terms of Western European powers, the major gap is reflected by the nature of the national armed forces. With the exception of UK, Western and Central European armed forces are predominantly continental, and thus designed around the concepts of mobilization and territorial defense. Consequently, Europe has major gaps in air and maritime forces generally, and significant specific gaps in terms of strategic airlift and air-to-air refueling. In practice, this means that continental powers have a medium readiness when it comes to territorial defense, and are faced with major mobilization, logistical, projection, efficiency (in terms of threat adaptability), and, of course, multinational interoperability problems when it comes to defending NATO territory. Given the Alliance refusal to establish permanent deterrence structures on its Eastern flank and continued reliance on in depth deterrence, readiness in numbers continues to be a challenge despite RAP and VJTF.

When it comes to South Eastern Europe and particularly Romania, the situation is even grimmer. In the last 15 years, in the context of its NATO integration in 2004 and 9/11, Romania has overtly focused its defense capabilities on expeditionary warfare. Heavily participating in the war in Afghanistan and in the coalition of the willing in Iraq, Bucharest has largely neglected its defense capabilities, in spite of being a continental armed force. After 2008, the rhetoric indeed switched towards a greater emphasis on territorial defense, but it was not translated into acquisitions. Most of the equipment Romania owns dates from the communist time, is outdated and not interoperable.

Today, Bucharest has to drastically restructure both its strategy and its armed forces. However, the process is slow and seems at times aimless. The necessary steps Romania needs to take in order to be able to defend its territory if attacked is to develop the ability to deny access to the battle space – in this case the Black Sea via anti-ship, surface and air capabilities, while protecting the critical infrastructure and military assets.\textsuperscript{22}

For Romania, this means a systematic assessment of its capabilities and priorities, a much stronger emphasis on territorial defense and, of course, the development – with help from its Allies – of its

\textsuperscript{21} Idem.

naval force. Beyond national capabilities, a necessary (but difficult) endeavor will be the partial integration of its forces with Bulgaria and Turkey.

Given the lack of preparedness and Bucharest’s very low ability to deter, NATO will also have to boost Romanian defense in order to avoid the unlikely scenario of a full-blown war caused by the Romanian inability to deter. This means an in-depth focus and investment in NATO air and maritime defense in the Black Sea. Unlike the Baltic A2/AD, where the focus is on strengthening land forces and moving NATO deterrence from punishment to denial, the Black Sea bubble is all about air and maritime denial and medium range defense. For NATO, this raises several non-exclusive possibilities:

1) creating a semi-integrated structure for the Romanian, Bulgarian and Turkish navies with funding for modernization of their infrastructures, and ideally including the transfer of Allied naval capabilities as national to circumvent the limitations of the Montreux Convention;

2) a rotational air patrol;

3) the deployment on the Black Sea coast of anti-ship and anti-aircraft.\textsuperscript{23}

Such measures would necessitate a re-evaluation of NATO strategy. First and foremost, it would mean linking deterrence with territorial defense. In practice, this means the further development and, most of all, full implementation of the NATO Maritime Strategy as the foundation for building capabilities on the South Eastern flank, including effective electronic reconnaissance and command capabilities, enhanced cyber defense and intelligence penetration, an extended and in-depth development of missile capabilities and effective anti-submarine capabilities.\textsuperscript{24} Second, this also means the necessary alignment of the NATO Eastern flank strategy with the Alliance, as well as U.S. strategic priorities.

These possibilities, even though costly and in need of a great allied effort, seem doable on paper. At a closer look, however, political considerations impose drastic limits. The most obvious problem is that of transnational defense cooperation among three countries with differing, at times opposing views on the mutual threat – the Russian A2/AD bubble. As became evident yet again by the unexpected Bulgarian veto of the Romanian pre-Warsaw initiative of a multinational fleet and the declaration regarding the Bulgarian position vis-à-vis Russia as amicable, a Romanian-Bulgarian in-depth defense cooperation is unlikely. The same goes for Turkey, where recent events and latest policy positions question its role as a member of the Alliance (see Chapter 4 of this Special Report). In the end, the problem Romania and the Alliance face with regard to the Russian threat in the Black Sea is creating and developing a yet altogether virtually inexistent deterrence, first by punishment, then by denial.

\textsuperscript{23} Idem.
\textsuperscript{24} Idem.
Offset strategies as ways to strengthen conventional deterrence

Historical background

Before discussing in detail the broad contours of a third offset strategy, it is important to clarify first the historical legacy of its precursors. It is key to understand the underlying strategic reality that forced the United States to adopt its second offset strategy, one that “was consistently pursued by five administrations during the 1970s and 1980s.” At the center of it are three main characters – Harold Brown (U.S. Secretary of Defense during the Carter Administration, 1977-1981), William Perry (Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering) and Robert Komer (Undersecretary of Defense for Policy) – that had pivotal roles in shaping it.

By mid 1970s, the conventional balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact has been significantly altered in favor of the latter. At the time, “NATO and the United States were looking at a Soviet Union with parity in nuclear weapons and about a 3-fold advantage in conventional weapons,” William Perry would later remember. The trends were pointing out towards a conviction that the Soviet Union was enjoying “conventional warfare superiority in Europe,” not everywhere, but in the right places where it really mattered, the eventual “geographical breakthrough corridors” that could be used by the Warsaw Pact as invasion routes into Western Europe. Tactically, these choke points were providing a sort of collective center of gravity for the NATO defenses. While overall NATO had superior force ratios and a very diversified, but loose and highly dispersed portfolio of capabilities, its posture was far from adequate to respond to the Soviet challenge particularly at these strategic pressure points. The biggest problem for the Alliance was that the Warsaw Pact forces were channeling their resources in order to establish a significant competitive advantage by optimizing their posture for “an overwhelmingly armored and air blitzkrieg thrust across the NATO Center Region.” So what was to be done?

The choice that was made then was to gradually build a credible conventional deterrence-by-denial posture aimed to demonstrate the ability “to prevent a quick conventional Soviet victory by stabilizing for at least thirty days a line near the inner German border.” In short, if the focus of the Warsaw Pact was on “out-massing” the NATO forces through multiple follow-on echelons, the Alliance’s core objective was to “outlast a Soviet blitzkrieg (...) by strengthening initial anti-blitzkrieg defense.” Towards this effect and under the guidance of the Carter administration, the Alliance will begin a process of profound readjustment in terms of its geographical posture and capability investments. The signature initiatives taken then would sound highly familiar to the

26 Blowtorch, location 4889 of 10212.
30 Robert Komer, RAND, p. 4.
31 Idem
observers of the post Crimea NATO summits in Wales (fall 2014) and Poland (summer 2016). They all share a common denominator: a tailored mix of forward presence, pre-positioning of equipment, improved readiness, advanced interoperable command-and-control elements while developing the capability for rapid reinforcement through rapid reaction forces. All these building blocks were perceived as essential for projecting a credible deterrence message, but insufficient. They needed a force multiplier. In hindsight, the jewel in the crown was what has been called as the second offset strategy. Its core logic was grounded in an insight observed in market patterns: “there are levels of strategy for a nation just as there are for a firm that is developing strategies to deal with its environment and competitors”, concluded Andrew Marshall, the director of Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment, in a memo where he made the case for the necessity of developing a competitive strategy under which the DoD should invest in “areas of competitive advantages for ourselves that we believe are naturally enduring, or can be made enduring through appropriate research and development, training etc.”

This is the general philosophy that will guide William Perry’s journey as the architect of the second offset strategy whose purpose by design was to “compensate for the Soviet size advantage in conventional forces and thus re-establish general military parity and shore up deterrence.” It was a conscious effort of harnessing the very niche technological advantages of the information age (especially the progress in microelectronics and computers) where America was uniquely positioned and place them in the service of reinforcing conventional deterrence by gradually fielding a new generation of weapons that would “enable revolutionary, decisive battlefield prowess even against considerably larger forces.” Concretely, it was an innovative bet on blending and networking three core dimensions: stealth technology, the progress made in the so-called “smart weapons” precision-guided munitions regime, sensors that could provide very detailed real-time battle space awareness in relation to the location of enemy forces. Some signature products that later will make a great career and whose seeds were planted in this early stage were the F-117, the AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control Systems) and the GPS (Global Positioning Satellite). All these revolutionary trends (fitted more for the iconic Star Wars movie) will merge in order to create a “system of systems”, a reconnaissance strike-complex that aimed “to find and destroy follow-on echelons of Russian troops before they reached the central front.”

The embodiment of the vision will be the Assault Breaker concept that operationally was aimed at “disrupting”, “interdicting” and neutralizing the successive waves of an armored assault intended to overwhelm and out-mass the NATO forward defenses and penetrate into Western Europe before the Alliance could mobilize. Of course, the technology was not in itself a panacea. It had to be embedded in force structures and be used under the logic of very specific operational constructs (like the Air-Land battle). Overall, the second offset strategy was a way to restore the credibility of the deterrence measures in Europe and can be seen, retroactively, as a major causal mechanism for changing the Russian calculus:

“it clearly influenced Soviet perceptions about deterrence. By demonstrating the capability to

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34 A.W. Marshall, Competitive Strategies-History and Background, March 3rd, 1988, p.2
36 Ibidem, p. 35.
look deep and shoot deep into Warsaw Pact territory in the 1970s and 1980s, NATO called into question the underlying Soviet operational concept at the time for combined arms ground maneuver. (…) It did influence Soviet calculations about the balance of power and bolstered deterrence along the Central Front in Europe. It certainly sowed doubt in their minds about the feasibility of achieving the timelines underpinning their operational plans.”

This particular understanding became a guiding lesson with major influence on the thinking of the current leadership in the Pentagon who concluded that the whole effort launched under the Carter Administration and bolstered by Reagan had a systemic effect, making war less likely in Europe essentially by reinventing NATO’s deterrence credibility via the offset: “by 1984, we convinced the Soviet general staff that they could not achieve their conventional objectives.” Ultimately, the Desert Storm operation against Saddam Hussein provided the real-world proof of the concept behind the technological bet of the second offset strategy since the Iraqi military was a mirror image of the Soviet one, in fact a “miniature Warsaw Pact military” and “the fourth largest army in the world.”

Why do all these matter and what is their current relevance?

The main takeaway is that the second offset strategy was a way to preserve the status-quo in Europe by thickening up deterrence, sustaining it and fixing the NATO conventional imbalance in Europe: “containment, deterrence and offset strategy were the components of a broad holding strategy during the Cold War. (…) it did not change the geopolitical conditions which led to the Cold War, but it did deter another World War and it did stem Soviet expansion in the world until the internal contradictions in the Soviet system finally caused the Soviet Union to collapse.”

Nonetheless, by harnessing this very diversified mix of initiatives (new philosophies for employing force, the asymmetric advantage of deep attack smart munitions, readjustments in the overall posture of the Alliance) that reinvented NATO in the Central Front, the message sent to the other side was loud and clear: “we are able to defeat you because we have concepts, infrastructure and technologies that will disable your strategy. You will take a great risk in attacking because we would be able to deviate your intent. The concept was to develop an RMA kind of thinking – structures, concepts, technologies – that combined will send a message that you cannot defeat us”, concluded a NATO research expert. These are some of the big lessons that are informing the current discussions on the third offset strategy.

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43 Interview conducted by Octavian Manea, Summer 2016.
**Garry Kasparov meets *Ex-Machina* and *Ender's Game***

For a few years now, Pentagon’s leadership is emphasizing the need to invest in a new offset strategy (a third one) able to consolidate U.S. conventional deterrence in the new security environment. While it was an effort initiated in Chuck Hagel’s term as Secretary of Defense (2013-2015), the real chief architect of the whole philosophy will remain the Ashton Carter – Robert Work team, whose efforts over the last two years have defined the vision of the third offset strategy.

The third offset strategy is first of all an answer to a multipolar world, where China and Russia are becoming mature A2/AD powers. In a way, it is the end of the unipolar technological cycle, because both China and Russia are mastering today the precision guided munitions regime that was at the core of the second offset strategy, developing counter-intervention bubbles (some of which expand well over the territory of NATO allies, see p. 10) that keeps at bay the power-projection capability of the other side. Neutralizing these traditional key tenets of reassurance and deterrence can have major destabilizing effects, especially for U.S. allies placed in the proximity of super-regional powers that displayed direct revisionist impulses (Russia and China). This is the context in which U.S. has embarked on a new offset journey trying to preserve its technological edge by leveraging the next wave of weapon-systems. The overall purpose (very much inspired by the whole experience of the second offset strategy) is to strengthen conventional deterrence ultimately aiming to “eliminate any incentive for pre-emption or aggression, convince our competitor to change their strategic calculus and reduce the chances that a miscalculation could lead to a major power conflict.”

The historical reality that drives this effort is similar to what happened previously in the inter-war period, when Germany was able to leverage the available technological advances in key domains - radio, aviation and mechanization - combining them in new creative formulas and forging revolutionary operational constructs (the so called blitzkrieg) that transformed the way wars were fought.

Today the whole intuition that underlines the third offset strategy is very 21st century oriented and is rooted in something that happened in 1997, when a computer beat the famous world champion Garry Kasparov. Eight years later, “two amateurs, working with 3 PCs defeated a field of chess champions, grand masters, and machines themselves. It was the machines -- well, Garry Kasparov using the strategic analysis of a human, combined with the tactical acuity of a computer.”

It is the nexus between human and learning machines, the ability of technologically enabled decisions (potentially better and faster) that might impact how war will be fought in the near future. The end result could be a reconnaissance strike complex on steroids, with a very 21st century flavor - a comprehensive human-machine battle network able to synchronize operations across multiple domains.

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domains: “the advances in artificial intelligence and autonomy will allow the joint force to develop
and operate advanced joint collaborative human machine battle networks that synchronize
simultaneously operations in space, air, sea, undersea, ground and cyber domains.”

How is this applicable to the current European theatre, a highly constrained A2/AD environment
where a potential adversary not only leverages the proximity, but has at his disposal a highly
sophisticated arsenal of “precise guided munitions, advanced air-to-air and anti-air defenses, very
long-range artillery, and very effective cyber and EW weapons”? During the second offset, the
Assault Breaker program was deeply embedded in the NATO operational and organizational
constructs (Air-Land battle and FOFA-Follow on Forces Attack) that neutralized most of the
assumptions on which rested the theory of victory of the other side. In today’s Europe, where the
main challenge is maintaining the freedom of movement and the ability to project power to secure
and defend allies whose territory is covered by Russian A2/AD bubbles, the option encouraged by
the Pentagon top leadership could be that of a Raid Breaker capability, essentially a protective
umbrella that will shield the rapid reaction forces (like VJTF) in their way to the flank. Concretely,
this could take the form of a multi-domain human-machine enabled battle network capable of
orchestrating precise fires with artillery, rockets, conventional ballistic missiles complemented by
MD capabilities. But as it was the case during the second half of the 1970s and 1980s, the Alliance
renewed focus on finding the next-wave deterrent technology should be mirrored by a significant
process of rethinking and updating its operational constructs for an A2/AD environment.

Going back, NATO’s own history, suggests that it is the mix of pre-positioning of equipment,
forward presence oriented posture, reinforced by traditional power-projection capabilities and
combined with new ways and means to offset the competitive advantages of the other side (time,
space, quantity) that will ultimately convey a deterrence effect changing the Russian perception on
its ability to change the status-quo. After Warsaw, deterring Russia still remains the main game in
town because “an unstable Russia could at some point be unable to resist the opportunity to exploit
an overwhelming local advantage to take Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and present the West with
a nuclear-backed fait accompli”.

47 Remarks by Deputy Secretary Work, Satellite Industries Association, Washington, D.C., March 7, 2016,
http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/696289/satellite-industries-association
48 Remarks by Deputy Secretary Work on Third Offset Strategy as Delivered by Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work,
49 Idem.
ANNEX I: Risks for Romania’s EEZ after Crimea’s Annexation

After the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Ukraine de facto lost more than half of its EEZ to Russia. The annexation made Romania and Russia bordering maritime states and jeopardizes Bucharest’s sovereignty of resource-rich perimeters in the Black Sea. The most problematic area may be a maritime strip disputed between Ukraine and Romania of which Bucharest was awarded 80% following a trial against Ukraine at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2009. Before the ICJ decision, Romanian estimates for the disputed strip were 70 Bcm and 12 Million tons of oil. Romania and Russia do not differentiate between the 2009 gained perimeter and the rest of the EEZs (no demarcation exists between the EEZs of newly annexed Crimea - now claimed by Russia, Ukraine’s remaining EEZ, and Romania’s current EEZ) which may be the object of future disputes. According to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), states have exclusive sovereign rights of exploration and exploitation of natural resources in the EEZ, but only operational rights, as EEZs fall into the legal category of international waters, which does not limit the traffic of other states.

If Romania were to hold on to economic sovereignty over its continental shelf as a response to Russian military activities in its EEZ, it would most likely not receive support from the U.S. (supporting a UNCLOS interpretation that favors great naval powers, plus the risk of antagonizing Russia is too high) or the EU (which hasn’t developed a clear policy on EEZ and its position towards Russian aggression is non-consensual). On the other hand, Russia’s repeated aggressions in the Black Sea make belligerence towards Romania in the Black Sea likely.

From a military point of view, Romania’s only viable option towards Russia is deterrence through military acquisitions that would significantly increase the costs of a Russian attack. Air defense and short- and medium range missiles must be a priority. Beyond this, Romania should develop a modernization plan for its naval forces, which must be focused on defense capabilities, especially at tactical level (coastguard vessels and submarine).

The risk factors to exploration for companies that have leased on this strip from Romania could include: media debate and environmental protests; bribery; endangering the pipeline approval process; and subversive attacks on pipelines. As a result of possible subversive Russian activities in various stages of exploration and production, Western companies may withdraw from the Romanian market, putting the long-term energy security of Romania, and the region, in jeopardy.

Russia may also resort to military force by: attacking exploration activities in the Romanian EEZ and declaring it an accident; threatening with military power and mobilizing naval forces in the vicinity of exploitation operations (see the 2011 Cyprus incident, where Turkey conducted military exercises in the vicinity of exploration to intimidate companies and Russia sent two attack submarines in support of Cyprus). Romania is unable to militarily protect its explorations in its EEZ due to the unavailability of required capabilities and the risk of conflict in a territory that is not protected by Art. 5.

ANNEX II: Russian electronic warfare capabilities

U.S. and NATO forces enjoyed a net superiority over the electronic battlespace over the past 25 years, ever since the first Gulf War. Then, satellite imagery, secured satellite communications, early warning aircraft (AWACS, JSTARS), Ground Positioning System (GPS) and electronic countermeasures allowed for a quick victory against an Iraqi army that could not muster the latest technological advances. After 1991 the development of network centric warfare, GPS guided weapons and sensor fused weapons further secured the West’s battlefield superiority.

However, that superiority is now being challenged as access to technology is widespread and as other countries begin to learn how to employ sophisticated sensor, targeting and communications systems as well as how to counter such systems. The advantage has now been transformed into a disadvantage that can be exploited by other competitors. China and Russia have taken note of the western style of warfare and have taken steps to counter it. In the words of Allan Shaffer, Pentagon’s chief engineer, “We have lost the electromagnetic spectrum... That’s a huge deal when you think about fielding advanced systems that can be [countered] by a very, very cheap digital jammer.”

The Ukrainian war has highlighted Russian military capabilities in the information battlespace. Russian forces successfully jammed Ukrainian military’s communications during the conflict in the Donbas, electronic countermeasure (ECM) systems brought down Ukrainian UAVs by successfully jamming their GPS signals, electronically fused artillery rounds were neutralized in flight and Ukrainian command and control centers were put out of commission. The electronic superiority thus achieved gave Russian and rebel forces almost free reign over the battlefield. Russian electronic warfare systems have also been used to support operations in Syria and to buttress the nascent A2/AD bubble around Latakia.

Over the past decade, Russia has developed the doctrine of radio electronic combat on how to fight in the electromagnetic spectrum. It is a broad framework that surrounds the targeting of enemy artillery, missile forces, both conventional and nuclear, command and communication centers, radar facilities, air defenses, logistics centers, enemy reserves and point targets that jeopardize advancing military forces. Russia has organized its electronic warfare assets in independent battalion and brigade sized formations under the command of the general staff, which can be deployed relatively fast and can be attached to other units.

Electronic warfare systems have been developed and fielded that are aimed at U.S. and NATO key assets in the electromagnetic spectrum. A particular target is the GPS without which it will be impossible to navigate, locate or target an enemy. Russia is also developing and deploying a system aimed at countering NATO’s “eye in the sky” – the E-3 Sentry AWACS and similar systems.

Krasukha-4 as it is known, is able to jam aircraft, radar and, it is claimed, even low earth orbit satellites.\textsuperscript{58}

U.S. and NATO vulnerability to electronic attack is enhanced by a comparative lack of investment and interest in the field. For example, after the Cold War, the United States Army had disbanded its Combat Electronic Warfare and Intelligence (CEWI) units.\textsuperscript{59} However, the systems and tactics developed by Russia are not invincible. GPS jamming can be overcome by using more secure datalinks or by switching to inertial navigation chips (Micro-Technology for Positioning, Navigation and Timing, Micro-PNT)\textsuperscript{60}, but this technology is still in its infancy. The West has also other assets that can be used to counter their Russian’s equivalents such as the EA-18G Growler electronic attack and anti-radar aircraft in service with the U.S. Navy. The capabilities of the Growler fleet will be enhanced in the near future by adding the Next Generation Jammer to its arsenal.\textsuperscript{61} In the future, F-35 Lightning II, which possess a sophisticated electronic warfare suit could be used to “burn” through enemy electronic warfare systems.

\textit{Note: Annex II is written by George Vişan}
Chapter 2

NATO missile defense – fundamentals, vulnerabilities and perceptions

by GEORGE VIȘAN and ȘTEFAN POPESCU

Missile Defense in Europe: the building blocks

At NATO’s Warsaw Summit in July 2016 the missile defense system in Europe has been declared operational, even if parts of it are still “under construction” (the interceptor in Poland). As NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated “US ships based in Spain, the radar in Turkey, and the interceptor site in Romania” are operational, work together under the control center in Ramstein (Germany) and make possible the interception of a ballistic missile which Iran could supposedly launch towards NATO’s South-Eastern Flank. At the same time, system elements have been formally transferred by Washington to NATO command. Consequently, we are dealing with a defensive equipment, as evident from the project title itself: anti-missile defense shield.

There are no less than 30 states in the world today pursuing or improving ballistic capabilities, and some of them would qualify as potential threats to NATO. In addition, there is a high risk of proliferation, of non-state actors wanting to own ballistic capabilities to be used against the West. The spread of ballistic technology seems unstoppable despite adoption by the international community of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 1987. NATO’s anti-missile defense is thus a technology antidote to a technology challenge, a security measure to a security challenge, a set of military measures that complements nuclear deterrence in relation to new nuclear club entrants or to those states covertly developing nuclear military programs.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), signed on July 15, 2015, made the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) an insurance policy against Iranian nuclear and ballistic ambitions. Once fully implemented and operational, EPAA will complement nuclear deterrence and will question the effectiveness of Iran’s ballistic missiles. The new approach places interceptors aboard ships and in Romania and Poland, countries which are considered to have the ideal geographical position for the missile defense of Europe. Originally, the EPAA was structured in four phases. Phase I consisted in the deployment of missile defense ships to the Mediterranean Sea in 2011. The Ticonderoga class cruiser USS Monterey was the first ship to perform a ballistic defense patrol as part of the new approach to the missile defense of Europe. Phase II saw the deployment of the Aegis Ashore system at Deveselu, in Romania, in 2015. The Aegis Ashore facility in Romania is equipped with 24 Standard SM-3 IB missiles capable of intercepting medium-range ballistic missiles.


range ballistic missiles. Additionally, between 2014 and 2015, 4 U.S. Navy destroyers were based in Rota, Spain, to perform missile defense patrols. Phase III which should be implemented in 2018 will see the building of another Aegis Ashore facility in Poland, at Redzikovo, which will be equipped with Standard SM-3 IIA missiles capable of intercepting intermediate range ballistic missiles. These interceptors have some capability to deal with intercontinental ballistic missiles. Phase 4 of EPAA was to be implemented after 2022 and entailed the deployment ashore and on ships of the SM-3 IIB missiles which would have had an increased performance against ICBMs. However, Phase 4 was cancelled in 2013. Deveselu and Redzikowo bases, together with the Aegis cruisers and destroyers, insure the protection of Europe against ballistic missile threats from Izmir and Incirlik to London.  

Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD): NATO capabilities due by 2018 vs. Russian response

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BMD Phases and how it works

Setting up the missile defense shield

The U.S. is establishing its Angle defense Missile Defense System in Europe in four phases, hereby called the European Phase Adaption Approach.

**Current Deployments**
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**Future deployments**
- Phase 1: 2011-2016
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**Phase 2: 2015-2018**
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**Phase 3: 2018-2020**
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**Phase 4: 2020+**
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**How the missile defense shield would work**

NATO’s ballistic missile defense plan involves a coordinated national- and theater-level missile defense, threat and defense monitoring, and tracking and targeting of threats.

**Early warning**

Ground-, air- and sea-based radar, and satellite surveillance systems detect and track incoming missiles. This information is shared with USMC operators, who monitor the region for threats.

**Tracking**

In addition to strategic radar systems, other ground-based, air-based, and sea-based radar systems detect and track incoming missiles.

**Standard Missile 3 (SM-3)**

The SM-3 is the U.S. Navy’s primary weapon against an intercontinental ballistic missile. It uses a kinetic kill vehicle that摧毁s the missile. The energy released in a high-speed collision of the SM-3 and the target missile creates a large explosion that destroys the target missile.

**Source:** eurasiangeopolitics
Missile defense vulnerabilities

Missile defense economics

Getting a missile to hit another missile is like hitting a bullet with another bullet – this oft repeated adage by both missile defense advocates and detractors means that it requires a lot of time and resources to make an antiballistic system work. Access to ballistic missile technology is much easier now for both state and non-state actors than before the end of the Cold War. Developing ballistic missiles is cheaper and efforts in this direction can be aided by states willing to share the technology for a certain price – North Korea is the best example of ballistic missile technology proliferator.

The reality of missile defense technology is that right now it costs more to intercept a ballistic missile than to build one. An SM-3 Block IB interceptor missile has an estimated cost of 11.2 million dollars apiece while an Iranian Shahab 3 or 4 missiles is much cheaper. To put things into perspective, the missile defense base at Deveselu cost the U.S. Government around $1 billion and the budget allocation for the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Program for the 2017 fiscal year is $1.7 billion.

Meanwhile, Iran’s defense budget for 2015 was $10.3 billion and has decreased by a third since 2006. In FY 2014, the Pentagon spent 1.7% of its budget on missile defense that is $7.6 billion – a staggering amount of money compared to Tehran’s military expenses. With a relatively small investment in ballistic missile technology a state can impose large costs even on a great power like the United States, forcing it to protect itself and its allies from such a threat.

Then there is the issue of credibility of ballistic missile defense. In pure economic terms, the advantage lies squarely with the proliferator/potential aggressor. A ballistic missile salvo is many more times cheaper than a missile defense counter-salvo. And even with a high performance system like the AEGIS BMD there is a likelihood that some ballistic missiles will get through. Therefore, missile defense systems represent a strategic and political gamble that is underpinned by nuclear and conventional deterrence. However, costs can be imposed on the potential proliferator by improving ballistic missiles defenses and by threatening military retaliation. In the medium and long term, integrated air defense and ballistic missile will be supplemented with directed energy weapons and railguns (electromagnetic cannons). These systems are still under development and will be deployed sometime after 2025. As with the current antiballistic technology, the costs of these new generation weapons system is rather prohibitive and only a technological breakthrough will lower the costs for missile defense systems.

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73 Robert Haddick, Fire on the Water: China, America, and the future of the Pacific, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2014, p. 113
Gaps in Romanian air defenses

These represent another matter of concern, in particular the vulnerability of the Deveselu site to aerial attack, given the tense situation on NATO’s Eastern flank. Ballistic missile defenses are generally vulnerable to multiple missile attacks that deplete their stock of munitions and overwhelm them, to air strikes by aircraft or cruise missiles – the latter vulnerability is quite serious for fixed installations such as the one at Deveselu. Sabotage or direct action can also compromise the security of a fixed installation, although the probability of such attacks is remote. In case of ship based missile defenses, such as the four destroyers deployed by the United States at Rota, on the Atlantic coast of Spain, the main threats come from coordinated air and naval attacks. Attack submarines, both nuclear (SSNs) and their sophisticated conventionally powered counterparts (SSKs) represent a potent threat to the missile defense ships patrolling in the Atlantic, Mediterranean, Black and Baltic Seas.

After the annexation of Crimea, Russia has deployed in the Black Sea modern surface and subsurface combatants, capable of employing Kalibr cruise missile to strike land targets deep inside enemy territory. The capabilities of these cruise missiles have been amply demonstrated in 2015 and 2016, when Russian surface ships and a submarine from the Black Sea Fleet launched repeated strikes against Syrian opposition and Daesh targets in Syria. By the end of 2016, the Russian Black Sea Fleet will have received 3 Admiral Grigorovich class guided missile frigates, 6 Kilo class diesel-electric attack submarines and at least 2 Buyan-M missile corvettes. All of these ships are capable of employing Kalibr cruise missiles. Crimean naval shipyards have begun building two new missile corvettes for the Russian Navy that may also be armed with land attack cruise missiles. Had there been a consensus between the United States and Russia concerning European missile defense, this situation would not have occurred. Consequently, by deploying cruise missiles in the Black Sea, Russia is trying to increase the costs of ballistic missile defenses for the United States.

The concentration of cruise missiles and launch platforms in the Black Sea is not accidental and represents countervailing response to the American deployment of the missile defense system in Europe. Russia is employing these assets as a hedge against the U.S. missile defense deployments in Europe. The mission of the Aegis Ashore installation in Romania is to defend against possible ballistic missile attack originating from the Middle East. As such, the system is not capable of dealing with cruise missiles that can be deployed from aircraft, surface ships and submarines. By default, the protection of the missile base at Deveselu falls to the host nation, Romania.

The Romanian Air Force is at the moment ill-equipped to deal with cruise missiles strikes or air strikes against the missile defense assets deployed on Romania’s territory. The mainstay of the

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Romanian Air Force is still the MiG-21 Lancer\(^7\), a 60 year old design that had been upgraded towards the end of the 1990s. Although Romania has acquired a squadron of F-16 AM/BM from Portugal in 2013 and preparations are being made to acquire another one between 2017 and 2019, 24 aircraft are barely enough to protect its air space. Originally, it was projected that Romania required 48 modern multirole fighters, however, financial issues led to an acquisition process structured in batches and focused on used aircraft.

When it comes to ground based air defense systems, the situation is almost the same. While Romania has invested heavily in modern radar systems since becoming a NATO member, its surface-to-air missile systems are outdated. The most modern air defense system employed by Romania is the medium range MIM-23 HAWK which has been acquired in 2004 from the Netherlands and became operational in 2014.\(^8\)

The other medium antiaircraft defense systems used by Romania are of Soviet origin such as the S-75M3 Volkhov (SA-2 Guideline) in service with the Romanian Air Force, and the mobile 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful) in service with the Romanian Ground Forces. Short ranged air defenses are provided by a mixture of Soviet systems manufactured locally under license (CA-94 and CA-95), Soviet legacy systems (9K33 Osa/SA-8 Gecko and the S-60 57 mm antiaircraft cannon), locally developed systems (A-436 30 mm antiaircraft cannon) and systems of western origin (Oerlikon GDF-003/Viforul 35 mm antiaircraft cannon and Gepard self-propelled antiaircraft system). Some of these systems are self-propelled (SA-6 Gainful, SA-8 Gecko, CA-95 and Gepard) and their mobility can be used to protect high value targets or maneuvering military formations.

Recently, Romania has shown interest in modernizing its air defense by acquiring modern long and short range systems.\(^9\) Given the vulnerability of the missile defense base at Deveselu to air strikes and cruise missile strikes, as well as Russia’s ongoing efforts to increase its air power in Crimea, Romania will likely acquire an integrated air and missile defense system in the near future. Although Bucharest may be unwilling and incapable of investing $ 5 billion in an integrated air defense system as Poland does,\(^10\) it will probably try to come up with a more affordable alternative. Meanwhile, it will consolidate and upgrade some of its current assets and rely on allied assistance to ensure the security of its airspace. For example, in the wake of the Ukrainian crisis, U.S., Canadian and Portuguese aircraft helped secure Romania’s air space.

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\(^8\) *Forțele Aeriene Române*, “Sistemul HAWK”, available at http://www.roaf.ro/?page_id=2567


Russia and INF Treaty Compliance

The cruise missile threat to the Aegis Ashore bases in both Poland and Romania may be greater if it is confirmed that Russia has been developing land based cruise missiles in violation of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) of 1987. Specifically, Russia has been suspected of developing a land based cruise missile variant of the Iskander-M ballistic missile system since 2007. The United States has called into question Russia’s compliance with INF Treaty since 2014. The range of the Iskander-K system may be around 2,000 km which would threaten not only Deveselu and Redzikovo bases, but the missile defense command center at Ramstein air base or the AN/TPY-2 radar stationed in Turkey.

The possible breach of the INF Treaty can be interpreted as a retaliatory measure taken by Russia against the deployment of missile defenses in its vicinity and U.S. unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Furthermore, the development of ground launched cruise missiles (GLCM) by Russia may in part be caused by its two neighbors, China and Iran, which are not parties to the INF Treaty and have developed intermediate range ballistic missiles.

Political and diplomatic vulnerabilities

The year 2016 is an election year in the United States with national security and foreign policy as key campaign issues. Missile defense has proven to be vulnerable to political turnovers in the United States. In 2009, the Obama Administration radically changed missile defense plans for Europe laid out by the previous administration, after a reassessment of Iran’s capabilities. The forthcoming U.S. presidential election may affect U.S. missile defense plans in Europe and elsewhere. Donald Trump, the Republican contender, has shown little interest in maintaining U.S. alliances and commitments, especially NATO, which he described as being outdated.

Poland and Romania, the hosts of the missile defense bases in Europe, have fraught relations with Russia, due to diverging regional interests and historic grievances. Russia routinely issues veiled threats to Warsaw and Bucharest for their participation in the EPAA. After the Ukrainian crisis, Poland and Romania have requested a greater alliance presence on the Eastern flank to deter against a possible Russian aggression. In the long run, this situation is untenable and may lead to increased regional tensions. Efforts should be undertaken by both the host nations and Russia to normalize their relations.

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Perceptions of missile defense: United States vs. Europe

The American view

For the United States, limited missile defense for Europe is linked with the Iranian nuclear program and its missile arsenal. In 2008, U.S. secretary of defense Robert S. Gates told outgoing president Vladimir Putin that without an Iranian nuclear program there will be no need for the missile defense of Europe, a point soon reiterated by president Barack Obama to its Russian counterpart, president Dmitri Medvedev. The diplomatic and geopolitical importance of missile defense is not small. For the United States “missile defense is a key element of U.S. security guarantees to its allies in Europe, Middle East and South-East Asia.” Subsequently, given the limits of anti-missile technology to stop a ballistic missile salvo, its function is first of all diplomatic, meant to strengthen America’s presence at global level. The “phased adaptive approach” itself, which was adopted for Europe, is a concession made to some big European states (to France and Germany, above all) in the context of the revived issue concerning European strategic autonomy, and foresees a certain association of Europeans to decision-making on this project. The concept aims to reassure these European states which see the shield as an element of political control of European defense by the U.S., a competitor to European missile and anti-missile industries and capacities, and a challenge to their “technological sovereignty”.

Political, commercial and technological rivalries aside, there are other points of divergence, that are deep, and irreconcilable in long-term without some mutual concessions. For France, the main European “opponent” of the shield, the European Union (EU) is a “power multiplier”, a construct compensating in part the loss of its colonial empire and supporting its long-term post-imperial ambitions. As such, any element that deepens EU’s strategic dependency on the United States is seen as an obstacle in the way of its own vision for Europe and of its own ambitions within the Union. It is also a matter of principle: how can European defense rely first and foremost on non-European capabilities? Especially, if the EU projects itself as a great international power.

Since missile defense represents just a deterrent while the conventional forces of host nations its extension, Paris considers that Washington will hold a number of arms markets captive and will thus have a major advantage on the new technologies segment. Secondly, for France, a country that has a post-imperial space and therefore global ambitions, America’s already dominant position is further reinforced: the elements of the shield are points of U.S. presence in addition to the big American bases (Diego Garcia – in the Indian Ocean, the Azores, the Bermudas, or Island – in North Atlantic, Okinawa and Guam – in the Pacific Ocean). Japan is a partner in developing the SM-3 IIA

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87 But also to Italy which, alongside France, is engaged in development of an European anti-missile program, SAMP/T and SAMP/N. Great Britain is part of this program too, but it lacks the ambition to create an alternative to the American system.
88 “The American anti-missile defense program thus plays an organizing role in international relations, comparable to the force or even superior to the one played by nuclear deterrence during the Cold War. The shield creates a relation between the United States, the protector, and the other allied nations, the protected, which places the later in a difficult position to ever manifest attitudes that are contrary to key American decisions. Moreover, the missile defense system allows the U.S. to lead uncontested any alliance of the «the free world» - a name referencing the ancient Athenian League.” Rapport d’information fait au nom de la commission des Affaires étrangères, de la défense et des forces armées.
interceptor and may host Aegis Ashore bases on its territory in order to protect itself from the increasing North Korean ballistic threat, as well as the more sophisticated Chinese one.  

There is a third element that has to do with a different strategic culture and traumatic experiences. Compared to France, in the U.S. there is a pervasive myth of the danger coming from the sky: Pearl Harbor, the first soviet Sputnik, followed shortly after by Yuri Gagarin - the first man in space, the Cuban missile crisis, and more recently, 9/11. This security concern is widely reflected in American literature and cinematography.

Such a perception does not exist in either France or any other European NATO member state (UK did confront V1 and V2 German missiles during the World War II, but it is a singular and somewhat remote episode). There is another explanation which has to do with the mutations that occurred in the international system after the Cold War. In a “uni-multipolar” world alliances are no longer blocks of ideological purity as they used to be prior to 1991. Turkey’s development over the last decade, underscored by what happened in the second half of the summer this year, show how states are starting to perceive more and more alliances as systems with a variable geometry. For France, NATO is first and foremost a Western “reservoir of military capacities” which does not exclude common tactical positions with Russia to form and exercise a counterweight to the Superpower (l’Hyper-puissance). All these reasons weighed heavily when President François Hollande agreed to the North Atlantic missile defense, at the NATO 2012 Chicago Summit, under the following conditions:

“the complimentary and unsubstitutable character of missile defense compared to nuclear deterrence; system adaptation to existent threats; political control by allies; limiting costs; the need to preserve the EDTIB (European Defense Technological and Industrial Base) and cooperation with Russia”.

**The EU’s fragmented vision on Missile Defense**

Few European states have the industrial capacity to produce parts of a strategic missile defense system (France, UK, Italy, Germany and Netherlands). Furthermore, there is no such concept in Europe’s strategic thinking. European strategists consider tactical missile defense only. The concept of ‘strategic defense’ is therefore an extra-European (American) one, which just recently entered the specialized European vocabulary. Even fewer countries showed interest in an independent system,
similar to the American one, which might be interoperable with the elements given by the Americans to NATO. Earlier this year, on June 12, the French and Italian Defense Ministers, Jean-Yves Le Drian and Roberta Pinotti respectively, have signed an agreement for the development of a missile defense shield (operated from ground, naval and air means) based on the Aster 30 Block 1NT interceptor. The aim is to preserve some of Europe’s industrial and research capacity in the field, as well as some strategic autonomy in the EU vis-à-vis U.S. and NATO. As in the case of Galileo (competitor program to GPS) or Helios (Franco-Italian military observation satellites meant to offer capabilities independent of the USA), so does in the area of missile defense some European nations look for autonomy and breaking America’s monopoly (the Aster-based missile defense system has already been exported to a number of states\textsuperscript{93}).

It is worth noting that initially Germany wanted to make missile defense an additional item of NATO-Russia cooperation. Like Paris, Berlin has its own technological ambitions, but its simultaneous support for the American project springs from the hope that missile defense will generally suppress interest in nuclear arsenal. Most European states prefer either an active participation (with components) to the American anti-missile system (the UK, Netherlands, and Norway) or just diplomatic support of the project and hosting some of its elements (Romania, Poland).

\textit{Host nations}

The host nations, Poland and Romania, view the missile defense program as the only U.S. and NATO military assets permanently deployed on their territories and, as such, the ultimate security guarantee against Russian revisionism and aggression. This becomes evident when reactions of Central and Eastern European countries to the U.S. missile defense plans are taken into account. When the George W. Bush Administration decided in 2002 to deploy 10 interceptors in Poland and a radar system in the Czech Republic, Romania felt left out and insisted on adherence to the principle of indivisible security as defined by the Treaty of Washington. Conversely, when the Obama Administration surprisingly shifted from the Ground Based Mid-Course Defense system (GMD) to the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System (Aegis BMD) in 2009, the decision shocked so much the Polish leadership that it decided to build its own integrated antiaircraft and missile defense system\textsuperscript{94}, despite the costs involved.

\textit{Russian perceptions}

The placement of missile defense elements in Romania and Poland have created in Moscow the conviction that NATO considers Russia a threat from which it must protect. Geography aside, historical trauma has a role to play: the “Star Wars” Strategic Defense Initiative is seen by Russian experts as responsible for the USSR’s demise which in turn degraded Moscow’s position in the international system. This perception is reinforced by American support to color revolutions in the former soviet area, support which is seen in Moscow as an encroachment by Washington into its post-imperial space. One may remind also of the assurances received by the Russians following the

\textsuperscript{93} Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Singapore, Great Britain.

retreat of their permanent bases in Georgia, according to which the space left empty will not be occupied by Americans or by NATO.  

Another major trauma is the Western decision to bomb Serbia and Montenegro during the Kosovo crisis in 1999, without the backing of the UN Security Council and therefore Russia: in that instant of deep socio-economic crisis, one of the few great power elements Russia still had was its seat as a permanent member at the UN Security Council. Some pundits saw Crimea’s annexation by Russia as a reply to the extension of the American presence in the region, in Russia’s ‘near abroad’. This has been a mainstay of the Russian strategy over centuries: not to have hostile states at its borders, to say nothing about integration of a country such as Ukraine in rival alliances (EU and NATO). Finally, the Russians are concerned that the American investment in anti-missile technology will affect the global strategic balance and will increase the U.S. technological advantage.

Russia’s nuclear arsenal ensures that it is still a great power. Any threat to its arsenal and to nuclear deterrence is considered a serious strategic challenge. In nuclear strategy, a missile defense system is the shield which a state can launch a devastating nuclear attack against its adversary. The significance of nuclear weapons is reflected in Russia’s 2015 national security strategy, which states that it may use this type of weapons preemptively, in a “limited nuclear de-escalatory strike”.

In practical terms, it means that Moscow can initiate a nuclear strike if necessary – for example, if faced with defeat during a high intensity conventional conflict – even if it hasn’t been attacked with nuclear weapons. NATO’s military establishment fears that Russia may be tempted to grab a member state’s territory and then threaten nuclear escalation if the Alliance prepares to take it back.

Despite Russia’s public assertions, the EPAA doesn’t threaten its nuclear arsenal or compromise nuclear deterrence. As a 2015 RAND study pointed out, the SM-3 interceptors cannot affect Russia’s land based deterrent, even in the most unrealistic simulations. As for Kremlin’s underwater deterrent, for all practical purposes, it is invulnerable to the Aegis BMD System. Finally, the U.S. decided in 2013 to discontinue the development of Phase 4 of EPAA, which involved the deployment of SM-3 IIB interceptors, partly for reasons of cost and partly to allay Moscow’s fears concerning the system’s capability to intercept ballistic missiles.

However, Russia’s objections to the limited missile defense of Europe are not linked to the capabilities of the system. Moscow fears that the existing antiballistic technology will be further

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95 See chapter VII (« La Guerre de Géorgie », p. 241-303) on Russian-Georgian relations, written by Hélène Carrère d’Encausse (the foremost French specialist on Russia), in La Russie entre deux mondes, Paris, Fayard, 2010.

96 Isn’t it the same type of behavior as in 1940? The occupation of Karelia, the Baltic States, Eastern Poland, Bessarabia and North Bukovina in reply to German expansion. Creation of buffer zones and direct control of some areas with key strategic position is a mainstay of Russian geopolitics each time it perceives a threat in its near abroad.

97 Ukraine is not Russia, but Russia’s history starts in Kiev, said Hélène Carrère d’Encausse concerning Russia’s perception of the line delineating the so called « Russian world » from the rest of Europe.


100 RUSI, “A briefing by General Sir Adrian Bradshaw KCB OBE, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe”, February 20, 2015, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_4qeyVKpTcI

developed in the future by the United States in order to neutralize or severely degrade Russia’s strategic arsenal.\textsuperscript{102} This perception was reinforced by the unilateral decision of the United States in 2002 to denounce the 1972 ABM Treaty which forbade the development of missile defenses. The 2009 decision of the Obama Administration to reconsider the European missile defenses did not improve Russia’s perceptions of it, but made them worse, as the Kremlin considers the Aegis system far more effective than the GMD.\textsuperscript{103} Furthermore, the proximity of American and NATO missile defense to Russia’s borders has fueled Kremlin’s fears concerning the long term aims of U.S. policy. Although the U.S. made considerable efforts to involve and cooperate with Russia on the issue of limited missile defense in Europe, the Russian defense and foreign policy establishment met them with stiff resistance.\textsuperscript{104} In order to accept the deployment of such a sophisticated weapons system in its proximity, the Kremlin demanded a level of political and legal assurances from the United States that amounted to a veto right over its use and employment.\textsuperscript{105} For obvious reasons, the U.S. could not acquiesce to Russian demands and missile defense has become one of the thorniest issues between the two countries.

**What are the likely consequences of all these perceptions?**

The first one would be Moscow’s withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty which prohibited as of 1988 nuclear missiles with a 500-5,500 km range. Such a decision would complement Russia’s investments in anti-access systems (strategic air defense systems such as S-400 and S-500) capable of creating access-denial bubbles such as the ones in Kaliningrad, Crimea and Syria which cover also parts of Turkey, the Baltics and Poland. See map on pg. 10.

At the same time, the missile defense system can be seen as a symbolic frontier between two blocks, and this can drive Russia to have closer relations with China and Iran. Moscow is already in the process of delivering S-300 systems to Iran.\textsuperscript{106} Russia and Iran are not the only countries opposing the missile defense shield. China feels targeted by the interceptors that are to be placed in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. Russia’s participation in China’s naval exercises in South China Sea shows the two are united against any strengthened American presence in the region. Beijing’s future initiatives will certainly focus on measures that limit or deny American air and naval presence in the South China Sea.

As far as Europe and the divisions within NATO are concerned, the less France will be associated to the missile shield from an industrial and decision making point of view, the more it shall be tempted to develop tactical alliances with Moscow, to achieve greater strategic autonomy from NATO and to move away from countries that are perceived as a U.S. “Trojan horse” in Europe.

\textsuperscript{104} Idem.
As for Romania, a country supporting wholeheartedly the missile defense system, there is a risk for the American commitment to have the opposite effect: continued complacency, i.e. persistence of deficiencies in the area of conventional military capacity. The presence of the shield, of American and multinational forces creates the temptation to sub-finance your own military forces (in Romania’s case, the Type 22 frigates bought from UK have been waiting for upgrades and new weapons systems for 16 years while the only Romanian submarine has been mothballed for 20 years).

In a nutshell, the ballistic missile defense system is operational, but political problems (commitment, different agendas and threat assessment of NATO members) persist. Although the Iranian nuclear dossier is far from being solved, the missile defense is a piece of the deterrent, but not the ultimate solution. The United States will need to continue seeking diplomatic dialogue with Russia on missile defense and arms control in Europe. Host countries (especially Romania) must pull their own weight, not rely exclusively on the missile shield to compensate for military weakness. The presence of missile defense components on their territory must not lead to neglect of defense investments (Romania) or to overconfidence (Poland).
Chapter 3

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE TODAY

by ELIZA GHEORGHE and LIVIU TATU

This chapter examines the role of nuclear weapons in NATO’s strategy. It is divided into two sections: the first looks at nuclear deterrence between the U.S. and Russia, while the second investigates the reliability of the American nuclear umbrella over the junior allies in Europe, with a specific focus on Eastern Europe. 107

Nuclear weapons in an edgy world

In the afternoon of May 23, 1967 a very powerful solar storm turned off the newly installed NORAD’s Ballistic Missile Early Warning System. Military leaders in the Pentagon thought of the worst scenario - that Soviet Union had blinded U.S. Air Force eyes system for any incoming missile or air threat. Thanks to the professionalism of officers from the Air Service Weather (U.S. Air Force) who knew exactly what had happened, the alarm procedure for take-off of strategic nuclear bombers had been canceled. 108 If there is something worse than a full-scale exchange of nuclear weapons, it is a full-scale exchange of nuclear weapons launched because of a simple misunderstanding. 109 Since the end of the Cold War, mankind has never been so close as it is today to a political mistake that might include a direct confrontation between the West and Russia involving the possibility of using nuclear arsenal.

The unlawful incursion on Georgian soil (2008), the illegal annexation of Crimea (2014) and the hybrid proxy war in Eastern Ukraine showed that, after the end of World War II, Russia is the only country that has modified its national borders by military means and is very determined to use its conventional capabilities to fulfill its strategic goals. The Kremlin’s recent involvement in Syria has demonstrated upgrades to conventional arsenal delivery system to specific medium or long range targets - the newly Kalibr missile multiple launch on different targets from a very rapid and modernized frigate and corvette located in the Caspian Sea. 110

107 This paper focuses exclusively on the role of nuclear weapons in NATO’s collective defense arrangements. It is possible that the balance of conventional forces also has an important deterrent effect. This aspect is discussed in more detail in the first chapter of this report.
110 “On October 7, 2015, the Gepard class frigate and three Buyan-M class Russian Navy corvettes, part of the Caspian Flotilla, launched 26 Kalibr-NK system cruise missiles 3M14T from the Caspian Sea at 11 targets in Syria. The missiles traveled 1,500 km (932 mi) through Iranian and Iraqi airspace and struck targets in Raqqa and Aleppo provinces - the territory controlled by the Islamic State. The Kalibr 3M-54 (NATO codename – “Sizzler”, SS-N-30A) is a long-range, low-flying cruise missile capable of carrying conventional or nuclear warheads. It has land-attack, anti-ship and anti-submarine variants. The missile has a second stage that performs a supersonic sprint in the terminal approach to the
Russia is also in the middle of a broad modernization of its strategic and nonstrategic nuclear forces. Much of this process continues well-known programs that have been underway for many years, but some developments are new. The upgrades, together with an increased number of military exercises and operations, including explicit nuclear threats against NATO member countries (Baltic States, Poland and Romania), contribute to growing concern about Russian intentions and, justify nuclear modernization programs and political opposition to weapon program reductions in other nuclear states. The broad modernization reflects the government’s conviction that nuclear forces, in particular strategic nuclear forces, are indispensable for Russia’s security and regional power status. Kremlin is motivated by a strong will to maintain parity with the United States, but the development of multiple versions of the same missiles also indicates the strong influence of Russia’s military industrial complex on nuclear planning.

Nuclear deterrence theory postulates that nuclear weapon states would refrain from capitalizing on their atomic arsenals given that victory in nuclear war is impossible. This creed appears to be deeply engrained in NATO strategy. According to the Head of NATO’s Energy Security section Michael Ruhle “deterrence is the threat of force in order to discourage an opponent from taking an unwelcome action. This can be achieved through the threat of retaliation (deterrence by punishment) or by denying the opponent’s war aims (deterrence by denial). This simple definition often leads to the conclusion that all it takes to deter is to put enough force on display. As long as both sides act ‘rationally’, i.e. according to a cost-benefit calculus, and if none of them is suicidal, their military potentials will keep each other in check.” Yet contrary to deterrence theory expectations, the United States and Russia have “both increased the profile and operations of their nuclear-capable forces since the Ukraine crisis. With the development of increasingly sophisticated armaments, including nuclear weapons systems, Washington and Moscow appear more inclined to adopt “more ambitious war-fighting strategies that go beyond basic deterrence.” Russia, for example, embraces a de-escalation policy which relies on a limited nuclear strike. In other words, Moscow considers the possibility to use tactical nuclear weapons against its adversaries to ‘remind’ them about the devastation atomic bombs can produce. This ‘escalate to de-escalate’ approach challenges classical notions of the inutility of nuclear weapons as military assets. Ruhle cautioned NATO member-states
about reacting to Moscow’s nuclear strategy when he emphasized that although “Russia’s thinking, both politically and militarily, is far more “nuclearised” than most Western observers believed. The West does not need to mirror-image Russia’s approach.”

This year, new satellite images have shown that Russia is investing heavily in building new nuclear bunkers centers near Mount Yamantau, in Ural Mountains, but also in the vicinity of Moscow which could be interpreted as a quiet preparation for a confrontation with the West, that could include even a nuclear strike. Dr. Loren Thompson, a top defense expert from the U.S. think-tank Lexington Institute, told The National Interest: "The possibility of nuclear war between America and Russia not only still exists, but is probably growing." The place where it is most likely to begin is in a future military confrontation over three small Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

In the meantime, the U.S. Navy has quietly built a new underground nuclear weapons storage complex at the Strategic Weapons Facility Pacific (SWFPAC), a high-security base in Washington that stores and maintains the Trident II ballistic missiles and their nuclear warheads for the strategic submarine fleet operating in the Pacific Ocean. The SWFPAC and the eight Ohio-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) homeported at the adjacent Bangor Submarine Base are located only 32 km from downtown Seattle. The SWFPAC and submarines are thought to store more than 1,300 nuclear warheads with a combined explosive power equivalent to more than 14,000 Hiroshima bombs.

Global nuclear inventory (2016 est.)

Note: There are approx. 15,500 nuclear warheads in the world today, of which cca. 10,000 in military service, the rest being retired and awaiting dismantlement.

119 Ruhle, Deterrence.
121 Ibid.
123 Ibid.
The former Cold War superpowers are still the most powerful nuclear actors in the world. Over 90% of the current nuclear warheads are in the possession of Russia and the United States. The nuclear arsenals of all other nuclear weapon states - Britain, China, France, India, Israel, North Korea and Pakistan – pale in comparison, quantitatively and qualitatively.124

First time after the Cold War: Nuclear strike scenarios in military exercises

Possession of huge nuclear arsenal and constant modernization programs of vehicles for delivering it represent an alarming message to peace and security in some regions of the world. United States is keeping much of its nuclear forces on constant alert.125 As Hans M. Kristensen and Matthew G. McKinzie pointed out, such practices increase the risk of accidents, misinterpretation, and competitive risk-taking between the U.S. and Russia.126 Since 2009, Russia has started simulating conventional exercises that were interpreted by the North-Atlantic Council as a provocative scenario against NATO countries.127 In March 2015, Russian Military Forces conducted very large exercises.

126 Kristensen and McKinzie, Nuclear Arsenals, 564.
127 “On November 18, the NATO International Military Staff (IMS) briefed the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on the Russian military exercises Zapad and Ladoga, which had concerned many Allies because of the provocative scenario that had Russia and Belarus repel an attack launched from Poland and Lithuania. (…) NATO IMS indicated that Russian armed forces were: able to respond to a small to mid-sized local and regional conflict in its western region; not able to respond to two small conflicts in different geographical areas simultaneously; not able to conduct large scale conventional operations; and still relying on the use of tactical nuclear weapons, even in local or regional conflicts’’. See “23.11.2009, NATO-RUSSIA: NAC DISCUSSES RUSSIAN MILITARY EXERCISES,” Aftenposten, February
with 45,000 servicemen, around 3,000 vehicles, more than 40 surface vessels, 15 submarines and 110 aircraft, including long range strategic bombers Tu-22M3, that were deployed to Crimea, less than 400 km from the Romanian national border. 128

During the Zapad 2013 exercise, the Russian defense establishment tested the concept of total war. Military units acted hand-in-hand with the Federal Security Service, interior ministry troops, police and even local officials. This improvement in the interoperability among military, security and civilian entities is a crucial aspect of how Russia believes “next generation warfare” will need to be fought. In contrast to Zapad 2009, the limited use of nuclear weapons was not simulated during Zapad 2013. 129 A meeting of NATO defense ministers in February 2015 discussed an internal report on Russia’s nuclear strategy that expressed concern that the Kremlin may be lowering the threshold for potential use of nuclear weapons in any conflict. 130

In May 2014, more than a dozen of U.S. aircraft took part in a nuclear response exercise, only after a week since Russia had carried out a large military application on its national soil. Global Lightning (May 12-16) exercise involved ten B-52 heavy bombers and six B-2 bombers that were simulating a nuclear deterrence exercise, according to U.S. Strategic Command. 131 “Exercise Global Lightning 14 has been planned for more than a year and is based on a national scenario”, U.S. Strategic Command indicated. 132 Army Lt. Col. Stephanie Bounds, spokeswoman for Stratcom, explained that Global Lightning 14 provides training opportunities and tests and validates command and control procedures for U.S. Strategic Command and its subordinate units. 133

The Russian war games from May 2014 included the test launch of a SS-25 Topol intercontinental missile and two SS-N-23 submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Additional missile firings included six Russian air-launched nuclear-capable cruise missiles. 134 Mark Schneider, a former Pentagon nuclear strategy official, said the Russian exercises appeared intended as a political message to the

130 “What worries us most in this strategy is the modernization of the Russian nuclear forces, the increase in the level of training of those forces and the possible combination between conventional actions and the use of nuclear forces, including possibly in the framework of a hybrid war,” one diplomat said. Adrian Croft, “Insight - Russia’s nuclear strategy raises concerns in NATO,” Reuters, February 4, 2015, available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-ukraine-crisis-russia-nuclear-insight-idUKKBN0L825A20150204
132 Ibid.
133 “Just as technology changes, so do the threats. The exercise provides the opportunity to incorporate the most current technology and techniques in support of our mission. The command is constantly honing its capabilities to deter, dissuade, and defeat current and future threats to the U.S. and our allies” said Army Lt. Col. Stephanie Bounds, spokeswoman for Stratcom. See Bill Gertz, “U.S. To Conduct Strategic Bomber Exercise,” The Washington Free Beacon, May 11, 2014, available at http://freebeacon.com/national-security/u-s-to-conduct-strategic-bomber-exercise/
134 Ibid.

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The Russian military exercises came a month after Moscow conducted, on April 14, a test launch of a new ICBM (called the SS-27 by NATO) that carried multiple simulated warheads that analysts say potentially violated the 2010 New START arms treaty. Simulation of nuclear exercises by these two nuclear powers simply sends the message that nuclear arsenal is once again an element of huge importance in projecting options for strategic primacy. NATO gives Russia a significant place in its strategic documents, at the same time, it sends a clear message about collective defense for all its member states and, concerning deterrence, that it includes nuclear elements as well.

This year, at the Munich Security Conference, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg underlined that “deterrence is a key part of our overall strategy. Modern deterrence must deter today’s threats, not yesterday’s. Whether they come from the east or the south, from state or non-state actors, hybrid, conventional or nuclear. Deterrence starts with resolve. It’s not enough to feel it. You also have to show it.” Demonstrating the deterrence capability of the Alliance means calibrating an adequate response, including preparation for a nuclear defense posture. The message outlines the determination of the Alliance to understand, analyze and act based on the current security environment in which all Allies must be protected and in which Article 5 security guarantees must be as powerful as ever.

Extended Nuclear Deterrence – Challenges from Within

In the realm of nuclear deterrence between the U.S. and Russia, the traditional modus operandi has come under fire because of the increased emphasis on atomic arsenals as weapons of war, instead of political instruments. These changes in Moscow’s and Washington’s nuclear posture have spilled into extended nuclear deterrence (END) territory. Two problems can beset nuclear alliance dynamics. First, Washington will find it increasingly difficult to defend its nuclear apartheid policy. The United States has fought a long battle against the spread of nuclear weapons. For Washington, the ideal number of nuclear weapon states is one – the U.S. Every new addition to the atomic club puts a dent in Washington’s position of power. The proliferation of nuclear weapons greatly diminishes Washington’s power of coercion, and enables the weak to withstand the strong. Like any other superpower, the U.S. wants to keep its capability to impose its will on others as intact as possible. Extended nuclear deterrence helps Washington keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of its allies. The message the U.S. sends to its partners through END can be summarized as follows:

135 According to Mark Schneider, "Russia usually holds its nuclear drills in the fall and the timing of last week’s war games suggests that the intent was nuclear intimidation against NATO over the Ukraine." Cited in Gertz, “U.S. To Conduct Strategic Bomber Exercise.”
136 Ibid.
138 Shane J. Maddock coined the term “nuclear apartheid” to refer to the U.S. position on who should possess nuclear weapons. Shane J. Maddock, Nuclear Apartheid: The Quest for American Atomic Supremacy from World War II to the Present (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 1.
140 Maddock, Nuclear Apartheid, 1.
“We, the U.S., have the right to possess atomic weapons, while you, our junior allies, do not. You should trust us with their use, but we cannot trust you.” This situation is unlikely to last for much longer.

Second, the United States, and implicitly NATO, will face growing pressures emanating from the competition for preferential treatment among its protégés. Collective security commitments in nuclear alliances are meant to create the impression that all allies are created equal. Yet, geography and history quickly dispel such illusions. Every country tries to become the “special partner” and distinguish itself from the other protégés by hyping the threat, provoking the adversary, or playing the victim. This attention-seeking behaviour poses the danger of dragging the patron, and ultimately the entire alliance, into an unwanted conflict. The ongoing upmanship between Romania and Poland presents NATO, and the United States, with a difficult circle to square: how to reassure two competing junior allies without causing further trouble with Russia. The following analysis will examine these two dynamics into more detail.

Nuclear Protection vs. Discrimination

NATO revolves around the collective defense principle, which treats an attack against one member as an attack against all. As the Strategic Concept adopted at the 2010 Lisbon Summit underlines, “as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.” With the American atomic arsenal underpinning NATO’s response capacity, member-states find themselves benefitting from Washington’s nuclear umbrella. The Deterrence and Defense Posture Review, adopted at the NATO Summit in Chicago (2012), discusses the primacy of U.S. strategic nuclear forces in ensuring the protection of all Allies, stating that “The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States.” The UK and France have “their independent strategic nuclear forces, which have a deterrent role of their own, [and] contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies”.

In the aftermath of the invasion of Crimea, the UK renewed its Trident program – the foundation of the British nuclear deterrent. On July 18, 2016, a majority of British MPs (355) voted to maintain and update the Trident. According to Prime Minister Theresa May, the cost of the investment is estimated at

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143 On how allies can drag their patrons into wars, see Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity,” International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 2 (1990), 140-144.


146 Ibid.

147 The Trident program “consist of four Vanguard-class submarines which can carry up to 16 Trident II D5 ballistic missiles, each armed with up to eight nuclear warheads. At any time, one submarine is on patrol, one is undergoing maintenance, one is preparing for patrol and one has just come off patrol and is recovering”. See Emily Allen and Ben Farmer, What is Trident? Britain’s nuclear deterrent explained, The Telegraph, July 18, 2016, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/03/21/what-is-trident-britains-nuclear-deterrent-explained/

more than 40 billion pounds. The UK and France do not make their arsenals available for the kind of nuclear sharing schemes the U.S. has enforced since the Cold War - deployments of nuclear weapons on the territory of NATO allies – which signals their unwillingness to commit to the defense of Eastern Europe in the same way the U.S. has committed since the end of the Cold War.149

The past 67 years give credence to the argument that Extended Nuclear Deterrence works well both in theory and in practice: the Soviet Union did not invade Western Europe, despite having, at times, conventional superiority on the central front. Yet, the premise at the heart of END – that in a world of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), a nuclear power would put its own territory at risk for the sake of another state’s interests – defies the realm of plausibility.150 The United States signaled that it understood the risks of END when it embraced in 1968 the concept of “flexible response”, a policy which directed NATO commanders “to provide for the employment as appropriate of one or more of direct defense, deliberate escalation and general nuclear response, thus confronting the enemy with a credible threat of escalation in response to any type of aggression below the level of a major nuclear attack.”151 Moreover, extending nuclear deterrence over countries in the close vicinity of an enemy can be a reckless move, as it provokes the foe into action.152 Given the considerable risks associated with END, why does the United States remain so keen on it?

U.S. counter- and non-proliferation policy reveals a hidden goal of extended nuclear deterrence: maintaining control over nuclear weapons solely in the hands of the United States. Washington does not spread out its nuclear umbrella for purely altruistic reasons. In exchange for protection, it demands a pledge from its allies not to develop atomic weapons.153 The United States behaves like any other superpower: it tries to advance its national interest, sometimes to the detriment of other countries, and, in doing so, it relies on its own capabilities.154 To protect its position of power, the

U.S. has resorted to coercion against allies and enemies alike in its long-standing battle against the spread of nuclear weapons.155 Washington’s attempts to maintain a nuclear monopoly within NATO failed on two occasions, when the British and the French, respectively, acquired nuclear weapons. If the British decided to go nuclear for fear they would otherwise lose their standing in the international arena, the French made their nuclearization much more explicitly linked to their doubts about END. Charles de Gaulle questioned the soundness of putting one’s fate in the hands of another country. As the French leader famously argued, no U.S. president would “trade New York for Paris.”156

Aware of the credibility problems created by the advent of MAD, the United States sought to reassure its Western allies of its commitment through a variety of institutional mechanisms revolving around ideas about nuclear sharing. One such proposal, the Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF), envisaged the creation of a joint fleet armed with U.S. nuclear weapons under the command of multinational crews.157 Such arrangements would have allowed for a situation where a German naval officer could have carried out an attack with American atomic weapons. Faced with firm opposition from the Eastern Bloc, the United States substituted a consultative arrangement called the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) for the MLF.158 The task of the NPG is to serve as a forum for the U.S. to consult with its junior partners over nuclear policy. If judged by the consistency of American nuclear posture, including its first-use policy, forward deployments, and ultimately, its quest for military primacy, the NPG has fulfilled its purpose. Yet, in many respects, the NPG remains a poor surrogate for joint management of nuclear policy. No consultation, no matter how thorough and open, can replace a physical finger on the button. Time and again, European allies raised the specter of nuclear sharing to signal to the United States their concerns over the credibility of the American nuclear umbrella. Statements like President Barak Obama’s 2009 Prague speech, which announced that the United States will “seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons,” lead NATO member-states to call into question Washington’s commitment to their security.159 The East Europeans have worked relentlessly to preserve a firm U.S. nuclear presence on the continent and to embed themselves in the decision-making process.160 For example, in December 2016, Poland’s Deputy Defense Minister Tomasz Szatkowski publicly discussed the efforts of the authorities in Warsaw to join NATO’s nuclear posture, including its first-use policy, forward deployments, and ultimately, its quest for military primacy, the NPG has fulfilled its purpose. Yet, in many respects, the NPG remains a poor surrogate for joint management of nuclear policy. No consultation, no matter how thorough and open, can replace a physical finger on the button. Time and again, European allies raised the specter of nuclear sharing to signal to the United States their concerns over the credibility of the American nuclear umbrella. Statements like President Barak Obama’s 2009 Prague speech, which announced that the United States will “seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons,” lead NATO member-states to call into question Washington’s commitment to their security.159 The East Europeans have worked relentlessly to preserve a firm U.S. nuclear presence on the continent and to embed themselves in the decision-making process.160 For example, in December 2016, Poland’s Deputy Defense Minister Tomasz Szatkowski publicly discussed the efforts of the authorities in Warsaw to join NATO’s nuclear


sharing arrangements.\textsuperscript{161} The Polish official referred to “deficits in NATO’s nuclear deterrent capability on its eastern flank” to justify his remarks.\textsuperscript{162} His statements, which analysts interpreted as Poland’s desire to have U.S. nuclear weapons stationed on its territory, were later disavowed by the Polish Ministry of Defense.\textsuperscript{163} NATO officials also denied any rumors that the alliance plans to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new member states or to change existing deployment arrangements. Such a move would nullify the pledge at the core of NATO-Russia Founding Act that the Alliance has “no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspect of NATO’s nuclear posture or nuclear policy - and do not foresee any future need to do so.”\textsuperscript{164} This last point dispels the buzz created after the attempted military coup in Turkey in July 2016 about tactical nuclear weapons being relocated from Incirlik to Romania.\textsuperscript{165}

Yet such demands for nuclear weapons deployments would still be manageable, even if the allies were not recanting. The worst-case scenario for the United States entails countries pursuing independent nuclear deterrents. Washington understands that states have powerful incentives to acquire atomic bombs, and that once they decide to go down the nuclear road, it becomes very difficult to stop them. The tools the U.S. has relied on to prevent its allies from joining the nuclear club range from sanctions, export controls, and bribes, to intimidation, isolation, and diplomatic pressure.\textsuperscript{166} Some of the most successful instances of U.S. coercion against allies include the rollback of the Taiwanese nuclear weapons program, the temporary freeze on South Korea’s atomic ambitions in the mid-1970s, and the curbing of the West German nuclear pursuits.\textsuperscript{167} These three countries depended heavily on the U.S., not only militarily, but also economically and diplomatically. Some scholars have argued that the most decisive factor in turning around these proliferating protégés was the threat of abandonment.\textsuperscript{168} The Korean leadership, for instance,\textsuperscript{169}

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\item \textsuperscript{161} “Poland considering asking for access to nuclear weapons under NATO program,” The Guardian, December 6, 2015, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/06/poland-considering-asking-for-access-to-nuclear-weapons-under-nato-program.
\item Gavin, “Strategies of Inhibition,” 11.
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became so afraid of a pullout of U.S. troops that it put its nuclear weapons program on the backburner. Yet, recent studies have shown that the U.S. did not resort to outright bullying of South Korea, realizing that doing so would only make the authorities in Seoul doubt the American security umbrella even more and pursue an independent nuclear deterrent more vigorously. The main lever the U.S. used against South Korea was the threat to withhold civilian atomic assistance and to cut back on economic aid. These examples provide valuable insights into the challenges the U.S. would face if the authorities in Warsaw or other Eastern European governments were indeed musing about going down the nuclear path. New Europe depends on the United States for its security needs. Yet, Washington has very little economic leverage on the new NATO member-states, given that it does not count among any of these countries’ top five trade partners (in both exports and imports). According to the most recently available data from globalEDGE at Michigan State University, in 2014 the United States barely makes the top ten in terms of exports and imports for countries in Eastern Europe (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, and Bulgaria). Germany, on the other hand, represents not only the most important exports destination, but also the main source of imports for most New Europe countries. In case Eastern European countries start considering a nuclear hedging strategy, the United States cannot threaten them with abandonment because such a tactic would aggravate New Europe’s insecurity and push them even further down the nuclear road.

### Not All Allies Are Created Equal

Under the North Atlantic Treaty, all members of the alliance have the same rights and obligations. All NATO countries benefit from the protection guaranteed under Article 5, regardless of their wealth, size, population, or military contribution. Yet, in practice, equality remains an elusive target. Not only do U.S. capabilities dwarf those of any other member-state, but the protégées themselves pay careful attention to how they measure up against each other. Therefore, the alliance suffers from both a free-rider problem and from a schadenfreude syndrome. This section focuses on the latter, with a specific focus on “New Europe”.

The order in which the East Europeans joined NATO lies at the root of the jealousy these new members feel towards each other. For these post-communist countries, NATO accession became a matter of national pride, prompting them to define themselves not only in terms of their own achievements, but also in comparison to the rest of the cohort. Poland’s accession in 1999, for example, left Romania with a deep inferiority complex that still affects the Washington-Warsaw-

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170 Ibid.
171 Ibid.
172 globalEDGE, Trade Statistics, Trade Partners for Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, Bulgaria, 2014, available at: http://globaledge.msu.edu/global-insights/by/country. The only exception is Estonia, for which the US is the 6th most important export destination.
Bucharest strategic triangle to this day.\textsuperscript{175} The Romanians have resorted to two levers to compensate for what they perceive as Poland’s advantage vis-à-vis the U.S. and within NATO: their contribution to the military alliance on the one hand, and their demands for deployments of weapons systems and troops on their territory, on the other. These attempts to reach parity with Poland failed, adding strain on the backbone of Extended Nuclear Deterrence – the belief that the nuclear protector will defend all its allies equally.

First and foremost, the card Romania banked on has been its contribution in terms of personnel to NATO’s military missions, with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan being a case in point. The impetus behind Romania’s involvement in ISAF came not from a direct threat posed by al-Qaeda to Romanian security, but from the desire to prove Bucharest’s reliability and dependability to the American leadership.\textsuperscript{176} Romania’s rationale mirrored Poland’s, which had 25,000 military personnel serve in Afghanistan. Unable to match Poland’s contribution in numbers – only 20,000 Romanian militaries fought in ISAF – Bucharest decided to keep its troops longer and currently commits 650 soldiers to the Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan, compared to Poland’s 200.\textsuperscript{177} Much to Romania’s chagrin, this contribution did not offset Bucharest’s lagging behind on a much more important front – defense spending. Given the severe imbalance between Washington’s war-fighting ability and that of its European allies, NATO members have taken upon themselves the task of committing no less than 2\% of their GDP to national defense. Only five of NATO’s 28 member-states meet this goal. Poland is one of them, Romania is not.\textsuperscript{178} In May 2016, Deputy Defense Secretary Robert Work praised Poland’s ability to fulfill its commitment. Romania deservedly received a mere pat on the back for its pledge to do so.\textsuperscript{179} Poland has anchored in its Constitution the pledge of 1.95\% GDP dedicated to defense since 2010 while in Romania it was only in 2015 that the main political parties signed a pact to allocate 2\% of GDP starting with 2017 for a decade.\textsuperscript{180} This differentiation will likely accentuate Bucharest’s insecurity and make Romania lose trust in Washington’s willingness to come to its rescue in case of a war, undermining the very basis of END.


\textsuperscript{176} Robert Kaplan cited by Octavian Manea, “Pivotul polonez: Pentru ce se înarmează Varșovia,” \textit{FP Romania}, March 21, 2014, available at: http://adevarul.ro/international/foreign-policy/pivotul-polonez-inarmeaza-varsovia-1_532c0f850d133766a819249a/index.html. Romania joined ISAF in 2002 before it became a NATO-member, at a time when the force was a U.S.-led coalition. The authorities in Bucharest were not the only ones to contribute to ISAF before (without) being a NATO member. Bulgaria also joined ISAF, but in 2003. Other non-NATO contributors include: Australia, New Zealand, Jordan, UAE, Singapore, and South Korea, to mention just a few.


Second, Romania has offered to host a variety of platforms, such as the missile shield, to strengthen its ties to Washington. The missile defense saga has experienced many twists and turns. From the beginning, the Romanians have had a chip on their shoulder because Poland had gained a head-start on this issue, given their superior level of interoperability with other NATO assets. In 2002, the United States began discussions with Warsaw the possibility of locating interceptor missiles on Polish territory. However, in 2009, President Barack Obama caused stupor in Poland when he announced the cancellation of the project in its initial version. The Romanians relished this turn of events, as it gave them the opportunity to boost their strategic importance and anchor the U.S. more firmly in Bucharest’s security framework. Before the return to power of Vladimir Putin in 2012, the Russian Federation did not object as forcefully to a NATO missile defense system deployed in Romania, clearing the way for a speedy implementation of the plan. Yet, as the interceptors became operational, Moscow displayed a dramatic change of heart, warning that the missile shield had transformed Romania into a target for a Russian attack. In the light of this remark, what appeared to be a boon for U.S.-Romanian relations and a symbolic victory over Warsaw turned into a potential liability.

Also, when the Obama administration cancelled the Bush era plans for a European Interceptor Site in 2009, it replaced them with a phased plan, the third pillar of which includes SM-3 Block IIA interceptors which is scheduled for 2018. Poland decided to complement the U.S. missile shield with its own integrated air defense system (IAMD), at a rather hefty cost ($5 billion). The edge the Romanians have now will dissipate soon, leaving them feeling vulnerable. To keep up with Warsaw, Bucharest will likely put forward proposals meant to increase the U.S. presence on its territory.

Why can the Romanians afford to jockey for position with the Poles? In the aftermath of the Cold War, NATO entered a period of soul-searching caused by the disappearance of its principal adversary – the Soviet Union. Democracy-promotion drove the 1999 and 2004 enlargement rounds, leaving the ten candidates to vie for pole position on social, political, and economic matters. They could not get a clear sense about their strategic importance because NATO lacked the traditional security threat it was created to fight against. The Russian Federation did not pose a real danger, as it had not yet recovered from the economic debacle of the 1990s. Terrorist groups in far-flung places like Afghanistan spurred NATO into action, dragging it into a crippling thirteen-year war. But Al-Qaeda could not provide the fixed and easily identifiable adversary NATO needed to define itself against. Gone were the days when everybody in NATO knew the Third World War would be fought over Germany. NATO itself was changing and its new member-states were left wondering

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181 Pascu, Extinderea NATO, 47.
184 In 2010 and 2011, NATO and Russia “held productive exchanges” on a cooperative missile defense arrangement, entailing the creation of a data fusion center and a planning and operations center. These discussions led to a misplaced sense of optimism about Russia’s acceptance of BMD plans in Eastern Europe. Steven Pifer, “NATO-Russia Missile Defense: Compromise is Possible,” The Brookings Institution, December 28, 2012, available at: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/nato-russia-missile-defense-compromise-is-possible/.
186 In the 1990s, NATO intervened in the Balkans, adding peacekeeping and peacemaking missions to its operational menu. NATO enlargement, some would argue, was about strengthening countries around an area undergoing a fragile transition and post-war reconstruction process. Philip H. Gordon and James B. Steinberg, “NATO’s Enlargement: Moving Forward; Expanding the Alliance and Completing Europe’s Integration,” Brookings Policy Brief Series, November 15, 2001, available at: https://www.brookings.edu/research/nato-enlargement-moving-forward-expanding-the-alliance-and-completing-europes-integration/.
about where they fit in the picture. In an attempt to establish their position in the pecking order, the East Europeans let themselves get dragged into intra-alliance competitions for status, which in turn, led them to doubt American security assurances. Their distrust in END serves as a useful reminder that states in an alliance have nothing to fear but fear itself, above all the fear that they are not as special as their peers.

**Conclusion**

Since the beginning of the Ukraine crisis, policy-makers and analysts have been talking about a New Cold War. Washington and Moscow seem to be approaching the precipice once again. Yet, the current situation could not be more different from the pre-1990 era. The Cold War taught the two superpowers that nuclear weapons have little military value, but this lesson appears to have been forgotten. Treating a limited nuclear strike as a viable solution for de-escalation goes against the very foundation of strategic stability. Nuclear deterrence, in its extended form, has also been challenged from within, strained by doubts about its credibility and by the jealousy that junior partners harbor towards one another. Given the collision course Washington and Moscow have entered since 2014, a return to the Cold War – abidance by the mutual assured destruction (MAD) principle – would be the better course.
Chapter 4
TURKEY

by EUGENIA GUŞILOV, ŞTEFAN POPESCU and LIVIU TATU

Turkey’s role in NATO

Turkey is a NATO member since 1952. It is the second largest standing military power in NATO (612,000 men, WB), the most important NATO regional power in the Black Sea and in the Middle East and a key country for dealing with the migrant crisis. More than that, it is home to tens of American nuclear weapons stored at Incirlik Air Base as part of Turkey’s NATO obligation. In short, Turkey is paramount for the security of both, Southern and Eastern, Flanks of the Alliance.

The last NATO Summit, in Warsaw, underscored the need for a broad and consistent deterrence plan on the eastern Flank. Turkey is the most important heavy-military ally in the Alliance’s South-Eastern region and a potential fragile domestic regime could put a question mark over the capability of NATO to defend its south-eastern flank. In the Black Sea, there are two regional powers – Russia and Turkey, the last one is the only riverside country that can play a huge role in defending NATO Black Sea countries and at the same time be compliant with the obligations of the 1936 Montreux Convention. That being said, Turkey is the only relevant NATO naval power in the Black Sea region. Romania’s proposal for a NATO naval structure is not feasible in the foreseeable period without a clear and strong support from Turkey, considering the regulations of Montreux Convention, despite NATO’s message of support to the region at Warsaw.\(^\text{187}\)

Moreover, Ankara plays a key role for NATO’s ballistic missile defense system - “Turkey hosts a forward-based early-warning BMD radar at Kürekik” as was underlined by the NATO Allies in Warsaw this summer.\(^\text{188}\) The mobile AN/TPY-2 radar on Turkish soil is part of Phase 1 of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) and works as an integrated instrument of the AEGIS missile defense system, being in direct link with the facility base in Deveselu, Romania, with Aegis naval ships and with other facilities in Europe. Turkey is a trusted NATO Ally given its long-standing request to house Patriot missile air defense system on Turkish soil, after numerous incidents when Russian fighters violated its airspace.\(^\text{189}\) After Turkey shot down the Sukhoi Su-24M bomber last November, the need for deployment of the Patriot system on Turkish soil grew bigger.

\(^{187}\)“Appropriate measures, tailored to the Black Sea region and including the Romanian initiative to establish a multinational framework brigade to help improve integrated training of Allied units under Headquarters Multinational Division Southeast, will contribute to the Alliance’s strengthened deterrence and defense posture.....” See Warsaw Summit Communiqué. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm

\(^{188}\) Ibidem.

\(^{189}\) NATO to deploy Patriot missile system in Turkey again, Trend News Agency February 1, 2016, http://en.trend.az/world/turkey/2488375.html
In addition, Turkey, through its training and education centers, is part of the Defense and Related Security Capacity Building (DCB) Initiative, launched in Wales. A demand driven tool for projecting stability beyond NATO borders, the Initiative offers specialized assistance in the area of defense capacity building (such as strategic advice, development of local forces by training and education, support in logistics and cyber defense).

NATO and U.S. military presence in Turkey

Last but not least, threats emanating to the south of Europe (Syrian war, refugee crisis and Daesh) are a matter of concern for all NATO states, but they are paramount security threats for Turkey. Before the Warsaw Summit, the country’s priorities were the civil war in Syria, refugees, terrorism

DCB Tools have been launched for Georgia and Jordan (in September 2014), Iraq (in July 2015), and Republic of Moldova (in June 2015). For each participating country, the DCB package look different. For instance, for Iraq, it includes: “assistance in the areas of counter-IED, explosive ordnance disposal and demining; military medicine and medical assistance; advice on security sector reform; civil-military planning support to operations; civil emergency planning and civil preparedness; cyber defense; and military training”. For more on DCB, please see Defense and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative, NATO, June 27, 2016, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132756.htm

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and Russia’s A2/AD capabilities in Syria. In the Final Communique of the Warsaw Summit, allies acknowledged that, in addition to the Readiness Action Plan Assurance Measures, the “tailored assurance measures for Turkey to respond to the growing security challenges from the south” are contributing to the security of the Alliance as a whole. Turkey, Greece and Italy are on the frontline of efforts to deal with the refugees’ crisis and cooperate with NATO and EU’s FRONTEX agency. Since the beginning of the Syrian civil war, in 2011, Turkey hosted more refugees than any other country (2.5 million last year), according to data of the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR). That means that one NATO member country is dealing with the brunt of the problem. In March 2016, the European Union has reached an agreement with Turkey for a Refugee Facility on Turkish soil for 2016-2017 with an approved budget of EUR 3 billion. The facility, now fully operational, has already allocated EUR 740 million for both humanitarian and non-humanitarian assistance, of which EUR 150 million contracted and, of these EUR 105 million disbursed. As stated in the second report on progress made in the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement, despite the progress, “the success achieved so far is fragile, and it is too soon to conclude that all aspects of the EU-Turkey Statement are fully functional”.

The EU, through FRONTEX, is extending cooperation with NATO on refugees in the areas of early warning, surveillance activities, and intelligence sharing with Greek and Turkish Coast Guards in order to increase detection rate and exchange data on smuggling. A key stake is boosting the capacity of the Turkish Coast Guard in the Aegean (a EUR 14 million program is funded by the EU, plus an additional EUR 20 million was committed in May for search and rescue operations). Moreover, an operational framework has been put in place for the “One for One” Resettlement scheme which is meant to strengthen confidence of refugees in the legal pathways to enter the EU.

Nevertheless, despite the positive balance of its presence in NATO, over the last two decades, Ankara has engaged in a profound strategic reorientation, a process which can impact the unity and strength of the Alliance South-Eastern Flank in case of a major crisis with Russia. The end of the Cold War and the exit from the logic of rigid alliances opened up the possibility for Turkey to create a post-imperial space. It was underscored by the demise of the Soviet Union, and the resulting independence of Turkic states in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan

191 Ozgur Unluhisarcıklı, Turkey focused on the South, in “National Priorities for the NATO Warsaw Summit”, GMF, Transatlantic Take, No. 123/ May 2016, p. 8.
193 FRONTEX was set up in 2004 and its role is to foster and streamline the cooperation between the national border authorities of the EU Member States. See FRONTEX, Mission and Tasks, available at http://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/mission-and-tasks/
196 Ibid, p. 3.
197 Under this scheme, the EU took upon itself to resettle “a Syrian from Turkey to the EU for every Syrian returned to Turkey from Greek islands”.

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and Tajikistan) and South Caucasus (Azerbaijan), and a reinforced Muslim identity in the former-Jugoslav space (Bosnia, Kosovo). Balancing Russia in Central Asia and the Balkans was in sync with American interests. But, Turkey’s ambition to become the cultural, economic and political center of a regional Turkic construction were abandoned mainly for two reasons: the Taliban threat in early 2000s determined the ex-soviet Asian republics to prefer Russia’s strategic protection, and Ankara’s pragmatic interest in economic cooperation with Russia (which only got stronger after Erdogan’s party acceded to power, in 2002).

“Zero problems with the neighbors” and building “strategic depth”198 in the Muslim Sunni world became a priority of Turkish foreign policy. This spirit made possible the signing of the Joint Statement of profound friendship and multidimensional partnership with the Russian Federation in December 2004, on occasion of Vladimir Putin’s visit to Ankara. Parallel to developing relations with Russia, and normalizing ties with Iran, Ankara discovered the Arab countries in North and Sub-Saharan Africa and their markets. Turkey’s economic development (now the 17th largest economy in the world and a full member of G20) and sustained demographic growth is what fed Ankara’s geopolitical ambitions. The global city, Istanbul, now has more billionaires than New York, Moscow and London, according to a 2010 Forbes ranking. Turkey is re-discovering its Eurasian identity (that of a bridge between West and East) and is abandoning its position of a Western outpost. The Arab spring offered Ankara the possibility to aspire to the status of ‘beacon of the Muslim Sunni world’, making the EU accession no longer a cardinal point in Turkish foreign policy. Turkey’s desire to be part of BRICS199 is a clear indication that it wants to be one of the centers of the multipolar world. “The world can no longer have only one command center” said, in 2008, Abdullah Gül, the conservative-islamic president, suggesting that the U.SA. should share global responsibilities.200 At the NATO Summit in Bucharest, in 2008, Turkey was against Georgia and Ukraine joining NATO. This was followed, shortly after, in August 2010, by the birth of a Russian-Turkish strategic partnership and the creation of an intergovernmental body – the High Level Cooperation Council – for joint cooperation in the Balkans, Middle East, and Eurasia. This explains why Turkey obtained the status of “dialogue partner” to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in April 2013.201 Along with these geopolitical ambitions which dilute Turkey’s position in NATO, there is another, maybe more important, factor: managed democracy with authoritarian accents place Turkey much closer to the Russian and Chinese models than to those of NATO member states.

The coup d’etat

The failed military coup in Turkey and events that followed it have been the object of much speculation and contradictory information. In those hours, international TV channels showed the image of an almost successful operation: the president and the government were chased away, the Chief of General Staff was arrested, the headquarters (hq) of the national television was occupied.

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198 Former Turkish Foreign Minister and Prime Minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, is its artisan. See Ahmet Davutoğlu, Strategic Depth: Turkey’s International Position, Istanbul, Kure Yayinlan, 2001.
It looked like Turkey was about to relive the events of September 1980, when the army intervened to correct the backsliding of the civilian power from the kemalist order. This initial impression is what made Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his supporters claim that not only the army was behind the coup attempt, but an entire conspiracy involving large segments of the state apparatus. Despite the shaded areas, which only time will clarify, several aspects cannot be questioned.

It is abundantly clear that, in the night of July 15-16, a part of the Turkish army tried to remove president Erdogan from power. This was acknowledged immediately after the launch of the anti-coup operation by the PM Binali Yildirim: “Certain individuals undertook an illegal action without support from the chain of command”. Shortly after, mutineers posted on the website of the Army Chief of Staff an announcement stating that they took over, but will maintain “democratic order and human rights” as well as Turkey’s “international engagements”. State-run Anadolu Agency confirmed the military coup d’etat attempt (“a group of military men who try to trigger a revolt”) adding that “general Hulusi Akar, the Chief of General Staff, was taken hostage at the General Staff HQ”. The Turkish public television TRT aired a putsch communiqué stating that the country is lead by a “peace council” and that a state of siege and martial law are decreed. Finally, from an undisclosed location, president Erdogan made an appearance via Facetime on CNN Turk, and talked about “the rebellion of a minority within the army” and about its “attempted coup d’etat”. International TV channels show the first images with tanks blocking the access to one of the bridge over Bosphorus, tanks surrounding the parliament building, military jets flying over Ankara and firing from a helicopter into a pro-Erdogan crowd. The enemy of the Turkish president, imam Fetullah Gülen himself, exiled in the United States, condemned in those hours “any armed intervention in Turkey’s internal affairs”. The purges that followed suit in the army offer a clue of the coup scale: around 6,000 military personnel arrested, including colonel Ali Yazici, key military adviser to the president, general Bekir Ercan Van, commander of the Incirlik airbase, and generals Erdal Öztürk and Adem Huduti, commanders of the 3rd and respectively 2nd army. In total, 126 generals and admirals. The General Commandment of the Gendarmerie is subordinated to the Interior Ministry, and the regiment for the protection of the presidency is dissolved.

202 Out of 32,000 persons arrested, according to Turkish Justice Ministry official data cited by Euronews, France24, Reuters.

203 Turkey has 4 army corps. The 1st army is headquarter in Istanbul with units in Eastern Thrace. It is in charge of protecting the border with Greece and Bulgaria and the Bosphorus and Dardanelle Straits. The 2nd army is headquartered in Malatya (in South-East Anatolia) and is responsible for Anatolia region and protection of the border with Syria, Iraq and Iran. The 3rd army is the most important in size of all the ground forces of Turkey, it has its hq at Erzincan (North-East of Turkey), and is responsible for the border with Armenia and Georgia. Finally, the 4th army, also known as the Aegean Army, has its hq at Izmir and is tasked with protecting Turkey’s West coast. Units present in North Cyprus belong to the 4th army.

Another clue is the speed with which the putsch was repressed, not so much the reaction of the population and loyal forces as the quality of the putsch operations. Successive purges since 2007 have affected the quality and unity of the officer corps which used to function as a caste. Pundits have underlined the amateurism, lack of coordination, certain useless actions of the military personnel involved in Erdogan’s overthrow. One thing is certain, the action was triggered around 10 pm, while at 1:20 am the government was announcing that loyal forces have the situation under control, although some “difficulties persist in certain areas of the capital and in Istanbul”. Although the fire exchange intensified around 2 am and the parliament in Ankara is bombed by military aircraft (2:30 am), any doubt regarding the outcome of the putsch dissipates the moment President Erdogan lands on the Istanbul airport (3:30 am) and shows himself to his supporters. In the early morning hours (6:30 am), Turkish TV stations air the first images with military personnel who surrender to the security forces.

The third certainty is Turkey’s different perception: reserved attitude of NATO allies, in contrast to support from the Russian Federation. The first reaction came from Paris: a mere recommendation from Quai d’Orsay to French citizens in Turkey not to go out on the streets because of “serious unfolding events”. The White House has announced that “all parties in Turkey should support the democratically-elected Government of Turkey, show restraint, and avoid any violence or bloodshed. (...) The President asked the Secretary to continue to keep him updated as the situation unfolds.” The tone of Sergey Lavrov, Moscow’s top diplomat, Sergey Lavrov, although along the same lines, was perceived in Turkey as more wholehearted: “We believe that it is important right now to avoid any bloodshed, any violent clashes, and all issues should be addressed and resolved constitutionally in any country.” / “надо избегать любых кровопролитных столкновений и решать возникающие в государстве ситуации исключительно в конституционном поле”.

Only after any trace of confusion has disappeared, subsequent Western reactions became more firm: a spokesperson for Berlin Chancellery stated that “the democratic order must be respected”, NATO and the European Union pleaded for avoiding a bloodbath and asked for “an urgent return to the constitutional order”. The subsequent attitude of the Turkish authorities – president, Prime Minister, Foreign Minister – and the messages they have sent have confirmed how much was appreciated Russia’s position (Turkey’s foreign minister talked about Moscow’s “real support”) and how little were appreciated the reserves initially expressed by NATO allies. The warming up of relations with the Russian Federation was decided before the July 15-16 events, but they were favored by Russia’s attitude towards the Erdogan regime during the coup attempt. The explicit friendship manifestations


209 Russian MFA, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s remarks and answers to media questions…., July 15, 2016, http://www.mid.ru/en/ vizity-ministra/-asset_publisher/ICoYBGeCUgTR/content/id/2356206?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_ICoYBGeCUgTR&_101_INSTAN CE_ICoYBGeCUgTR_languageId=en_GB
towards Russia (“my dear friend Vladimir” said president Erdogan several times during a subsequent interview with Tass Russian News Agency\textsuperscript{210}) and the arrest of pilots who shot down the Russian jet at the Turkish-Syrian border (accused of playing the game of the coup plotters, of the “enemies of Turkey who want a worsening of its relations with Russia”\textsuperscript{211}) have to do, first and foremost, with the long term future of Turkish-Russian relations, decided before, but reinforced by the July coup. It seems that Russia has grasped better the context and informational flow than Turkey’s own allies. President Erdogan’s visit to Sankt Petersburg on August 9, 2016 (accompanied by his Energy Minister and the Chief of the main intelligence service, MIT), Ankara’s opening towards the regime of Bashar al-Assad, Turkey’s intervention in Syria\textsuperscript{212} (impossible without an understanding with Russia), the Erdogan-Putin proximity exhibited during the G20 Summit in China stand in contrast to Erdogan’s repeated accusations of harboring a terrorist (Fetullah Gülen) addressed to the U.S..

The fourth certainty is that the failed coup was used by president Erdogan to rid the Turkish apparatus of Fetullah Gülen’s followers, to sideline the opposition and pave the way to install a presidential regime. The removal of 2,700 judges and the arrest of 5 members of the Magistrates’ Supreme Council and of 2 Constitutional Court judges means one thing: complete control over the justice system, especially since many magistrates are suspected of being part of the 

Hizmet (Service) organization\textsuperscript{213}, which is patronized by Gülen. However, this strategy seriously undermines Turkey’s European aspiration (whatever is left of it) as well as its desire to become a beacon of the Sunni Muslim world.

The last certainty relates to the evolution of Turkish society and the army’s role in it. Since coming to power in 2002, Recep Erdogan never stopped diminishing the role of the army and dismantling the “Kemalist military caste”, making use very adroitly of the EU requirements for civilian control of military structures. The Ergenekon process (2007-2009), inspired by Gülen’s brotherhood\textsuperscript{214},

\textsuperscript{210} “Erdogan Exclusive: New page in Russia - Turkey relations”, interview with Turkish President Recep Tayip Erdogan, conducted by TASS First Deputy Director-General Mikhail Gusman, August 9, 2016, http://tass.ru/en/world/893204


\textsuperscript{212} Launched on August 24, 2016 in Jarablus region and codenamed Operation Euphrate Shield.

\textsuperscript{213} The Hizmet movement is a brotherhood, a social group built on religious criteria, founded in 1970 by Fetullah Gülen, a mystical Sufi thinker who was designated as one of the world’s most influential intellectuals by Foreign Policy magazine in 2008. His movement engulfed important segments of the Turkish elite, with the exception of the army. Until 2011, when Erdogan and Gullen had a falling out, Hizmet supplied cadres to Erdogan’s party, the AKP. The brotherhood has several million Turkish and Turkic followers, a network of schools and churches all over the world. Until July 2016, the brotherhood also owned Zaman, the most read Turkish daily, and several TV channels, as well as a financial institution – Asya Bank.


\textsuperscript{214} The Turkish army has traditionally been opaque to religious brotherhoods.
practically beheaded Turkey’s General Staff (over 300 officers were purged from the army[215]) resulting in the appointment of officers loyal to Erdoğan. More recently, the conviction of several high ranking officers in 2012[216], accused of organizing a plot, have affected the cohesion of the military body. The start of the military coup shows also some complicities from the intelligence services, since the operation could not be known in advance and nipped in the bud.[217] The rebels represent the part of the army loyal to kemalist values: their communique resembles very much the ones issued by the military in the successful coups of 1960, 1971 and 1980; the name of the rebel military organization - The Committee of Peace in the Nation - is derived from Mustafa Kemal Attatürk’s motto “Peace in the nation, peace in the world”. But, in comparison to previous coups, the army was not united this time and did not enjoy support from the urban population. Maybe, the memory of the brutal repression that followed the military coup of September 12, 1980, was also a factor: 49 executions by hanging, 650,000 arrests, 30,000 persons forced into exile and 1.5 million persons on which the secret service kept records. The police stayed loyal to Erdoğan after having been purged itself of inconvenient officers in 2014. At the same time, the plotters didn’t know how to rally opposition parties, so that the only segment of civil society that made itself heard during the hours of the coup was that of Mr. Erdoğan’s supporters. It is noteworthy that the imams, who are public servants, played a key role, having effectively mobilized and called the population into the streets to defend the regime.

**Consequences**

During the Cold War, Turkey has faced different military coup d’état episodes which is why some may consider that the Turkish Army has a great experience in dealing with this kind of events, or with the risks to foreign arsenal and foreign military staff on Turkish soil. Turkey has faced similar coups in 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s order (enshrined in the 1923 Constitution) designed a secular Turkish state, one in which the Turkish Army has always been a major player. But, as Dr. Ilter Turan explains[218], the circumstances were very different this time:

> “There was a routine to earlier military interventions. They would be preceded by an erosion of national political consensus, an outbreak of continual violence, the decline of faith in the ability of bickering politicians to address the crisis, a growth in citizen expectations that only the military could restore law and order, military pronouncements that politicians should put their house in order, and finally the military takeover. This time, although Turkey’s politics were also highly polarized (...) there was no feeling that the military could do more than what was already being done.”


[217] Later, data leaked to the press, according to which authorities were informed late, at 4 pm (local time) of the day operations were launched that some army units execute suspicious maneuvers. “Turquie: le maitre espion d’Erdoğan dans la tourmente”, Le Parisien/Aujourd’hui en France. July 24, 2016: [http://www.leparisien.fr/flash-actualite-monde/turquie-le-maitre-espion-d-erdogan-dans-la-tourmente-24-07-2016-5991235.php](http://www.leparisien.fr/flash-actualite-monde/turquie-le-maitre-espion-d-erdogan-dans-la-tourmente-24-07-2016-5991235.php)

The heavy-handed government response to the coup, however, spells bad news for Turkish democracy. The state of emergency allowed the government to expedite due process which means that many innocent people could have been wrongfully punished in what has been called “the biggest purge in Turkey’s modern history”. The numbers are staggering: cca. 100,000 people dismissed/suspended, 70,000 detained and 32,000 arrested in, literally, all walks of life. How is the government planning to correct the injustices? If Turkey reintroduces the death penalty (as the president has suggested) that could significantly affect EU accession negotiations, although the progress has been dire already (since accession negotiations started in 2005, only 1 chapter out of 35 has been closed – Science and Research[220]). In both the EU and Turkey, there is an obvious fatigue (with enlargement, in EU, with being kept at the door for so long, in Turkey). There is a fair chance of a referendum being organized with a question on whether it makes sense to stay on the path of EU integration at all. If this happens, Turkey will likely engage in more geostrategic optionality than it already has.

**Turkey-U.S. relations** already volatile, will be further strained by the issue of Fetullah Gülen extradition and a lengthy process is likely to produce further resentment in Turkey who sees him as the mastermind of the coup. Turkey’s speculations that the U.S. may have somehow been involved in the coup, were dismissed by the U.S. president. Traditionally, the U.S. military had very close relations with their Turkish counterparts which would explain (but not justify) the sensitivity of the Turkish civilian government. The U.S. provides some USD 3-5 million in security aid to Turkey and plans to sell it F-35 aircraft. Moreover, not only Turkey plans to purchase 100 F-35 strike fighters, but it is a program partner, meaning that Turkish companies have commercial opportunities in the range of USD 12 billion. As recent as September, Lockheed Martin and Turkish Roketsan teamed up to develop a next-generation, air-to-surface standoff cruise missile for the F-35 fighter jet. The growing post-coup anti-American sentiment in Turkey benefits none, and the Americans are making efforts to dissipate any concern that they had any connection to the mid-July coup.

An internal crisis is always different and unpredictable and may lead to a crisis between allies. During the days of coup, there was some uncertainty over the safety of the Allied forces in Turkey, whether in reference to Incirlik Air Base or to the largest expeditionary commandment of land forces of NATO – Izmir. The electricity was cut off for a short period at the Incirlik base. It is worth noting that Turkey has the right to deny access to the Incirlik base with a 3-day notice (Zanotti & Thomas). In this context, some Western analysts raised the question whether it is not better to move the nuclear arsenal (a few dozen B 61 nuclear gravity bombs) out of Turkey over safety concerns. But, unlike other countries (Belgium, Germany, Italy, and Netherlands) where host nations possess “dual-capable aircraft”, the Incirlik base is considered by some analysts as just a “glorified storage depot”

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222 [https://www.f35.com/global/participation/turkey](https://www.f35.com/global/participation/turkey)


since there are no planes in Turkey certified to carry nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{225} Nevertheless, the best security guarantee is always the friendliness of the host nation, and it is this last point that was challenged by events this summer.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg asked for “calm and restraint and full respect for Turkey's democratic institutions and its constitution. Turkey is a valued NATO Ally.”\textsuperscript{226} The remark - Turkey is a valued NATO Ally - sends a clear message to Ankara to remain anchored in NATO’s shared values and secure NATO’s arms and personnel at Incirlik and Izmir bases. When such an important military ally faces domestic turmoil, that sends security concerns to Alliance members and can have an impact on the organization’s plans in that region. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry also asked for calm and said that “the Department of State was monitoring a very fluid situation” and "emphasized the United States' absolute support for Turkey's democratically-elected, civilian government and democratic institutions."\textsuperscript{227} In Kerry’s remarks, “fluid situation” depicts an evolving crisis that could have triggered a bigger one in the region, taking into account the fact that U.S. air raids conducted against the Islamic State (in Syria) from the Incirlik Air Base were suspended during the days of the coup. This was unprecedented, since for the last 15 years the Incirlik Base played a key role in U.S. military missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and now in Syria, against the Islamic State.\textsuperscript{228} The decisions taken by Turkey’s leaders after the coup was suppressed, to target the Turkish Army and security structures elite, sends a very dangerous message to NATO Allies: more instability in the South. Moreover, the purges in the military, are likely to reduce the combat readiness of the army (air force, in particular).\textsuperscript{229}

The relationship between Ankara and Kremlin took an unexpected turn after the coup. In fact, the mid-July coup looks like a watershed moment in Turkish-Russian relations. The diplomatic overtures of the Turkish president towards Russia indicate the will of Recep Erdogan for a new chapter in Turkish-Russian relations. Russia is one of Turkey’s top 3 economic partners.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>24,937</td>
<td>21,261</td>
<td>20,401</td>
<td>11,141</td>
<td>10,839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>24,910</td>
<td>22,380</td>
<td>25,280</td>
<td>12,727</td>
<td>12,559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>24,983</td>
<td>24,182</td>
<td>26,064</td>
<td>13,359</td>
<td>12,655</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: in thousand USD; Top 5 countries.


\textsuperscript{227} NATO Secretary General statement on events in Turkey, July 16, 2016, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_134194.htm;

\textsuperscript{228} Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas, Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations, Congressional Research Service, August 26, 2016, p.21, available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R41368.pdf;

\textsuperscript{229} Ilter Turan, op. cit.
Since 2006 until 2014, Russia consistently ranked first as a source for Turkish imports. Only in 2015, did China and Germany overtake Russia in terms of value of imports (see table above), and consequently as share in total imports – 12% of total imports came from China, 10.3% from Germany and 9.8% from Russia. Turkish citizens enjoyed visa-free travel to Russia. Turkey is not a resource-based economy, it has a strong services and financial sectors and it relies heavily on FDI (est. USD 184 Billion in 2015\(^\text{230}\)). It also means Russia is a key provider of mineral resources (oil and natural gas in particular). Russia is Turkey’s largest supplier of natural gas (27 Bcm in 2015) and Turkey is Russia’s second largest market after Germany. In 2014, 47% of the electricity produced in Turkey was natural gas fired indicating a heavy dependency on Russian gas for power generation:

It is against this background that the recent unfolding of bilateral relations was almost painful to watch: the ill-fated downing of the Russian jet in November last year has triggered an “ice age” (Евгения Габер) in Turkish-Russian relations that lasted 8 months.

Turkey’s industry is traditionally dominated by textiles and clothing sectors, followed by food processing, mining (coal and copper), construction, lumber, paper, etc. Therefore, in the economic sector, Turkish-Russian relations focus on 3 main areas: tourism, trade, and infrastructure (energy and transport).

**Tourism:** Since the late ‘90s, the number of Russian tourists grew five times (less than 500,000 Russians opted for Turkey as a holiday destination in 1999) to reach 2.4 million (in 2007) and 3.3 million (in 2014) making Turkey “the most preferred holiday destination for Russians”.\(^\text{231}\) The downing of the Russian military jet in November 2015 has curtailed this burgeoning relation, so much so that TV reports on Turkish tourism in the first half of 2016 were showing depressing scenes with empty resorts and hotels. Tourism, the “golden segment of Turkey’s economy” (turnover of USD 31.5 Billion and 41.6 million visitors in 2015) was the hardest hit.\(^\text{232}\) Turkey made efforts to diversify to other markets, but the loss of Russian tourists was not easy to substitute. Figures by


Turkey’s Ministry of Culture and Tourism cited a contraction of 90% y-o-y of Russian tourism to Turkey in May 2016. This increased dependency meant that Russian sanctions, combined with the heightened terrorist threat (Istanbul attacks) which dissuaded many European tourists, cost the Turkish budget somewhere between 7 to 10 Billion USD of lost revenue this holiday season. Tourism was also the first area in which Russia has lifted restrictions after receiving the letter from the Turkish president at the end of June.

Trade: Turkey did not join European sanctions imposed on Russia, therefore the Russian embargo on EU food products presented an opportunity for Turkey which has been accused of “exploiting” the situation. Back then, the Turkish Economy Minister Nihat Zeybekci described the sanctions as a “window of opportunity for Ankara”. Despite this accusation, if you look at the numbers, it almost seems as if Turkey failed to seize the opportunity. Overall, Turkey’s exports to Russia have in fact decreased in 2014-2015: according to the Turkish Statistical Institute (TSI), in 2015, the Russian market ranked 11th among key destinations of Turkish exports, after Germany, UK, Iraq, Italy, USA, France, Switzerland, Spain, UAE and Iran. Moreover, the value of Turkish exports to Russia has dropped by 40% in 2015 (USD 3.6 Billion) compared to the previous year (USD 5.9 Billion in 2014). However, despite accounting for just 2.5% of total Turkish exports, the bulk of exports to Russia were fruits and vegetables:

**Top 10 Turkish Exports to Russia** (2015)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Value (USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Fruits, nuts</td>
<td>$600.1 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Vegetables</td>
<td>$336.9 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Machinery</td>
<td>$319.2 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>$214.2 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Plastics</td>
<td>$186.2 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Knitted or crocheted fabric</td>
<td>$168.9 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Electronic equipment</td>
<td>$138.2 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Iron or steel products</td>
<td>$93.4 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Manmade filaments</td>
<td>$90.4 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Manmade staple fibers</td>
<td>$89.7 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: [http://www.worldsrichestcountries.com/top_turkey_exports.html](http://www.worldsrichestcountries.com/top_turkey_exports.html)

Turkey made significant inroads into the Russian market on the background of Russian counter-sanctions to EU, as far as fruits and vegetables are concerned. The thinking at the time was that it simply made business sense. After the shooting of the Russian jet, Russia enacted an embargo on Turkish products (fruits, vegetables, poultry and salt). However, Turkish products continued to reach the Russian market via black market channels or by re-export through 3rd countries at a significant mark-up. Turkish textiles, which were not included in the sanctions list, have been reported to be the object of an “unofficial ban” with exports dropping significantly as well. It is worth noting that in some vital areas, trade remained unhampered. For instance, Russian grain exports to Turkey

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remained unaffected, since Turkey is the largest buyer of Russian wheat and sunflower oil (4.1 million tons of wheat last year).

**Infrastructure:** Restrictions were introduced for Turkish citizens working in Russia while work on Turkish Stream was suspended. Although Russia did ban construction projects with Turkish companies in Russia, it made sure to allow room for exceptions (“unless a special exemption is granted”). In designing the sanctions for Turkey, Russia was careful to exclude its most lucrative business: natural gas sales. As far as energy infrastructure projects are concerned, Turkish Stream is not the only energy project affected. Economic reasons forced Russia to put on the back burner expensive mega-projects (such as the gas pipeline to China or the bridge over Crimea) out of desire to save money. The outlook in Moscow is that the worst is behind and that “the economy will muddle through.” Romanian analyst Stanislav Secreriu explains Russia’s seemingly unusual willingness to suffer short term economic loss by the fact that the ruling elite prioritizes military force over economic statecraft as the most effective foreign policy tool. However, in this case, economic statecraft (sanctions) worked wonders. The Russian-Turkish showdown also has the merit of proving the much bigger resilience of the Russian economy, which has been described lately as becoming quite good at “downshifting” (doing more with less).

As far as Russian-Turkish cooperation on nuclear projects is concerned, there was a significant degree of uncertainty in January 2016, as pointed by Sinan Ülgen: “Turkish and Russian authorities have refrained from opining about the future of the Akkuyu nuclear power plant, on which construction was scheduled to begin in 2016. This silence, though, should not be construed as an indication that the future of the project is secure. Rather, it is a reflection of the prevailing uncertainty about the consequences of a unilateral withdrawal.”

Following the meeting on August 9, 2016, of the Russian and Turkish presidents, all uncertainty was removed: the Akkuyu NPP shall be granted the status of “strategic investment project”. Moreover, according to Turkey's Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu, his country will “initiate Turkish Stream works as soon as possible and make necessary and additional agreements accordingly”. Investments in energy are not affected by the July coup, if anything, after the Russian-Turkish reconciliation, there is a renewed interest. A new target for trade with Russia was announced: USD 100 billion. Turkish subcontractors are once again essential for building all the infrastructure projects in the runner up to the 2018 football championship. All these political messaging form Turkey suggest quite a U-turn in bilateral relations that may not resume only to the economic sector. For instance, the press reported that Turkey and Russia plan to establish a joint military, intelligence and diplomacy mechanism.

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238 Stanislav Secreriu, “Why Russia does not retrench”, in New Eastern Europe, September-October No 5 (XXIII)/ 2016, pp. 41-44.


243 Idem.
The renewed impetus and the new target for trade means that economic interdependence between Turkey and Russia will only increase. With a population of 80 million (July 2016 est.), Turkey has enjoyed an enviable annual average GDP growth rate of 5% between 2010 and 2014. However, this growth is expected to slow down, with Moody’s forecasting a 2.7% rate in 2017-2019\(^{244}\), and the IMF- a 3.4% growth (2016) and 3.5% (2017). Hence, Turkey’s drive and efforts to put economic issues first.

**Conclusions**

Although drawing conclusions with regard to developments in Turkey may be premature\(^{245}\), the 300 dead, the images with tanks destroying civilian vehicles or those of military firing upon civilians will stay for some time in the collective memory and will affect the credibility of the military body.\(^{246}\) At the same time, the latest purges within the army will leave a mark on the quality of the Turkish officer corps. Above all, the July attempted coup in Turkey this summer already produced a few notable consequences:

It further strengthened the unexpected breakthrough in diplomatic relations between Russia and Turkey, although efforts in this direction predate\(^{247}\) the coup as well as Erdogan’s apologetic letter to president Putin that resulted in the go ahead for “normalizing relations”. However, on a broader scale, despite this Turkish-Russian rapprochement, “deep mutual mistrust” (E. Gaber\(^{248}\)) remains. Turkish-Russian relations face an uphill battle as the “knife in the back” may not be such a forgettable affair.

It unnecessarily strained Turkish-American relations. Despite past incidents when Turkey imposed restrictions on U.S. use of its territory and airspace (1962, 1975, and 2003), there was no such outcome this time and no significant short and medium term risks to U.S. basing operations in Turkey. As far as Turkey’s dynamic with NATO is concerned, there has been some aggressive rhetoric towards the Alliance as of late. The Turkish ambassador to Russia Umit Yardim said recently, that NATO is not in the position to dictate Ankara’s foreign policy: “*In no way can NATO limit our contacts with other countries ... It means NATO has no right to dictate its terms and tell us who we should or should not meet and communicate with*”.\(^{249}\) Moreover, a statement made in August by the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs is no less puzzling: “*Turkey wanted to cooperate with NATO members up to this point (…) But the results we got did not satisfy us. Therefore, it is natural to look for other options. But we don’t see this as a move against NATO*”\(^{250}\).

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\(^{245}\) A positive element is the abandonment of niceties towards the Islamic State.

\(^{246}\) In spite of the operation on Syrian territory aimed at restoring the army’s credibility.

\(^{247}\) Back in December 2015 regrets were expressed about the death of the pilot while in April this year representatives of the two countries engaged in consultation brokered by Kazakhstan’s president Nursultan Nazarbaev. On June 12, Turkish officialdom sent its congratulations to Russian counterparts on the occasion of the Day of Russia. In paralleled, working contacts continued at ministerial level.


\(^{249}\) “Turkish ambassador in Russia: NATO can't dictate Ankara's foreign policy”, *Thomson Reuters Foundation News*, August 11, 2016, [http://news.trust.org/item/20160811093456-2iq2h](http://news.trust.org/item/20160811093456-2iq2h)

Where does that leave the current state of NATO – Turkey relations? The noise aside, Turkey remains the most valuable NATO ally in the Middle East. It is the most important NATO pillar in the Black Sea region and in the Eastern Flank. So, what does this (so far rhetorical) distancing mean for the Alliance? For countries on the Eastern Flank of the Alliance, NATO is the bedrock and only true guardian of their security. In the context of a proxy hybrid war in Ukraine, Eastern Allies could properly ask what does the new normal of Russian-Turkish relations mean for NATO? The Alliance Eastern Flank states need to see solid proofs that Article 5 security guarantees are working. Especially since, in the interwar period, CEE countries failed to receive the much needed help from Western Powers. An unstable Turkey is not only a vulnerability of the Southern Flank, but may prompt a weakening of the Southern part of the Eastern Flank. A stable and predictable Turkey is in the best interests of all. NATO is a military alliance above all, but it also represents a community of shared values. Turkey is not just a military ally or an airbase, but also a political and cultural model for the Muslim world (arguably, the most successful one, a “model of models”). In this key, the most important consequence of the coup (democracy backsliding and the turn towards more authoritarianism) may yet be the loss of the moderate Islam model. It has become obvious that although a NATO member, Turkey is on its own path, where it wants to enjoy more freedom to forge strategic Alliances as it sees fit, and that means it may not always be the reliable partner the West wants it to be.
Report Conclusion

The European order is once again at an inflection point. The 1990s unipolar hangover is over, being replaced by a multipolar reality shaped by the return of great power competitions and raw Hobbesian geopolitics. The normative post-war anchors of security – the UN Charter, Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter – are constantly challenged by revisionist behavior. In short, “the Fukuyaman quarter-century is drawing to a whimpering close. It is no longer about the victory of liberal democracy, it is a scramble to protect it both abroad and at home”\(^\text{251}\), as has recently defined the Estonian President the new normal. This reality forced NATO to reinvest in its article 5 foundational purpose – collective and territorial defense – and adjust its regional posture to the emergent security environment. It is the journey that NATO embarked on at Wales, essentially a reassurance summit, and a process that was reinforced this summer in Warsaw by deploying an enhanced forward presence on the Eastern Flank.

Though the NATO Wales summit in 2014 marked the urgency to reassure Eastern European member states and increase the military readiness in case of a Russian aggression directed at NATO territory, the measures adopted served to create only a limited deterrent against the new threat the Alliance faces and to address exclusively linear, conventional military challenges. The Warsaw summit two years later was meant as a follow up to the Wales reassurance measures, as well as an answer to the developing, non-conventional challenges in Eastern Europe. However, the Warsaw summit conclusions remained unclear: nuclear deterrence has yet to be addressed, Germany’s leading role in European security is limited by the lack of domestic consensus, NATO-EU cooperation is clouded by Brexit and the suspicion of leadership overlap and lack of political will, and, most importantly, the Eastern flank was conceptually divided between North and South, leaving the Black Sea in a strategic gap.

On the nuclear deterrence front, the objective both Washington and Moscow should aim for is strategic stability. Arms races and war-fighting strategies relying on nuclear weapons go against the core principles of the nuclear revolution. The U.S. and Russia need to remind themselves that nuclear weapons have little military value, because a nuclear war cannot be won. Russia’s nuclear posture – which emphasizes the feasibility of a limited nuclear war - undoubtedly weighs heavily in the minds of U.S. military strategists and political leadership. If the United States adapts its posture to mirror Russia’s, both countries – and the entire world for that matter – are worse off. At the same time, failing to respond to Moscow’s increasingly nuclearized military strategy could send the wrong signal to allies. Washington must therefore strengthen its nuclear umbrella over its junior partners without getting dragged into an arms race with Russia. Giving allies more of a say within the Nuclear Planning Group could build up the credibility of American extended nuclear deterrence. Moreover, getting the UK and France to make similar commitments as the U.S. to the non-nuclear NATO member-states could reinforce the idea of collective defense. Last but not least, the United States should increase its efforts to foster cooperation among junior partners, especially in Eastern Europe, so as to prevent the competition among them from weakening the alliance.

\(^{251}\) Tomaas Hendrik Ilves, “The End of the West as We Know It?”, The American Interest, June 2016, https://www.president.ee/en/media/interviews/12368-qthe-end-of-the-west-as-we-know-itq-the-american-interest/index.html
On the conventional deterrence front, despite the fact that the Wales and Warsaw summit measures have focused on increasing military readiness, the European capability gap remains a major issue, which renders European Allies virtually unable to defend their territory without American help. When it comes to South Eastern Europe, the situation is even grimmer. Faced with the Russian military build-up in Crimea, Allies such as Romania have to drastically restructure both strategy and armed forces, in order to be able to deny access to the battle space and defend their territorial integrity. This entails a systematic assessment of Romania’s capabilities and priorities, a much stronger emphasis on territorial defense and, of course, the development – with help from its Allies – of its naval force. However, in order to implement this process, Bucharest needs extensive political will, significant help from NATO and would have to succeed where it has so far failed— to rally NATO member states and partners from the region for comprehensive common defense in form of an A2AD umbrella.

The overall NATO conventional deterrence on the Eastern Flank needs further development and investments. One such niche is boosting the enhanced forward presence. As a recently retired British General, Richard Barrons emphasized: “there is no force behind it, or plans or resilience (...). It is an indication of how at this stage in our history I think many people have lost sight of what a credible military force is and requires. They think a little bit of posing or a light force constitutes enough and it isn’t.”252 The second dimension that it needs to be taken into consideration is related to the ways and means necessary to preserve the ability to rapidly reinforce and project power in the frontline states, some that might be already well under the coverage of the access-denial network of the other side. Options to deal with the A2/AD scenarios should be devised: they could entail maritime and commercial blockades, or investing in offset strategies, while developing the capabilities that will give the ability to break and operate inside an access-denial shaped environment.

Limited ballistic missile defense remains a key issue for NATO in the short and medium term. It has both strategic and political implications that go beyond the limited scope envisioned when it was implemented. If the ballistic missile defense is handled properly it may become one of NATO’s integration drivers, as well as an asset for both territorial defense and out of area operations. The next 10 years may well see the rise of international tensions along with the advent of multipolarity while Europe will see the likely development of an autonomous hard EU strategic core. If such is the case, ballistic defenses are a strategic insurance policy for U.S. and European security. For Eastern Flank member states, ballistic missile defense represents the embodiment of collective security guarantees.

Last, but not least, keeping Turkey firmly anchored in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is essential in the long term. Nevertheless, in spite of its importance, Turkey now faces a strategic constraint: relative paralysis in relations with Russia, cold relations with the West, and polarization of Turkish society. Ankara’s post-imperial ambitions are not irreconcilable with NATO’s long term interest. The bottom line is: there is no alternative for the West/NATO to Turkey as a connector to the Islamic world.

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Western chancelleries have “sold” to the public, especially to the one in Eastern and Central Europe, the idea that the Warsaw Summit represented a historic moment, a milestone in the evolution of the Alliance and that, from now on, the Eastern flank states, from the Baltic to the Black Sea will feel much more secure, despite their proximity to Russia.

The documents adopted at the summit are unusually lengthy. The Final Communique has 139 paragraphs. Such verbosity can be explained only by NATO’s eastern members’ obsession with long and convoluted legal documents. That is what they have been taught by their former Soviet “comrades”, which in turn borrowed this practice from the Czarist bureaucracy. Among the long paragraphs that make happy one capital or the other, are hidden crucial military decisions such as the creation of 4 multinational battalions in Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Paragraph 41 of the Final Communique announces the formation of a multinational brigade on the South Eastern flank and, the promise to assess a stronger Alliance naval and air presence in the Black Sea.

Russia is mentioned many times in the summit documents, yet Russia’s reaction does not live up to expectations. It seems that president Putin has lost his appetite for dramatic statements and, on June 30, while celebrating Russian Diplomacy Day he merely acknowledged the increased NATO military exercises in the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea, and assured that Russia will not be drawn into a new arms race, but will focus on social-economic development.253 A few days later, in an interview to Kommersant, Alexandr Grushko, Russia’s permanent representative to NATO, praised the cooperation and peaceful relations between Black Sea States.254 However, Moscow, he said, is concerned by the increased military presence in the Black Sea of outside actors, such as the United States, which in Grushko’s opinion “destabilize”, “affect regional security” and “upset the strategic balance”. Not even the spokesperson for Russia’s ministry of foreign affairs Maria Zakharova has criticized the Warsaw Summit. On July 7, 2016, during a press conference held in Crimea, she accused NATO that instead of focusing on international terrorism, it complains about the Russian threat and suggested the West cooperates with Russia. At the same time, Zakharova confirmed Russia’s availability for a Russia-NATO Council (the activity of which was suspended after Crimea’s annexation) meeting scheduled on July 13, 2016.255 A day after the NATO Council reunion on July 8-9, Zakharova hit back with a communiqué where the main idea is that NATO leaders rather256 turn their eyes to the South where the terrorit threat originates257 than look East and stop portraying Russia as evil, in order to justify the adopted military measures.

253 <<Нельзя просто пропускать вранье в отношении России>>, http://kommersant.ru/doc/3026006 Putin’s speech on Russian Diplomacy Day stands in sharp contrast to statements made just a month before, in Athens, during the official visit to Greece: „Putin says Romania, Poland may now be in Russia’s cross-hairs“, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-europe-shield-idUSKCN0YI2ER


255 «Брифинг официального представителя МИД России М.В.Захаровой, Республика Крым, Российской Федерации, 7 июля 2016 года».

256 <<Комментарий официального представителя МИД России М.В.Захаровой в связи с саммитом НАТО в Варшаве>>, http://www.mid.ru/ru/kommentarii/-/asset_publisher/2MrVt3CzL5sw/content/id/2350611

257 Ibid.
How do we explain though Russia’s unusual moderate tone? The decisions adopted in Warsaw seemed to shift the balance of forces, revolutionize deterrence and defense against Russian aggression. They seemed, because in reality their military impact is low. The decisions taken in Warsaw matter, first and foremost, for the Polish and Baltic public opinion which are the most concerned by the annexation of Crimea and destabilization of Ukraine. In February 2016, RAND has released a report which has some unsettling conclusions: the Baltic states capitals can be occupied in 36 hours; to deter a Russian aggression in Poland and the Baltic states, at least 7 brigades are required (one brigade has around 4-5,000 troops, so around 35,000 soldiers would need to be deployed). Otherwise, there is a risk that the 4 battalions (4-5,000 men) agreed in Warsaw to be overwhelmed, especially those deployed in the Baltics.

The core measures adopted at the NATO Warsaw summit do not solve the security dilemmas of the Baltics, because they do not take into account the increased efficiency of the Russian army, the fruit of reforms undertaken by former Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov (2008–2012) who, after 150 years, has abandoned the concept of "mobilization of the entire people", and refocused the Russian Army on elite units instead. Serdyukov's decision has affected several million people, but provided the Kremlin several highly effective units, able to execute orders in just a few hours. It must be emphasized that, there is no need for parliamentary approval for military operations in Russia, so the speed of decision-making and troops deployment make a military tactic based on the element of surprise very difficult to counteract. The senators in the upper house of the Russian Parliament needed just one hour to vote for sending troops to Ukraine, in March 2014, and less than half an hour to approve sending troops to Syria, in September 2015.

Military analysts point out that the priority at Warsaw was not sending troops, but should have been developing the capabilities to counter-balance the anti-access and area denial facilities, something that is of concern for the Alliance as well. In recent years, Russia has built air, sea or land access-denial systems in key NATO points that can potentially block the entry of enemy forces in those regions. There are three such anti-access "domes" on the Eastern Flank: in Kaliningrad, they cover the Baltic countries and parts of Poland; in Crimea, it aims to control the whole basin of the Black Sea; in Latakia, Syria, it threatens the central and southern part of Turkey, an important NATO member. For example, the Crimean-based Iskander missiles (500 km range) can hit Constanta, while Kalibr rockets (1,500 km range) can reach Ankara, Sofia, Budapest, Warsaw, Vilnius, or Kiev. It is in this area, however, that the Alliance did not take any decisive step in Warsaw. Thus, just one month after the summit in Warsaw, Moscow has strengthened the exclusion systems in Crimea

261 «Источник в НАТО заявил о планах альянса ответить на создание РФ мощных зон ПРО», Москва, 2 июля 2016 г., http://www.interfax.ru/world/517660
by installing S-400 missiles.\textsuperscript{264}

When implemented, the measures decided in Warsaw will not alter in any way the balance of conventional forces in the Baltic region and even less so in the Black Sea area. On the contrary, the more extensive military maneuvers conducted by the Russian army, in breach of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, which requires information exchange, remain without adequate response from the Alliance. Thus, it was reached a point where maneuvers involving more than 150,000 men with thousands of tanks and armored vehicles, are impossible to monitor because they are not properly declared by the Russian side according to international agreements.\textsuperscript{265}

Unlike other NATO summits, the Warsaw one - although initially announcing a mobilization of Russian propaganda for political, diplomatic and military reactions to what Moscow calls the “Western threat” – was commented in a surprisingly calm tone. The likely cause of this repositioning of the Russian propaganda machine might be that, a simple analysis has showed the Russians that the Warsaw decisions did not alter the balance of power in Eastern Europe.

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{264} Emily Chan, „Russia deploys advanced surface-to-air missiles with a 150 mile range to Crimea amid escalating tensions”, August 12, 2016, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3737920/Russia-deploys-advanced-S-400-air-missile-Crimea-agencies.html}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{265} Alexander Golts, art. cit.}
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