FREE

Romanian-Chinese relations State of Play

China is rising to great power status faster than any previous great power in history. Not only is China looking to shape its relations with Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), but Romania too is looking to adapt to the most substantial change in the international system since the end of the Cold War by transforming its relations with China. But, reconstructing the bilateral relationship is far more challenging and far from a pre-ordained enterprise it first appears to be. This report looks into Romanian-Chinese relations in 2015, bilateral trade, current level of Sino-Romanian economic cooperation, strategic considerations, perceptions and economic interests, all in the wider context of China’s Central and Eastern European policy. Although, sources for optimism are limited, assessing and translating Chinese economic interests into political clout and leverage in Romania is premature, as in the short-term, there are as many common interests as there are divisive ones that ply the relationship.

The relationship between Romania and China is one of the success stories of the Romanian Cold War period diplomacy and an example of Romania’s strategic thinking in a time of great security challenges. While much of the discourse about the old Communist legacy around the “special relationship” is coming back in today’s Chinese political discourse towards Romania, the expectations it creates are not entirely met by the content and substance of the bilateral relationship. While definitely interested in the prospects of accessing China’s market and a large chunk of the Chinese foreign direct investments (FDI) flowing into Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), Romania continues to be wary of closer political engagement with China. To this effect, Bucharest is well aware of the fact that all its dealings with China are closely monitored and scrutinized by both Washington (its strongest strategic partner and the guarantor of Romanian national security in these turbulent times) and the EU (Romania’s main economic partner). There are multiple reasons to be wary of an alluring China to be kept in mind, but they should not to deter Romanian institutions and business alike to further engage with China, but force them to be smart in their approach of the economic giant.

From Special Relationship to Economic Pragmatism

The basis for the 65-year long (2014) Romanian-Chinese bilateral relationship is what both parties like to commonly refer to as the special relationship stemming from their close cooperation during the 1950s and 1960s in opposing and resisting Moscow. This special relation manifested in the Chinese informal security guarantees for Romania’s territorial integrity and political security in the 1960s, when both countries’ relations with Moscow were deteriorating. As China moved closer to the U.S. in the 1970s and 1980s, relations with Romania became estranged, especially with Romanian-Western relations coming to a standstill during that same period.

After the 1989 Romanian Revolution, successive Romanian governments actively sought to maintain a close economic relation with China, seen as a market for Romanian products and a source of FDI. However, with the Romanian priorities in the 1990s steering towards the strategic goals of developing a functional democratic regime and a liberal, market economy that would facilitate its accession to NATO and the EU and the worsening Romanian economic situation in the 1990s, the Chinese interest in the Romanian markets and the bilateral political relation was marginal. The Romanian political rhetoric concerning the special Sino-Romanian relationship of the Cold War period was abandoned in the mid-1990s and replaced by a liberal, democrat discourse towards China that endures today, albeit in a significantly toned down version.

It was not until the mid- and late-2000s when China started to implement its openness to the West policy and in the context of the growing negative effects of the economic crisis and China’s growing role in the international system, that the Romanian authorities re-evaluated the relationship with China. It is uncertain to what degree the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)’s current Chinese strategy is a truly bipartisan one, given the divide between the Romanian right- and left-wing parties. The liberal-democrat governments of the 1990s and the mid- and late-2000s focused mainly on promoting economic relations with the West, whereas social-democrat governments tended to be preoccupied about relations with China. For instance, it was under the social-democrat government in early-2000s that Romania signed the Economic Cooperation Agreements with China. Moreover, after signing the Enhanced Cooperation Partnership (in 2013), the current Social Democrat government sought to expand trade and cooperation with China so as to correct its huge bilateral trade deficit (-€745 million in 2013).^[1] More recently (March 2015), the Chinese authorities have expressed readiness and willingness to engage bilaterally with all Romanian political parties, in order to bridge this apparent divide, but also to ensure greater stability for future Sino-Romanian economic and investment ties.

Romania’s interests for engaging China

Albeit more prudent than its neighbors Poland and Hungary, Romania has engaged in relations with China at both bilateral and multilateral levels with some considerable success. In 2014 Romania was China’s fifth largest economic partner in CEE, while China is Romania’s largest Asian trading partner and largest source of imports.^[2] By comparison, Poland who put in place the China 2020 dedicated strategy for enhancing economic cooperation, trade and investment with China, is Beijing’s largest economic partner in Central Europe and the value of their bilateral trade is 4 times the one between Romania and China. Poland received over 58% of all Chinese FDI flowing into the CEE region in 2012-2014, followed closely by Hungary and the Czech Republic. Romania received less than 5% of the Chinese FDI flowing in the CEE region during the same period – not taking into consideration signed, but still not implemented contracts.^[3] This is a clear example of missed economic opportunity to diversify its markets and economic partners, as well as its sources of FDI – especially when CEE is the third largest destination for Chinese FDI after Asia-Pacific and Western Europe, and the region with the fastest growing share of Chinese FDI since 2009. Despite China’s enhanced presence in the region (some 700 Chinese companies regularly attend the 16+1 format), China is only Romania’s 29th largest investor, with under $150-200 million invested annually (roughly 0.2% of total FDI flowing into Romania in 2013 and less that 1% of Romania’s GDP), disproportionately behind Western states in general and, even behind Poland, Hungary or the Czech Republic.^[4] The Polish and Hungarian cases, seem to suggest the Chinese authorities highly value stability and predictability in their bilateral relations and tend to regard both as a sign of trust to enhance economic cooperation and investment.

According to Romanian authorities, Bucharest’s interests vis-a-vis China could fall into three categories:

1 Strategic interests

The Romanian stimulus for closer strategic engagement with China stems from the latter’s ascending to great power status, its transformative role at regional and global levels, and its predominant role in the world economy. However, Romania continues to entertain prudent perceptions of China, in particular: (a) an undesirable stronger Chinese leadership in the international system ; (b) a preference to work with China through EU/European multilateral formats, rather than bilaterally; or (c) a tendency to consider China an economic threat to the European community.^[5]

The current Romanian rapprochement with China should be understood in the broader context and spirit of the American and Western European pivots to Asia. Romanian interests are predominantly in favor of developing the bilateral and multilateral relations with China, but only complementary to the EU-China trade and investment formats still under negotiation.

Moreover, Romania regards the Jintao and Jinping administrations’ opening to the West policy and their economic development and cooperation agenda implemented through the China–Central and Eastern Europe Forum (16+1 format) and the New Silk Road Economic Belt^[6] (both the maritime and continental routes – See Fig. 1) as important strategic and economic opportunities for Romania. Indeed, Romania’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) considers Bucharest’s engagement with both these Chinese formats to be of primary strategic importance. More specifically, the Romanian MFA strongly supports the prospects of becoming a regional hub connecting the Chinese maritime and continental Silk Road Economic Beltway with the EU’s Danube Strategy^[7]. The connection would be made through: (1) the Constanta port on the Black Sea, an area with the potential to become the EU’s largest logistics site in Eastern Europe, which is also featured on the Chinese Silk Road Economic Beltway; and (b) the Danube-Black Sea channel, which could facilitate the transfer of goods from the Silk Road all the way into the heart of Europe via the Danube.^[8]

So what are the potential problems? Romania is tacitly uneasy about China’s approach to building the New Silk Road Economic Belt through bilateral negotiations in which the economic and security dimensions are kept completely separated. In particular, Romania is uneasy about the perceived Sino-Russian strategic rapprochement; China’s tacit acceptance of the annexation of Crimea, despite its own secessionist concerns; and an increasingly unstable regional security environment in which Romania perceives Russia as a security challenge through Moscow’s use of hybrid tactics to destabilize and undermine the territorial integrity of its neighbors, through its disrespect for international law, through the militarization of the Black Sea and through its illicit use of military force and intentions to control the Danube gateways.

China’s New Silk Roads (2015) Source: Jeremy Page “China Sees Itself at Center of New Asian Order” The Wall Street Journal, November 9, 2014.

Moreover, Romania is uneasy about the Chinese reluctance to engage directly with the EU – which would be implicit if the Silk Road Economic Belt and the EU Danube Strategy would be connected through Romania, as a regional hub. Since the early 2000s, Chinese foreign policy has sought intense and active engagement with Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) simultaneously at bilateral and multilateral level – the latter by developing the 16+1 format as a Chinese-driven policy instrument. While publicly open to collaboration in the Chinese-driven format, and quite active in proposing new dimensions to develop and deepen multilateral cooperation in it, Romania remains uneasy about Beijing being adamant on maintaining its agenda-setting role within the newly institutionalized 16+1 format and reluctant over allowing the EU to become a member or even an observer in the 16+1 format.

Thus, while Beijing is openly supportive of a more prominent political role for Romania in the CEE region and the Chinese Silk Road Economic Belt, Bucharest is more likely to fold in line with the Western (the EU and U.S.) positions over the Chinese New Silk Road.

2 Economic interests

Romanian interests to engage with China are and most likely will remain mainly economic for the foreseeable future. More specifically, as a developing economy, especially in the aftermath of the economic crisis of the late 2000s, Romania has been seeking to diversify its economic partners, markets and, most importantly, its sources of FDI by developing bilateral economic relations with China. Since the implementation of Hu Jintao’s opening to the West strategy (currently deepened by the Jinping leadership), the Romanian-Chinese bilateral trade has tripled in value and volume since 2007, with a substantial increase in bilateral trade since 2011 – from approx. $1.5 billion in 2011 to over $4 billion in 2014.^[9]

In 2013, China announced a $10 billion investment fund for the 16 CEE countries participating in the 16+1 format; the investment fund is made available to these CEE countries over the course of the next decade. While this overall amount is certainly a significant one, upon closer look, it is severely under-estimated and insufficient. It amounts to an average of approx. $62 million worth of Chinese FDI flowing into each of the 16 participating countries (assuming an equal distribution), far too small an amount to be significant for the CEE economies. By comparison, China has already signed bilateral FDI contracts worth $8 billion with Romania covering the same period.^[10] The 16+1 investment fund does not entail a steady growth of current Chinese FDI levels in these countries suggesting the Chinese authorities may be seeking to stabilize, not necessarily increase their economic presence in the CEE economies. China’s guiding principle – reciprocity – in economic development is potentially harmful to the CEE countries’ economies: while there may not be any visible and immediate political strings attached to the Chinese FDI in the CEE countries, it does force them to accept greater market exposure to Chinese economic presence in exchange for a relatively limited FDI contribution because they lack power to reciprocate in kind on the Chinese market.

Since 2012, Romania and China signed a number of significant investment contracts in several economic sectors:

1. Energy – China is willing to finance reactors 3 and 4 of the Cernavoda nuclear power plant, with an overall investment of $6 billion over the next 10 years. The projects with Nuclearelectrica, Oltenia Energy Complex and Hunedoara Energy Complex (i.e. Rovinari and Deva thermoelectric power plants), Tarnita-Lapusesti (hydroelectric power plant) and a wind power project in Constanta are among the Sino-Romanian joint-ventures launched in the last two years. These investments have been long time priorities for Romania’s energy sector as well as for the development of its new generation and regional energy-transportation capacity. They also represent priority areas for Chinese investment in Romanian energy infrastructure.^[11] Moreover, with a number of Romanian state-owned companies scheduled for IPOs, Romanian authorities hope to get the Chinese investors further interested in them.
2. Infrastructure – Romania is seeking to consolidate Chinese investment in infrastructure development: development of three main highways, modernization of Romania’s railway infrastructure and development of harbor and maritime infrastructure in Constanta,^[12] all of which are priorities under the Social-Democrat 2015 Romanian Transport Master-Plan. In particular, Chinese investors and companies could help co-fund and build several remaining sectors of the Bucuresti-Transilvania highway; they could modernize the Romanian Railway system and even take an interest in the privatization of the Romanian Railway Company. The deal could potentially include a $500 million-worth contract to purchase Chinese-made high-speed trains (a 2013 Chinese offer that the Romanian authorities are still evaluating), according to sources in Romanian MFA in March 2015. As for the Chinese interest in the maritime infrastructure in Constanta, it is neither new, nor surprising. The Chinese are interested in acquiring and developing maritime infrastructure in all maritime Eastern European states – Croatia, Greece, Romania, etc. Moreover, Constanta is featured on the Jinping leadership’s new Silk Road Economic Belt – an economic trans-Eurasian transmission belt – connecting two of the world’s largest economies. Recently, the Chinese party has made an offer to develop an industrial park near Agigea, a $10 billion project that would also involve the development and modernization of maritime infrastructure in Agigea.^[13] The Romanian interest in developing the harbor infrastructure in Constanta is extremely important in the context of connecting China’s New Silk Road Economic Belt to the EU Danube Strategy, referred to earlier.
3. Agriculture – Is a priority area of economic development under the social-democrat government and, with the considerable support of European funds, Romanian agricultural output has been steadily growing since 2010, which is further reflected in an increase of the sector as percentage of the GDP (from roughly 4.6-5% prior to 2010 to an average of 6% after 2010).^[14] As such, following the Sino-Romanian 2014 Cooperation Agreement on Agriculture, Romania is interested in increasing its agricultural exports on the rapidly-growing Chinese markets – livestock, cereal, dairy, meat products, wine, etc.
4. The need to consolidate the presence of CEE countries on Chinese markets is pressing for Romania as well, on account of economic relations with Russia and in light of economic sanctions mutually imposed by Moscow and Brussels in the context of the conflict in Ukraine. While the market expectations were that the slowdown in the CEE states’ bilateral trade with Russia would be temporary, the recent decisions of the EU and the U.S. (March 2015) to extend the sanctions indefinitely and possibly impose additional ones could indicate a trend in the CEE countries’ trade profiles, thus leading them to reorient most of the trade cut with Russia towards China. This is all too important for the CEE states which are competing fiercely for access to the Chinese markets – more permissive than the Western markets, but less transparent than the EU highly standardized and regulated markets on which they CEE countries face tough Western competition. However, in bilateral relations with China, access to national markets is governed by the principle of reciprocity. There is a strong tendency for regional states to maximize Chinese investments in their economies in order to gain more access to the Chinese markets, but there is an inherent vulnerability that their small and open economies gain in this process – they become too open to Chinese financial and economic interests while never achieving reciprocity simply because their economic agents are too small and fragile. Thus, while Chinese FDI and economic cooperation seems to have no immediate and apparent strings attached, its impact is cumulative and brings an asymmetric interdependence relationship with an economic giant.
5. Communication and IT – Huawei and Lenovo are the largest Chinese IT&C companies present on the Romanian market, having created approximately 1,200 jobs in the Romanian economy since 2011. This is a match-made-in-heaven since Romania has highly-trained labor force in the field of IT&C and China is looking to absorb as much knowledge and expertise as possible in this sector. Moreover, the IT&C sector is of strategic interests to China, an issue which is discussed in greater detail in the next section of this analysis.
6. Tourism – Romania is interested to attract as large a number as possible from the 5 million Chinese tourists that are forecasted to visit Europe in the next decade or so.
7. Heavy industry – Romania is interested to attract Chinese investment in the state-owned and bankrupt Oltchim industrial complex.
8. Cultural interests

Cultural exchanges are increasingly important, too. China has opened four Confucius Institutes^[15] in Romania already and, in 2015, Romania is programmed to open its first Romanian Cultural Institute in Beijing. Also, there is an increasing interest in educational exchanges (student exchanges, joint university research projects, etc.).

and

Second-track diplomacy – On the occasion of the latest 16+1 summit in Belgrade in 2014, the parties endorsed a Romanian proposal for the establishment of a network of think tanks and research institutes that are to meet regularly and cooperate on scientific projects. The first meeting of this new collaborative format is to take place in Beijing in 2015.

China’s interests for engaging Romania

Following the 18^th Communist Party’s Congress of September-October 2014, the Chinese leadership under Xi Jinping has decided the Chinese development model – also known as socialism with Chinese characteristics – needs to enter a new stage of development. More specifically, China is to undergo a profound transformation of its socio-economic development and modernization model marked by (a) a transformation from an export-based economic growth model to a sustainable domestic consumption-based one; and (b) a transformation from a manufacture and unqualified labor-based economic model to a highly technological and industrially innovative one (what the Chinese like to refer to as the change from “made in China” to “produced/developed in China”).

Since Romania became an EU and NATO member, China has increasingly demonstrated interest in Romania (and, in 2015 has publicly spoken of a greater role for Romania in China’s regional strategy, to ensure:

Access to the European market. China regards Romania as a potential entry point and market for Chinese goods, a source of European high-tech, as well as a potential supporter/promoter (alongside other regional governments) of larger Chinese import quotas in the EU and of closer EU-China relations. However, to keep a low-profile, Beijing prefers to work through joint-ventures in Romania and other CEE states. As of September 2013, there were as many as 11,000 Chinese-Romanian joint-ventures registered in Romania which bring in a reported $400 million annually^[16] (with the annual Chinese FDI flowing into Romania and in other countries in the region being very uneven – see Fig. 2 below).

Mapping China’s M&A projects with a deal value higher than EUR 77.7 million (USD 100 million) in Europe, 1995-2013) Source: Heritage Foundation apud EU SME Centre, “Chinese Outward Foreign Direct Investment in the EU” (2013), p. 3.

Access to the expanding Romanian market. Romania has the fastest growing economy in CEE (with the exception of Poland in 2008-2013), with average annual growth rates of 8% between 2000-2008 and average 2.5-3% growth rates since 2012.^[17]

Access to EU funds for new member states. Romania has access to significant funds for economic areas in which China is interested – i.e. infrastructure development/modernization, services (banking, medical, energy efficiency, and education). Due to Romanian prudence in dealings with Chinese businessmen and EU restrictive regulations for allocating structural and cohesion funds, bilateral contracts are negotiated at a very slow pace. The Chinese are frequently accusing Romania of stalling the process, of discriminatory and nontransparent practices^[18] which constitutes a serious bilateral relations problem. However, these kinds of problems seem to be emerging in Chinese relations with all governments in the region. In interviews with Chinese officials and scholars in 2009 and 2014/5 respectively, they invoked a similar set of issues arising in relation to CEE countries, particularly Poland, Czech Republic and Romania: high suspicion to Chinese companies, a tendency to delay visas for Chinese entrepreneurs, over-emphasis on EU regulations as a means of masking a preference for domestic or Western companies implementing contracts, discriminatory conditions on contracts meant to limit access of Chinese companies to said contracts, unstable fiscal policies.

Access to CEE energy markets. Romania is the only CEE country with viable chances at energy independence – having already the lowest level of energy dependence on Russian energy resources and the largest shale gas reserves in CEE after the Poland-Baltics field.^[19] China is very interested in participating in and funding energy infrastructure construction in Romania (both in fossil fuel and renewables). Shale gas is of growing interest to China who has expressed desire to participate in Romanian tenders.

Building political and economic goodwill for implementing the Chinese Silk Road Economic Beltway discussed above, and

Monitoring NATO and U.S. military facilities in Romania. With Romania being an important NATO member, which hosts not only two American military bases, but also the Deveselu ballistic missile defense site and, more recently, a NATO headquarters with pre-positioned military equipment, China is increasingly interested in following the developments of Romania’s security role in the region. In particular, the implications for its own access in the region.

Sources of friction

While Sino-Romanian economic relations are steadily developing, political relations are seriously lagging behind. There are concerns that these increased economic exchanges will put China in a position to exert political leverage on Romania, but these concerns are generally pushed aside by the governments in Bucharest. Romania’s MFA has repeatedly declared stronger economic engagements with China will not lead to changes in or conditioning of Romania’s “one China policy,” nor will they affect Romania’s support for the EU arms embargo against China.

However, it must be said that Romania was one of the first CEE countries to engage economically with Taiwan in 2013-2014. In 2013, the Romanian Parliament sent an official delegation to Taiwan to negotiate the deal – an incident which caused quite a stir in China that requested the Romanian ambassador to clarify the situation. Despite the reaffirmation of its commitment to the “one China policy”, the Romanian government refused to make more public statements on the matter and emphasized that its business agreement with Taiwan was not a matter of inter-state relations. Even so, the incident exposed just how sensitive the Chinese are to “one China policy”-related issues and how duplicitary they are in their expectations that Romania puts aside its democratic and liberal political principles in its dealings with China.

While not going so far as to actually refuse to meet with the Dalai Lama, as other regional states have done under Chinese pressures, the Romanian government at times seems receptive to Chinese political leverage, even at these relatively low levels. The current Social Democrat government in Bucharest seems less likely to emphasize the democratic dimension of Romanian foreign policy. For instance, the fact that the Romanian Prime Minister traveled to China during the Chinese government’s violent repelling of Hong Kong protests in 2014 (and still ongoing at the time of writing, albeit in a tamed form) shows that Bucharest tends to focus on pragmatic goals in relations with China rather than human rights and democratic standards.

Another source of friction seems to be over the Chinese community in Romania and Bucharest’s visa-issuing policy for Chinese nationals. China is recurrently accusing Bucharest of discriminatory visa-issuing policy towards Chinese citizens and investors, Romania issuing 10 times less visas for Chinese citizens (approx. 11,000 in 2013-2014) than other CEE countries (by comparison, Hungary issued approx. 115,000 visas in the same period).

More recently, cyber security has become a concern in bilateral relations as well. In line with the Western (EU and NATO Cyber Security Strategies), Romania’s 2014 Cyber Security Strategy considers China a source of potential cyber security challenges for Romanian national critical infrastructure grid and other Romanian secured sites (banking, corporate and national personal databases, etc.).^[20] In response to this, in 2014 the Chinese discourse towards Romania and all CEE countries has changed following the fourth round of the 18^th Communist Party meeting. It now emphasizes the fight against corruption, the consolidation of constitutionalism and the rule of law as well as a greater control of cyber crime originating from China.^[21]

Instead of a conclusion

The Sino-Romanian relationship is still in the early stages of being rebuilt, in a very different strategic circumstance than its historical beginnings and, as such, there are still important obstacles to overcome. Unlike in the Cold War period, when the relationship acquired a security dimension – all-too important for Romania in all its dealings with great powers – current Sino-Romanian relations are severely lacking the prospect of such a security dimension because of a series of incompatibilities concerning different political and economic development models as well as Romania’s clear and strong strategic partnership with the U.S. and membership in NATO. Moreover, in the context of the ongoing Ukrainian conflict (where Romania sees Russia as an aggressor power), a perceived strategic rapprochement between China and Russia diminishes Bucharest’s appetite for further strategic and politic engagement with China.

In light of these arguments, Romanian engagement with China is still optimistically prudent and profoundly entrenched in a strong coordination with the U.S. and EU pivots to Asia. While the Romanian exports to China have temporarily increased in 2013 and 2014 respectively, it is still uncertain whether they mark a sustainable trend in Sino-Romanian trade relations. The investigation of Chinese FDI in Romania (and indeed the CEE) over the last decade, leads to the conclusion that the flight risk of Chinese FDI in Romania remains very high. At the same time, during the process of enhancing economic cooperation, the known implicit exposure of the Romanian economy to Chinese markets is considerably without hope of reciprocation. Therefore, provided no more shifts occur in Romania’s economic conditions,^[22] it is unlikely that Romanian-Chinese relations will see a significant development in the short-term. At this moment, there are more divisive aspects in the bilateral relationship (political, ideological, human rights, etc.) than there are convergent ones (economic) which even on a technical level are slowed down by concerns which are just now starting to be addressed.

FOOTNOTES:

1. According to Anuarul Statistic National 2013 [National Annual Statistics 2013] (Bucharest: National Statistical Institute, 2014), p. 21. ↑
2. “Investitiile Straine Directe in Romania in anul 2013” [FDI in Romania in 2013] (Bucharest: National Bank of Romania and the National Statistical Institute, 2014), http://www.bnr.ro/Investitiile-straine-directe-%28ISD%29-in-Romania-3174.aspx, p. 12. ↑
3. Dr. Marta M. Golonka (ed.), “Partners or rivals? Part II: China and CEE – business and ethics” CEED Institute, Warsaw, 2012, http://ceedinstitute.org/report/1717. ↑
4. Ibidem. ↑
5. According to the German Marshall Fund Transatlantic Trends 2013, available online at http://trends.gmfus.org/transatlantic-trends/ (accessed February 26, 2015). ↑
6. For more details see “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21^st Century Maritime Silk Road” Issued by the National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, with State Council authorization, March 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2015-03/28/c_134105858.htm. ↑
7. “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: European Union Strategy for Danube Region” Brussels, COM(2010) 715, August 8, 2010, http://www.danube-region.eu/component/edocman/communication-of-the-commission-eusdr-pdf Also see “Commission Staff Working Document: Action Plan Accompanying document to the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: European Union Strategy for Danube Region” Brussels, SEC(2010) 1489, August 8, 2010, http://www.danube-region.eu/component/edocman/action-plan-eusdr-pdf ↑
8. Remarks by Secretary of State for Strategic Affairs within the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the occasion of Vice-Minister Zhu Li’s visit to Romania, March 2, 2015. ↑
9. The data is cross-checked against official data of the Romanian National Statistics Institute and the Chinese Customs data for 2011-2014. ↑
10. “China announces 8 Bln Euros investments in Romania”, Independent Balkan News Agency, November 26, 2013, http://www.balkaneu.com/china-announces-8-bln-euros-investments-romania/ ↑
11. Remarks by Chinese official during Chatham House discussion on the occasion of his official visit to Bucharest, March 2, 2015. ↑
12. This could possibly include a Chinese offer (currently under evaluation) to build an industrial park in Agigea, next to Constanta. ↑
13. China has made similar, albeit more expensive offers to Belarus in 2011. According to the signed contract, the Chinese are building a $30 billion-worth industrial park in Belarus, a project estimated to be completed in no less than 8 years, but definitely not longer than 2030. See “Belarus looks to China for investment in infrastructure” Financial Times, July 22, 2013, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/82589a6e-ef98-11e2-8229-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3XCnEZs9V ↑
14. According to the Romanian Trade and Industry Chamber’s 2014 Agriculture statistical data available in Romanian at http://ccir.ro/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/statistica-agricultura.pdf, p. 2-3. ↑
15. Confucius Institutes are China’s key instrument for disseminating the Chinese language and culture abroad. Their main function is cultural and educational exchanges, especially the learning of Chinese language in host countries. For more details, see http://www.chinesecio.com/ ↑
16. Radu Adrian, “Present, Past and Future” Nine O’Clock, November 24, 2013, http://www.nineoclock.ro/past-present-and-future/ ↑
17. “Raport privind Situatia Macroeconomica pe anul 2014 si proiectia acesteia pe anii 2015-2017” [Report on Romania’s Macroeconomic Situation and Projections for 2015-2017” (Bucharest: Ministry of Finance, 2015), p. 7. ↑
18. Romania’s successive procedures of contestation of public procurement contracts, long attribution processes, average project implementation periods of minimum 10 years, poor technical standards, lack of transparency, etc. act as a serious obstacle in relations with China. See “IMF Country Report No. 15/80” (Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 2015), p. 41. ↑
19. “Technically Recoverable Shale Oil and Shale Gas Resources: An Assessment of 137 Shale Formations in 41 Countries Outside the United States” (Washington D.C.: U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2013), pp. X-1/24. ↑
20. China, alongside Russia are the only countries in the world to be known for publicly developing and deploying offensive military cyber capabilities. According to The Military Balance 2014 (International Institute for Strategic Studies, London) and the Pentagon’s Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014. ↑
21. In 2014 the Chinese embassies across the CEE countries had specific directives to engage national audiences for presentations concerning the sheer levels of internet use in China. The overall purpose of these presentations was to highlight the fact that this high level of internet use in China is as much a risk for other countries as it is a vulnerability for China’s security itself. ↑

22. In particular, Romania and the CEE countries’ slowdown in economic and investment relations with Russia caused by the EU sanctions against Moscow and the Russian embargo against European food products or the growing political instability in the CEE countries determined by the rollback of democracy in this region (see Freedom House Report “Freedom in the World 2014”, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2014#.VVjZPs5RW01). ↑